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1.1 Motivation and Object of Research 
Two independent studies by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) 
estimate that EU member states lose between EUR 50 and 190 billion of annual revenues due 
to corporate tax avoidance (EPRS, 2015a, 2015b). There are two potential conclusions that 
could be drawn from this: Firstly, there is a problem related to the taxation of corporations and 
European policymakers should feel urged to respond adequately to it. Secondly, the bandwidth 
of the estimates suggests that there is a great deal of uncertainty about the extent and the severity 
of the problem. 
However, understanding the scope of aggressive corporate tax planning and its 
determinants and mechanisms should be of utmost priority for policymakers around the world. 
If companies pay little or no taxes on a systematical basis, the collection of public revenue and, 
consequently, the funding of worthwhile investments and public goods is at risk (For a global 
assessment, see Crivelli, De Mooij and Keen, 2016). Moreover, corporate tax avoidance has 
attracted increasing attention over the past decades and became a topic of major public and 
political interest. If companies do not contribute their fair share, why should citizens feel 
obliged to do so? Or put differently, why should civilians elect politicians or trust in authorities 
that tolerate such circumstances? In fact, several European parties, including the Greens and 
the Party of the European Socialists, address the public resentment when they stress the need 
for stricter corporate tax rules in their campaigns for the 2019 European parliament election.1 
Anecdotal evidence of multinational enterprises (MNEs) strongly affects the public 
perception of corporate tax aggressiveness as a whole (Lee, 2015). In particular, large U.S. 
MNEs have made the headlines due to their low tax burdens: For instance, Amazon.com Inc. 
did not pay a single cent of U.S. federal income taxes despite its accumulated profit of $16.8 
                                                 
1Press Release by the Greens (22/01/2019); available at: https://www.greens-efa.eu/en/article/press/vast-
differences-in-corporate-tax-rates-across-eu-shows-urgent-need-for-transparency-new-report/ and Press Release 
by PES (21/03/2018); available at https://www.pes.eu/en/news-events/news/detail/PES-welcomes-Commissions-
legislative-proposal-to-tax-digital-companies/. 
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billion in the fiscal years of 2017 and 2018.2 Other firms, like Google Inc. and Starbucks, 
exploited artificial international structures in order to relocate taxable profits from high- to low-
tax countries and paid less than 5 percent of taxes on their profits abroad.3 Moreover, the recent 
revelation of numerous tax scandals through confidential tax documents fueled the public 
debate: The Luxembourg Leaks in 2014, the Swiss Leaks in 2015 and the Panama Papers in 
2016 provided the public with sensible data regarding tax fraud and/ or reprehensible tax 
planning activities of individuals, companies and authorities (Huesecken and Overesch, 2015; 
Rettig, 2016). 
The good news is that public policymakers worldwide undertook coordinative efforts 
and have been developing reforms that aim at a more successful taxation of MNEs. The Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is intended to establish an international framework to combat tax 
avoidance of MNEs. The main ambition of the project is fixing tax law inconsistencies between 
countries that enabled corporations to shift profits from high to low-tax jurisdictions. The BEPS 
action plan comprises in total 15 action points, ranging from specific anti-avoidance rules, as 
the limitation of intra-group interest deduction or controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, to 
broader initiatives, as stricter disclosure regulation (OECD, 2015). In particular, increasing tax 
transparency (Action Plan 13) carries substantial hope in the combat against international tax 
avoidance. Contrary to many traditional anti-avoidance rules, mandated tax transparency, e.g. 
in form of a Country-by-Country-Reporting (CbCR) scheme, cannot be circumvented by 
corporations through alternative tax planning techniques. Tax transparency rules require the 
disclosure of key financial data – in particular actual tax expenses – and are intended to 
indirectly exert pressure on CEOs and CFOs of MNEs. Already in 2013, the European 
                                                 
2 Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (13/02/2019); available at: https://itep.org/amazon-in-its-prime-
doubles-profits-pays-0-in-federal-income-taxes/. 
3 Bloomberg (11/12/2012); available at https://www.gadgetsnow.com/it-services/How-Google-saved-2-billion-in-
income-tax/articleshow/17567959.cms and The Guardian (15/12/2015); available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/dec/15/starbucks-pays-uk-corporation-tax-8-millionpounds. 
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Commission mandated an independent, pioneering tax transparency initiative for the European 
financial sector, including CbCR (European Commission, 2013). Moreover, the European 
Commission presented its proposal for an Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD), which is 
scheduled to enter into force for all EU member states form January 2019 onwards (European 
Commission, 2016). But not only international organizations tackled the issue of corporate tax 
avoidance. Several governments, like the U.S. administration under Donald Trump, also 
reacted, partly in uncoordinated solo-efforts, with new anti-avoidance regulations over the last 
years. 
Whereas the taxpayers’ sentiment pressured the political action, the input for reforms 
must be based on sound knowledge regarding the systematic incentives, mechanisms and 
determinants of aggressive corporate tax planning. Tax researchers have been delivering such 
input: A large strand of literature examines how international company structures facilitate tax 
avoidance (e.g. Collins and Sheckleford, 2003; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Markle, 2016). In 
particular, the key role of affiliates in tax havens was analyzed in this context (e.g. Desai, Foley 
and Hines, 2006; Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009). Moreover, specific firm attributes have been 
identified as particular suitable for saving taxes: Grubert (2003) and Dischinger and Riedel 
(2011) show how firms systematically exploit intangibility in assets and higher Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditures for the reduction of their tax expense. De Simone, Mills and 
Stomberg (2014) emphasize the crucial factor of mobility in income for successful tax planning. 
Moreover, tax aggressive firms can be linked to higher debt financing (Graham and Tucker, 
2006), specific ownership structures (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010) and managers’ 
compensation (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012), among others. All this helps 
policymakers to design precisely targeted tax reforms and certain input is already embedded in 
the current regulations. 
Nonetheless, the secrecy of fiscal data and the complex interconnection between 
corporate tax and operational, accounting, financial and other strategical decision processes 
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complicates the identification of tax planning determinants. Even nine years after the call for 
more research on tax avoidance in the renowned literature review by Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010), there remains uncertainty regarding several aspects of the phenomenon. In particular, 
the question why only a limited number of corporations takes advantage of tax planning 
opportunities – the so called “undersheltering puzzle” (Weisbach, 2002) – still represents a 
pressing challenge for tax researchers. This shows that researchers most likely have not yet 
identified all related costs (or overestimated the benefits) of aggressive tax planning for 
corporations (Kim, McGuire, Savoy and Wilson, 2016).4 
This thesis aims at a better understanding of corporate tax avoidance, its empirical 
measurement and the evaluation of tools for policymakers in the global combat against it. The 
three independent essays address two challenging areas of tax research that have not been 
sufficiently examined yet. 
The first challenge lies in the measurement of corporate tax avoidance. Until today, there 
exists neither a uniform definition of corporate tax aggressiveness nor an academic consensus 
on how to measure it (Blouin, 2014). Instead, tax researchers apply numerous empirical proxies 
when examining the aggressiveness of corporate tax planning. However, Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010, p. 146) express that their “overarching concerns” are with the divergent proxies, their 
difficult validation and, most importantly, with the strength of the inference that can be made 
given the chosen proxies. So far, the literature has mostly neglected the effect of conceptual 
differences between distinct measures on the measurement outcome. Thus, investigating to 
what extent methodological choices affect the tax avoidance outcome is justified and helpful 
for future tax research. Moreover, the existing literature has not sufficiently stressed the risk of 
misinterpreting low tax expenses as necessary consequences of aggressive tax planning (Henry 
and Sansing, 2018; Drake, Hamilton and Lusch, 2018). As a matter of fact, corporations 
                                                 
4 Potential costs of tax avoidance could be reputational losses (Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock, 2014) or 
anticipated litigation through tax authorities (Wilson, 2009), among others. 
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occasionally have low tax expenses for justified reasons that are unrelated to intentional tax 
planning. Financial years before and after net operating losses (NOLs) represent such periods.5 
Thus, putting the measurement outcome into the perspective of NOLs is necessary for the 
correct documentation of tax planning activities. Lastly, tax avoidance researchers (and the 
public mind) sometimes tend to ignore firm-specific circumstances for the interpretation and 
extrapolation of their findings. Thus, drawing conclusions beyond distinct industries, tax-
jurisdictions and even firm characteristics is to be seen critically. In particular, MNEs that are 
headquartered and represented in different countries over the world cannot be compared with 
respect to their global tax burden without making further assumptions. Thus, information on 
the geographical distribution of firm activities should be incorporated in the measurement of 
international tax aggressiveness. This, however, was often not feasible due to data limitations.  
The second challenge for tax avoidance researchers is to give policymakers feedback on 
the effectiveness of their actions. The number of ongoing reforms bespeaks how seriously 
policymakers have come to take the issue of corporate tax avoidance. Nevertheless, whether 
the new legislations achieve their goals is still to be determined. Recent evidence suggests that 
prior regulation attempts have not effectively curbed corporate tax avoidance over the past 30 
years (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock, 2017). Corporations turn out to be quite 
flexible when confronted with new anti-avoidance rules (see e.g. Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber 
and Wamser, 2012; Nicolay, Nusser and Pfeiffer; 2017). Moreover, path-breaking reforms as 
the BEPS program have been, if at all, only a few years in place and, consequently, not been 
extensively examined yet. Thus, it is necessary to analyze how corporations respond to the new 
regulatory attempts in order to provide further guidance for effective policy-making 
(Dharmapala, 2014; OECD, 2014; Wilde and Wilson, 2018).  
                                                 
5 Corporations can take advantage of their accumulated tax loss carryforwards or carrybacks in several years before 
and after a net operating loss (Cooper and Knittel, 2006). 
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The three essays of this thesis aim to address existing knowledge gaps in the described 
areas of tax avoidance research. The first essay “The Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
in the Presence of Net Operating Losses” investigates how loss-observations in archival 
database research affect the measurement of corporate tax avoidance and how tax researchers 
can deal with it. I show that NOLs can meaningfully be included in the analysis by the use of 
certain tax avoidance proxies but only under given restrictions. Moreover, I document that the 
conventional removal of loss-years from tax researchers’ samples can have profound effects on 
the measurement outcome. In view of this, I revise trends in U.S. corporate tax avoidance 
documented by Dyreng, et al. (2017). The paper is single-authored and thus my sole 
responsibility. It was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in Cologne in February 2019. 
The second essay “Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance” is 
co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the University of Cologne and 
Tanja Krapat, former doctoral research assistant at the Chair of Business Taxation at the 
University of Cologne. We propose a new measure that isolates the additional or even 
aggressive part in international tax avoidance and analyze the determinants of aggressive tax 
avoidance of MNEs. Additionally, we show that our new measure can be used to condense the 
information provided by a tax transparency scheme. Based on a prior joint working paper, I was 
responsible for the collection and analysis of CbCR data and substantial revisions with regard 
to structural and empirical aspects. A previous version of the paper was presented at the 
Doctoral Research Seminar in Vienna 2014, the 37th European Accounting Association Annual 
Congress in Tallinn 2014, and the 4th EIASM Workshop on Current Research in Taxation in 
Muenster 2014. 
The thesis concludes with the essay ”Tax Transparency to the Rescue: Effects of 
Country-by Country Reporting in the EU Banking Sector on Tax Avoidance”, co-authored by 
Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the University of Cologne. The paper analyzes 
the effect of mandatory tax transparency on corporate tax avoidance in the European banking 
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sector. We find that particularly multinational banks with activities in tax havens increased their 
tax expense relative to other banks unaffected by the CbCR mandate. Our results suggest that 
CbCR can serve as an additional instrument for policy makers to curb corporate tax avoidance. 
During the project, I was responsible for data collection, the execution of all empirical analyses 
and structural revisions. The paper was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in Cologne 
2016, the 40th European Accounting Association Annual Congress in Valencia 2017, the 
Research School of International Taxation in Tuebingen 2017, the VHB Annual Conference in 
Magdeburg 2018, the IIPF Annual Congress in Tampere 2018, the Annual Meeting of the 
National Tax Association in New Orleans 2018, the Internal Research Seminar in Iowa City 
2018 and the CPB Tax Haven Workshop in The Hague 2018. 
1.2 The Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance in the Presence of Net Operating 
Losses 
1.2.1 Research Question and Design 
This article addresses the question whether loss-observations can be implemented in the 
measurement of corporate tax avoidance and analyzes how the handling of losses affects the 
measurement outcome. Tax avoidance researchers have two choices regarding the treatment of 
loss-observations: They either remove losses from the sample or include them by using specific, 
asset-scaled measures of corporate tax avoidance.6 One goal of this article is to inspect what 
new information is carried by studies that include losses and to which extent the enlarged 
sample coverage or conceptual differences between the applied measures determine the 
different outcomes. For this purpose, I compare the different measurement concepts of tax 
avoidance and discuss how the methodological choice affects the outcome. More precisely, I 
                                                 
6 Asset-scaled measures (e.g. Book-Tax-Differences) have the advantage over conventional profit-scaled measures 
(e.g. Effective Tax Rates) that the scalar is independent of pretax income, such that loss-observations can remain 
in the analysis. 
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measure U.S. industry tax avoidance and lay particular focus on the conceptual differences 
between profit- and asset-scaled measures of tax avoidance and the associated sample selection. 
Furthermore, this article highlights that the removal of loss-observations from tax 
researchers’ samples can have profound effects on the conceptual measurement of corporate 
tax avoidance. I document that one single financial loss does not only yield a non-meaningful 
effective tax rate (ETR) for the loss-year itself, but is also accompanied by misleading annual 
tax expenses before and after loss-years that are unlikely to signal tax planning. Consequently, 
even studies that remove loss-observations from the sample deal with abnormal tax expenses 
that could erroneously be interpreted as tax avoidance. In view of this, I revise the declining 
trend in CASH ETR for U.S. domestic firms detected by Dyreng et al. (2017) with respect to 
loss-observations. I replicate the original analysis but interact the main variable of interest, the 
time trend, with a variable that captures the firm-specific loss-intensity in the sample prior to 
data cleaning. This way, I differentiate the time trend between profitable and non-profitable 
firms. 
1.2.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
I find that the systematic inclusion of loss-observations in the measurement of corporate 
tax avoidance is feasible but only under certain conditions. My descriptive results suggest that 
asset-scaled measures label less-profitable firms more tax aggressive than profit-scaled 
measures, which origins from a scaling induced bias, firstly discussed by Guenther (2014). 
Hence, NOLs can only be meaningfully included in the samples of tax researchers when the 
ratio of pretax income (in profitable years) to book/market value of assets is comparable among 
firms and over time. Moreover, the intake of loss-observations changes the samples of tax 
researchers substantially. The newly gained loss-observations in Compustat are concentrated 
within a remarkably smaller, shorter-lived and younger subset of frequently unprofitable firms. 
Firms that continuously report negative earnings yield little, if not any, information content in 
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terms of tax avoidance. Thus, tax researchers should be clear on whether they would like to 
include such specific firms in their analyses. 
Additionally, I show that the underlying NOL structure in the data matters for the 
assessment of corporate tax avoidance even after the removal of loss-observations from the 
sample. I control for the initial loss-structure of firms in the research design of Dyreng et al. 
(2017) and observe that the decline in CASH ETR of domestic U.S.-firms is to some part 
attributable to distorted tax expenses that are linked to the loss-structure in the data. I document 
that profitable domestic U.S.-corporations did not engage in more aggressive tax planning 
activities over the years of their existence. This finding is new because so far abnormal ETR 
values of loss-making firms insinuated that domestic firms as a whole became more tax 
aggressive. 
This study contributes to the tax avoidance literature in several ways. It is the first study, 
to my knowledge, that explores the sample selection linked to different proxies of tax avoidance 
and their respective measurement outcome. Second, it adds knowledge to the understanding of 
loss-firms and their characteristics, frequency and patterns in the Compustat database (Teoh 
and Zhang, 2011; Klein and Marquardt, 2006). Most importantly, this is the first study to show 
how the handling of NOLs affects the measurement of corporate tax avoidance: Either through 
a scaling-induced profitability bias when applying asset-scaled measure or the contamination 
of neighboring observations even after the removal of actual loss years from the sample. Lastly, 
this article contributes to the ongoing discussion about trends in U.S. corporate tax avoidance 
(Dyreng et al., 2017; Henry and Sansing, 2018). 
1.3 Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance 
1.3.1 Research Question and Design 
The second essay “Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance” 
proposes a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax avoidance of MNEs. The 
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public debate about corporate tax aggressiveness has been fueled by anecdotal evidence on low 
ETRs of MNEs. As statutory tax rates on corporate income are significantly higher in most 
industrialized countries, this creates a gap between disclosed tax positions and common 
expectations about the tax level imposed. Nevertheless, MNEs pay their taxes in all countries 
of operation and consequently face a spectrum of different statutory tax rates. Thus, we propose 
a measure of international tax avoidance that isolates more aggressive international tax planning 
from the influence of moderate tax rates in host countries. 
Our new measure ETRDIFF is computed as the difference between the average of the 
statutory tax rates imposed by all countries worldwide that host a subsidiary and the ETR. A 
firm is classified as more tax aggressive if the gap between its ETR and its expected benchmark 
tax level according to the average statutory tax rate increases. We compute the ETRDIFF 
measure for the S&P 500 firms over a period from 2002 to 2012 by combining information of 
the location of subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k and Compustat data. For the 
manual collection of the statutory tax rates we use the worldwide corporate tax summaries of 
PwC, KPMG and E&Y. We also validate our measure with established proxies for international 
tax avoidance. In particular, we compare subsamples of firms with intense tax haven operations, 
firms with intense R&D activities and income mobile firms. Furthermore, we examine in 
multivariate regressions the impact of specific firm characteristics and international tax 
planning strategies, such as tax haven operations and profit-shifting opportunities, on our new 
measure.  
In additional analyses, we collect information regarding the geographical distribution of 
corporate activities in order to refine our measure: First, we weight the host countries’ statutory 
tax rates by sales of a typical U.S. foreign subsidiary (adjusted ETRDIFF). Next, we undertake 
a case-study approach in a specific industry where disclosure regulation provides valuable 
detailed data on geographical activities. In 2014 a European directive obliged financial 
institutions to publicly disclose key financial and tax information on a country-by-country level 
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for the first time in history. We exploit this - so far unique- data and compute a refined 
ETRDIFF measure for the largest European banks. This application shows that our measure 
can be used to condense the data set provided by a CbCR. 
1.3.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
For our sample of US firms from 2002 until 2012, we find an average FOREIGN 
ETRDIFF of approximately 5 percentage points. This suggests that U.S. firms undercut the 
mean of all foreign statutory tax rates clearly. Hence, U.S. MNEs in our sample appear to 
engage in aggressive tax planning that goes beyond the mere benefitting from moderate 
corporate tax rates. We also validate our measure with established proxies for international tax 
avoidance. Our analysis shows that larger tax haven operations or the enhanced opportunities 
to manipulate transfer prices are clearly associated with a higher value of our ETRDIFF 
measure. The results remain robust when we approximate the economic relevance of the foreign 
subsidiaries by sales data. Lastly, we apply our new measure to country-by-country data of 
European banks and revise the perception of their international tax aggressiveness. While some 
banks have substantial operations in countries with moderate corporate tax rates and 
consequently pay less taxes (e.g. Credit Agricole) other banking groups manage to pay less 
taxes globally despite their predominant activities in high tax countries (e.g. HSBC). Overall, 
the perception of EU banks’ tax avoidance changes substantially when the public mind 
benchmarks the banks’ tax payments against the expected tax liability in all countries of 
operation. 
The findings contribute to the recent debate about base erosion and profit shifting. The 
OECD requests new measures to analyze the scope and the determinants of base erosion and 
profit shifting (OECD, 2014). The methodology proposed in this paper allows to isolate the 
aggressive part of international tax avoidance and to identify important determinants such as 
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tax haven usage and opportunities to manipulate transfer prices. Moreover, the applications in 
this article emphasize the value of enhanced data availability through tax transparency. 
1.4 Financial Transparency to the Rescue: Effects of Country-by-Country Reporting 
in the EU Banking Sector on Tax Avoidance 
1.4.1 Research Question and Design 
The third essay “Tax Transparency to the Rescue: Effects of Country-by-Country 
Reporting in the EU Banking Sector on Tax Avoidance” analyzes the effect of mandatory tax 
transparency on corporate tax avoidance. In recent years, policy makers have been discussing 
comprehensive tax transparency as a key strategy for combating international tax avoidance 
(OECD, 2015). Corporate tax transparency rules require the disclosure of key financial data—
in particular actual tax expenses—and are intended to indirectly curb tax aggressiveness by 
exerting pressure on CEOs and CFOs of MNEs. Until now, most tax transparency initiatives 
have not yet been fully implemented and the existing ones do not make the collected data 
available to the public. Consequently, the effectiveness of tax transparency policy is largely 
unknown.  
The Capital Requirements Directive IV by the European Commission from 2013 forced 
multinational banks to publish key financial and tax data in the form of Country-by-Country 
Reporting for the first time in history. We use this event as an exogenous shock to the disclosure 
duties of European banks and examine tax expenses around the reform. More precisely, we 
apply several independent Difference in Differences approaches in order to quantify the impact 
of tax transparency on affected multinational EU banks relative to several control groups: 
Domestic EU banks, multinational U.S. banks, EU insurance companies and large European 
manufacturing corporations. For comparisons outside the EU banking sector, we apply 
propensity-score matching with respect to firm size and profitability to ensure comparability 
between the firms. Additionally we apply various robustness checks and install several placebo 
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treatments in order to disentangle the effect from tax transparency from other regulatory 
changes over time. 
1.4.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
Our results suggest that European multinational banks experienced a significant increase 
in their effective tax levels after the regulation, relative to unaffected banks. In particular, we 
find that the multinational banks, which are most exposed to the newly demanded transparency 
through the revelation of their activities in tax havens, reacted the strongest to the mandatory 
disclosure of CbCR. Banks with activities in tax havens increased their ETR by 3.6 percentage 
points relative to the other banks in our sample. In additional comparisons, we checked our 
results against trends in corporate tax avoidance, both in the financial sector and across other 
industries. This further analysis reveals a response only in the European banking sector. We 
also dismiss other regulatory influences embedded in the Basel III framework as alternative 
explanations. Ultimately, our results suggest that European multinational banks responded to 
the new transparency and did not simply follow a general trend in the financial sector or in 
international tax avoidance.  
We contribute to prior literature, which suggests that disclosure of additional 
information about the international firm structure influences the scope of international tax 
avoidance (e.g. Hope, Ma and Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2016). We add to 
this literature by analyzing the impact of the first comprehensive, supranational tax 
transparency initiative on tax avoidance behavior of MNEs. Our findings suggest that CbCR 
can be an additional effective instrument for policy makers to curb cross-border corporate tax 
planning. 
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This article addresses the question whether net operating loss (NOL) observations can be 
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affects the measurement outcome. I find that the implementation of NOLs in the measurement 
of tax avoidance is feasible but only under certain restrictions. If researchers control for the 
confounding effect of firm-profitability and heterogeneous characteristics of non-prospering 
firms, losses can meaningfully be included in the analysis by the use of asset-scaled proxies. 
When researchers decide to remove net operating losses from their sample, they should be 
aware of misleading tax expenses before and after loss-years that remain in the sample and do 
not signal tax planning. In view of this, I re-examine trends in aggregate U.S. corporate tax 
avoidance documented by Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew and Thornock (2017) and find that the 
loss structure in the data partly conceals the true development of U.S. domestic firms’ corporate 
tax planning. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Tax Avoidance; Losses; Effective Tax Rates; Book-Tax-Differences 
JEL Classification: H25, H26, H32, M41 
 
 
  
                                                 
* I am thankful to Casimir Carl, Birgit Huesecken, Michael Overesch, and Max Pflitsch for their helpful comments. 
21 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Tables ....................................................................................................................................... 22 
Figures ..................................................................................................................................... 22 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2 Related Literature ......................................................................................................... 26 
2.3 Including NOLs in the Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance ........................ 30 
2.3.1 Conceptual Comparison of Tax Avoidance Measures...................................... 30 
2.3.2 Sample Selection of Different Tax Avoidance Measures .................................. 34 
2.3.3 Determining Industry Tax Avoidance with Different Measures ....................... 40 
2.3.4 The Information Content of NOLs for Tax Avoidance Research ...................... 43 
2.4 Excluding NOLs from the Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance .................. 44 
2.4.1 The Distortion of ETR values before and after Loss Years .............................. 45 
2.4.2 Re-examining Trends in U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance ................................. 47 
2.4.3 Discussion of Results ........................................................................................ 59 
2.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 61 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 64 
References ............................................................................................................................... 69 
 
  
22 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection Characteristics by Tax Avoidance Measure .................................. 37 
Table 2: Industry Tax Avoidance Ranking by Selected Measures .......................................... 41 
Table 3: Loss Coverage in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample .................................................... 49 
Table 4: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Losses over Time ...................................................... 52 
Table 5: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Losses over Firm Age ............................................... 56 
Table 6: Corporate Tax Avoidance of Permanently Profitable Firms ..................................... 58 
Table A1: Variable Definitions ................................................................................................ 64 
Table A2: Complete Industry Tax Avoidance Ranking by Selected Measures ....................... 65 
Table A3: Industry Sample Selection by Tax Avoidance Measure ......................................... 66 
Table A4: Sample Characteristics of One-Loss-Year Sample ................................................. 66 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Availability of Tax Avoidance Measures in Compustat ........................................... 35 
Figure 2: Loss Frequency and Firm Lifetime ........................................................................... 39 
Figure 3: Industry Tax Avoidance by Selected Measures ........................................................ 42 
Figure 4: CASH ETR and GAAP-ETR Deviation around the Loss Year ............................... 46 
Figure 5: Average Cash ETR over Time .................................................................................. 50 
Figure 6: Average Cash ETR over Firm Age ........................................................................... 55 
Figure A1: The Difference between Firm Age and Time ........................................................ 67 
Figure A2: Compustat Coverage of Tax Aggressive Industries over Time ............................. 67 
Figure A3: Market Capitalization over Time ........................................................................... 68 
  
23 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The majority of tax researchers ignores loss-observations when measuring corporate tax 
avoidance. However, net operating losses (NOLs) in the Compustat database have become 
substantially more prevalent, persistent, and larger in magnitude since the 1970s (Denis and 
McKeon, 2016). In fact, 41 percent of all annual Compustat U.S. firm observations since the 
year 2000 represent negative earnings. Thus, it is difficult for tax researchers to further ignore 
losses without explaining why. The empirical measurement of corporate tax avoidance relies 
on multiple proxies. Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) and Book-Tax-Differences (BTDs) are the two 
most fundamental measurement concepts and often appear together in research designs. (e.g. 
Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009; Lennox, Lisowsky and Pittman, 2013). Both measures are 
closely related but differ with respect to their scalars: ETRs are always scaled by firm profits 
whereas BTDs are most commonly scaled by book value of firm assets (Guenther, 2014). Thus, 
negative earnings lead to ETR realizations that are difficult to interpret.7 Contrary, BTD can be 
constructed for loss-firms because its scalar is independent of the sign of reported earnings. 
Yet, the usage of loss-observations in BTD research is not consistent: The majority of BTD 
studies did not to include loss-observations in the sample due to an overall skepticism towards 
their information content. (e.g. Hanlon, 2005; Blaylock, Shevlin and Wilson, 2012).  
Henry and Sansing (2018) have reacted to this and developed the first cash-based 
measure of tax avoidance which is constructed to generate meaningful values for both profitable 
and loss-firms.8 When applying their measure, Henry and Sansing (2018) find contradicting 
results to prior literature which exclusively relied on profitable subsamples. Many industries 
that appear to be tax-favored in profitable samples are actually tax-disfavored when losses are 
included in the analysis. Moreover, the authors revise the results of Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew 
                                                 
7 A firm with a tax expense of 35 but a pretax loss of 100 would have the same ETR as a firm with a tax refund of 
35 and positive pretax income of 100 (Henry and Sansing, 2018). 
8 I use HS2018 when referring to the tax avoidance measure developed in Henry and Sansing (2018) and Henry 
and Sansing (2018) when referring to the published article, itself. 
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and Thornock (2017) who document a trend in increasing tax avoidance over time. Dyreng et 
al. (2017) detect a declining trend in ETR for both multinational and domestic firms between 
1988 and 2012. In contrast, Henry and Sansing (2018) find that the tax avoidance of domestic 
U.S.-firms decreased over time when unprofitable observations remain in the sample. The 
documented decline in profit-scaled ETR for domestic firms has been discussed by other 
researchers, as well: Schwab, Stomberg and Xia (2018) assess GAAP ETR as an unsuitable 
measure of corporate tax avoidance for poorly performing firms. In line with Drake, Hamilton 
and Lusch (2018), they document that the metric of GAAP ETR frequently suffers from 
substantial distortions, triggered among others by the release of valuation allowances and the 
impairment of non-tax deductible goodwill, which are both frequent events for loss-firms. Thus, 
Drake et al. (2018) argue that the downward trend in domestic firms’ ETRs is to a large part 
attributable to firm losses, their truncation from the data in ETR-research and subsequent 
releases of valuation allowances.  
Given the amount of studies that posit a reconsideration of established results from the 
ETR literature, it is necessary to gain a deeper understanding of loss-observations and their 
information content for the measurement of tax avoidance. It is of particular interest to inspect 
what new information is carried by studies that include loss-observations and whether the 
extended sample coverage or conceptual differences between the applied proxies determine the 
different outcomes. 
First, I compare different methods for tax researchers to include loss-firms in the 
measurement of corporate tax avoidance and discuss how the methodological choice affects the 
outcome. My descriptive results indicate that the intake of loss-observations changes the 
samples of tax researchers substantially: Using BTD (HS2018) instead of CURRENT ETR 
(CASH ETR) increases sample size up to 43.1 percent (28.1 percent) and the newly gained loss-
observations in Compustat are concentrated within a remarkably smaller, shorter-lived and 
younger subset of continuously unprofitable firms. Therefore, I argue that tax researchers 
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should distinguish between infrequent loss years of usually profitable firms and losses 
accumulated by steadily unprofitable firms. The latter are eventually unlikely to create future 
tax benefits due to impending bankruptcy of the firms and thus difficult to interpret when 
measuring tax avoidance. Ultimately, my findings suggest that asset-scaled BTDs - and the 
novel HS2018 measure- label less-profitable industries more tax aggressive than ETRs, which 
origins from a scaling induced profitability bias, first discussed by Guenther (2014). Thus, it is 
possible to analyze the tax planning of both, profitable and unprofitable firms, but only if the 
confounding factor of firm-profitability and the heterogeneous characteristics of non-
prospering firms are controlled for. 
Second, I show that the removal of loss-observations from tax researchers’ samples can 
have profound effects on the measurement of corporate tax avoidance, as well. I document that 
one single financial loss does not only yield a non-meaningful ETR for the loss-year itself, but 
is also accompanied by misleading annual tax expenses before and after loss-years that are 
unlikely to signal tax planning. Consequently, even studies that remove loss-observations from 
the sample deal with distorted ETR values that could falsely be interpreted as tax avoidance. In 
view of this, I revise the declining trend in CASH ETR for domestic firms detected by Dyreng 
et al. (2017) with respect to loss-observations. In the beginning, I show that the Compustat 
coverage of more recent generations of low-tax firms contributes substantially to the 
documented cross-sectional decline in CASH ETR. In fact, the tax planning of older U.S.-firms 
increased over the years, too, but at a lower rate than initially supposed. Most importantly, I 
observe that the decline in CASH ETR over the lifespan of domestic U.S.-firms is attributable 
to distorted ETR values that can be linked to the loss-structure in the data. Hence, domestic 
U.S.-corporations did not engage in more aggressive tax planning activities over their existence. 
In contrast, U.S.-multinationals truly became more tax aggressive. 
This study contributes to the tax avoidance literature in several ways. It is the first study, 
to my knowledge, that explores the sample selection linked to different proxies of tax avoidance 
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and their respective measurement outcome. Second, it adds knowledge to the understanding of 
loss-firms and their characteristics, frequency and patterns in the Compustat database. Most 
importantly, this is the first study to show how the handling of NOLs affects the measurement 
of corporate tax avoidance: Either through a scaling-induced profitability bias when applying 
BTD/HS2018 or the contamination of neighboring ETR values even after the removal of actual 
loss years from the sample. Thus, NOLs always affect the measurement of corporate tax 
avoidance. Lastly, this article contributes to the ongoing discussion about trends in U.S. 
corporate tax avoidance. I link the underlying loss-structure in the data to measured trends in 
tax avoidance and find that domestic and multinational U.S.-corporations evolved differently 
with respect to successful tax planning. This finding is new because so far abnormal ETR values 
of loss-making firms insinuated that domestic firms became more tax aggressive over their 
existence, too. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 delivers an overview over 
the tax literature dealing with NOLs. Section 3 compares different methods for tax researchers 
to include NOLs in the measurement of corporate tax avoidance and the respective 
consequences for the measurement outcome. Section 4 analyzes how the omission of loss-
observations affects the measurement of tax avoidance and revises long run trends in U.S. 
corporate tax avoidance. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Related Literature 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p.129) point out: “[…] we do not have a very good 
understanding of loss-firms, the utilization and value of tax-loss carryforwards, and how the 
existence of losses affects the behavior […] of any of the involved parties”. This incentivized 
tax researchers to closely explore loss-firms, their attributes and the informative content of 
accounting information related to losses. 
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A substantial body of research stresses the informative value of tax loss carry-forwards 
(TLCFs) for future firm performance. Dhaliwal, Kaplan, Laux and Weisbrod (2013) suggest 
that the recognition of a deferred tax asset valuation allowance – a discretionary accounting 
judgment that increases net income based on estimated future tax benefit realizations – provides 
incremental information about the persistence of future losses. Thus, investors should pay 
attention to such an event. McGuire, Neuman, Olson and Omer (2016) analyze the investors' 
valuation of new TLCFs and find that it varies with firms' prior tax avoidance behavior. This is 
because former tax avoidance signals firms' abilities to generate taxable income to offset TLCF 
through tax planning. Finley and Ribal (2018) confirm the informative value of the valuation 
allowance release decision but suggest that investors are not timely responding to it. Besides 
future performance, Edwards (2017) and Watson (2018) link the existence of deferred tax 
valuation allowances to firms’ creditworthiness. Moreover, Flagmeier (2017) finds that the 
predictive ability of deferred tax valuation allowances persists even when it is not recognized 
(as under US GAAP) but instead solely mentioned in the footnote (as under IFRS). However, 
the complexity of the accounting for deferred taxes and respective costs have been criticized 
(Laux, 2013) and some researchers find that the implementation of deferred taxes into common 
forecasting approaches even worsens the prediction performance (Dreher, Eichfelder and Noth, 
2017).  
At the same time, data quality appears to be a major issue when analyzing TLCF. 
Several scholars emphasize that the readily-available proxies for NOLs, in databases as 
Compustat, suffer from considerable measurement error (e.g. Mills, Newberry and Novack, 
2003). Heitzman and Lester (2017) develop a measure on basis of hand-collected data, which 
is superior to the traditional proxy in predicting cash tax shields on future earnings. Rechbauer 
(2016) confirms that database-driven methods do not perform well in predicting the availability 
of TLCFs for Italian firms. Lastly, given the great deal of uncertainty about the future gains 
from TLCF, Sarkar (2014) proposes a novel contingent-claim model to value this asset. Recent 
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work by Leung and Veenman (2018) analyzes the informative value of non-GAAP earnings 
disclosures (in press releases) for loss-firms and finds that they are significantly more predictive 
and less strategic than for profit firms. This suggests that loss-firms can help their investors to 
disaggregate GAAP losses into components that have differential implications for the firm by 
distributing information outside financial reporting. 
Second, there exist studies that analyze how firms take actions in order to maximize 
their tax loss benefits. Maydew (1997) finds that firms appear to report larger losses when the 
relative tax benefit of the carryback, measured by the tax rate differential before and after the 
1986 tax reform, is larger. Albring, Dhaliwal, Khurana and Pereira (2011) observe that a 
reduction in the NOL carryback period in the Taxpayer Relief Act 1997 incentivized firms to 
shift income to accelerate loss recognition in the tax year 1997. Erickson, Heitzman and Zhang 
(2013) document that firms manage their loss reporting in order to claim a cash refund of recent 
tax payments before the option to do so expires. Furthermore, they show that analysts do not 
incorporate tax-motivated loss shifting which leads to higher forecasting error. A large share of 
firms is known for exercising certain rights plans (so called “poison pills”) as a tool to preserve 
net TLCF (Erickson and Heitzman, 2010). Interestingly, Sikes, Tian and Wilson (2014) 
document a broadly negative market response to the announcement of such right plans and 
argue that investors do not believe that pills are usually adopted to preserve a valuable tax asset 
but instead to entrench management. 
Lastly, there exists a growing number of studies that re-evaluate and newly interpret 
established findings from the tax avoidance literature by explicitly including (and focusing on) 
loss-observations in the analyses. As Denis and McKeon (2016) indicate, operating losses in 
the Compustat database have become substantially more prevalent, persistent and larger in 
magnitude since the 1970s. The extent of loss-firms ranges between 30 and 50 percent of all 
available yearly observations, which makes it understandable why scholars argue that it might 
not be reasonable to exclude such a large share of firms. This holds in particular when 
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examining the variation in average corporate tax planning across the total population of firms. 
As mentioned before, Henry and Sansing (2018) develop their own measure of cash tax 
avoidance that produces meaningful values for losses, and re-evaluate the findings of Dyreng 
et al. (2017) on changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years. Henry and 
Sansing (2018) conclude that domestic firms have – contrary to the original analysis – become 
more tax-disfavored over time. This re-examination builds on the argument of Teoh and Zhang 
(2011) that the trimming of loss-observations in accounting studies might cause a downward 
truncation bias in estimated mean returns that is stronger in ex ante subsamples with more loss-
firms.  
Cooper and Knittel (2006, 2010) analyze U.S. tax return data and find that firms can 
incur significant penalties from the US corporate loss regime due to the lag between the 
generation of a tax loss and its utilization. They estimate the time delay in loss-utilization up to 
ten financial years after the actual loss. This underlines that low tax expenses several years after 
the event of a loss can origin from delayed TLCFs and, thus, do not necessarily signal 
aggressive tax planning. Guenther (2011) analyzes in detail 113 “unusual observations” from 
the research setup of Hanlon (2005) and indicates that despite Hanlon's diligent attempt to 
eliminate observations with TLCF, one third of those unusual observations report deferred tax 
assets related to TLCF. Thus, Guenther (2011) concludes that the utilization of TLCFs should 
not be interpreted as an actual BTD, supposedly triggered by earnings management and/or tax 
avoidance. Kohlhase (2016) investigates this link in detail by disaggregating the positive 
association between TLCFs and BTDs and finds that only so-called “double picture firms” with 
positive pretax income but negative taxable income explain the association between temporary 
BTDs and TLCFs.  
Schwab et al. (2018) more generally evaluate GAAP ETR as a measure of corporate tax 
avoidance for poorly performing firms. In line with Drake et al. (2018), they document that the 
metric of GAAP ETR frequently suffers from substantial distortions and could be misleading 
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when it is used to proxy tax avoidance. Two events triggering such distorted GAAP ETRs are 
the release of valuation allowance and the impairment of non-tax deductible goodwill, which 
are both frequent events for loss-firms. Drake et al. (2018) argue that the documented downward 
trend in domestic firms’ ETRs is to a large part attributable to decreases in the valuation 
allowance account of domestic firms and hence should not be interpreted as tax avoidance.9  
2.3 Including NOLs in the Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance  
In the following, I discuss different methods for tax researchers to include loss-
observations for the assessment of tax aggressiveness. It is of particular interest to inspect what 
new information is carried by studies that include losses and to what extent the enlarged sample 
coverage or conceptual differences between the applied measures determine the different 
outcomes. For this purpose, I elaborate the differences between profit- and asset-scaled 
measures of tax avoidance. Next, I show how the choice of tax avoidance measure affects the 
composition of tax researchers’ Compustat samples. Then, I examine how the perception of 
U.S. industry tax avoidance changes when using asset-scaled BTD/ HS2018 instead of profit-
scaled ETR on an identical sample. Lastly, I discuss the information content of loss-
observations and when it is useful to incorporate them in the analysis of corporate tax 
avoidance. 
2.3.1 Conceptual Comparison of Tax Avoidance Measures 
ETRs and BTDs represent probably the two most frequently used measurement concepts 
for tax avoidance and often appear together in research designs (e.g. Chen, Chen, Cheng and 
Shevlin, 2010; Lennox et al., 2013). Both measures are closely related but differ with respect 
to their scalars: ETRs are always scaled by firm profits whereas BTDs are most commonly 
                                                 
9 Since the majority of decreases in the valuation allowance takes place in profitable years and the increases in 
valuation allowance in loss years, the exclusion of only the latter in tax studies leads to a downwards bias in GAAP 
ETR (Drake et al., 2018). 
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scaled by firm assets (Guenther, 2014). Thus, negative earnings lead to ETR realizations that 
are difficult to interpret. Contrary, BTDs can incorporate loss-firms because its scalar is 
independent of the sign of reported earnings. 
ETR is computed as a measure of tax expense divided by pretax financial income. There 
exists a number of potential ways to measure tax expenses, which leads to different expressions 
of ETR. A widely used version of ETR is GAAP ETR (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff, 
2013) with total tax expenses representing the numerator. Total tax expenses include current 
and deferred taxes. Thus, GAAP ETR provides information to stakeholders about the amounts, 
timing and uncertainty of current and future tax payments (Demere, Li, Lisowsky and Snyder, 
2017). The CURRENT ETR differs from GAAP ETR as it relies exclusively on current tax 
expense and hence is unaffected by future tax payments. Lastly, CASH ETR describes the ratio 
of cash tax paid to pretax income of a given year.10 CASH ETR supposedly reflects all tax 
planning strategies, including those missed by accrual based measures, and has therefore been 
used extensively by tax researchers (Dyreng et al., 2017). Given the parallel structure, all 
expressions of ETR describe the respective average tax rate payable/paid for one unit of 
financial income (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2010; Frank et al., 2009; Gupta and Newberry, 
1997).  
 
Per definition, ETR measures indicate which firms manage to have a low tax burden in 
relation to their profits. Thus, ETRs do not capture conforming tax avoidance strategies which 
lower both, the tax expense and the book income (Badertscher, Katz, Rego and Wilson, 2015). 
                                                 
10 Therefore CASH ETR does not reflect taxes accrued in the current period but tax payments accrued in prior 
periods or advance tax payments (Lee, Dobiyanski, and Minton, 2015; Lennox et al., 2013). 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =  
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒/𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑃𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
     (Eq.1) 
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By way of contrast, BTD is computed as the total difference between financial and 
approximated taxable income and scaled by a firm’s pretax total assets (Manzon Jr and Plesko, 
2002). Due to the fiscal secrecy, the true taxable income stated on a firm’s tax return is not 
publicly available and thus commonly approximated by dividing the firm’s current tax expense 
by the statutory tax rate (𝜏).11 
 
Large BTDs describe situations where the approximated taxable income is lower than 
the book income, suggesting that taxes are successfully avoided and/or earnings are managed 
upwards without generating additional tax liability. Importantly, the choice of assets as a scalar 
for BTDs allows to retrieve potentially meaningful tax avoidance values for firms with negative 
pretax income. Thus BTDs, traditionally scaled by assets, have the advantage over ETRs that 
loss-firms can remain in the sample. Yet, the usage of loss-observations in BTD research is not 
consistent: The majority of BTD studies decided not to include loss-observations in the sample 
due to an overall skepticism towards their information content (e.g. Hanlon, 2005; Blaylock et 
al., 2012). Contrary, other studies included them without explicitly elaborating why (e.g. 
Lisowsky, 2010; Seidman, 2010; Lennox et al., 2013). 
The novel HS2018 measure represents a special type of BTD that is supposed to provide 
meaningful measurement of tax avoidance regardless of a firm’s pretax profitability. For this 
purpose, it relies on a firm’s cash tax payments and its market value of total assets as a scalar:  
 
                                                 
11 This procedure, however, has been subject to criticism due to systematically different consolidation rules and 
handling of tax credits between the book and tax account. (Hanlon, 2003; Gaertner, Laplante and Lynch, 2016). I 
set τ to 34% for fiscal years before 1992 and to 35% for fiscal years after 1993 in the analysis. 
 𝐵𝑇𝐷 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 −(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑥  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒)/𝜏
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
   (Eq.2) 
 𝐻𝑆2018 =  

𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
=  
𝐴𝑑𝑗.  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 − 𝜏∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒−𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (Eq.3) 
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Henry and Sansing (2018) measure corporate tax avoidance by , an indicator for being 
tax favored scaled by market value of assets.  describes the difference between adjusted cash 
taxes paid12 and the statutory tax burden (𝜏 * pretax income). If a firm has a  of zero, its CASH 
ETR equals the statutory tax rate. The less taxes a firm pays, the lower is  and the more tax 
favored is a firm. Interestingly,  can also become negative and consequently indicate that a 
firm is tax-favored in relation to the statutory tax rate. Scaling by market value of total assets 
brings the advantage that it is always positive and thus avoids the truncation of negative profit 
firms, just as the conventional asset-scaled BTD. Indeed, the HS2018 measure combines the 
advantages of BTD and CASH ETR: It does rely on real cash tax paid (and thus is not distorted 
by accounting concepts as valuation allowances) and supposedly provides meaningful 
information for loss-firms. However, the measure is still novel and is required to be used more 
frequently by other researchers. 
Lisowsky, Robinson and Schmidt (2013) discuss potential differences between ETR and 
BTD and argue that the latter captures more aggressive tax avoidance behavior than ETR does. 
This argument predominantly evolved from the tax shelter literature where researchers were 
able to link actual shelter activity, a strongly aggressive tax planning behavior, to BTDs but less 
to ETRs. However, Guenther (2014) clarifies that ETRs and BTDs are statistically equivalent 
measures unless they are scaled by different proxies. This matters as it is common practice in 
accounting research to scale ETRs by firm profit and BTDs by firm assets. Thus, Guenther 
(2014) argues that the BTD measure is equivalent to the ETR multiplied by the firm’s pretax 
return on assets. In the same manner, Guenther (2014) highlights that the HS2018 measure 
(earlier version) is statistically equivalent to the ETR multiplied by a measure that reflects 
several different firm characteristics, including risk, growth and leverage. 
                                                 
12 Henry and Saning (2018) adjust cash taxes paid by deducting changes in a firm’s tax refund receivable (txr) 
variable from it. This way, the usage of TLCF shall be reflected in the measure. 
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He underlines his theoretical argument with numerical simulations and shows that 
controlling for the additional factor influence from ROA by ROA itself is insufficient in order 
to correct the scalar induced bias. Ultimately, Guenther (2014) concluded that the information 
content on tax avoidance is equal between CURRENT ETR (CASH ETR) and conventional BTD 
(HS2018) and that any conflicting results between those measures result from the choice of 
scalar. 
2.3.2 Sample Selection of Different Tax Avoidance Measures 
Researchers can expand the size of their sample by choosing asset-scaled over profit-
scaled measures for tax avoidance. However, the occurrence of financial losses is most unlikely 
random between firms and time-periods. Therefore, I will explore the characteristics of loss-
observations in Compustat and how their inclusion through asset-scaled proxies affects the 
samples of tax researchers. 
First, I show the extent of additional tax avoidance observations when applying asset-
scaled proxies. Figure 1 illustrates the available values for asset- and profit-scaled measures of 
tax avoidance in the Compustat Database from 1990 to 2017: 
 CURRENT ETR = f (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠)  BTD = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠, 𝜏 , 𝑇𝐴) 
  BTD = 𝑓(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑇𝑅 𝑥  𝑅𝑂𝐴) 
  (Eq. 4) 
CASH ETR = f (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑 )  HS2018 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑, 𝜏 , 𝑀𝑉𝑇𝐴) 
                  HS2018 = 𝑓(𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 𝐸𝑇𝑅 𝑥 𝑅𝑂𝑀𝑉𝐴) 
                  (Eq. 5) 
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Figure 1: Availability of Tax Avoidance Measures in Compustat 
 
Note: Full Sample covers 200,096 observations from 1990 to 2017 with non-
missing values for income. ETR Outliers are defined as ETRs above 100% or 
below 0%. 
The total number of observations with non-missing pretax income is 200,096 for 27 
years of data and it is possible to construct GAAP ETR for 99.9 percent of it. This is less often 
the case for CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR, as the variables of interest (txc, txpd) are only 
available for 78 percent of the sample. Then, researchers are required to drop loss-observations 
form their ETR sample and end up with substantially less information: The share of usable 
GAAP ETR values shrinks to 61 percent while CURRENT ETR decreases to 45 percent and 
CASH ETR only delivers 52 percent of interpretable values. However, ETR sometimes happens 
to range at extreme values (above 100 percent and below 0 percent), even for positive pretax-
income13, which again does not result in meaningful values and consequently is usually subject 
to further trimming.14 This last step eliminates on average approximately further 3 percent of 
observations such that ultimately only 56.9 percent meaningful values remain for GAAP ETR, 
while only 41.8 percent for CURRENT ETR and 48 percent for CASH ETR. On the other hand, 
                                                 
13 The reception of a tax refund while reporting positive earnings would be one scenario for a negative ETR. 
14 Henry and Sansing (2018, p. 1047) reviewed 23 studies from top accounting journals and found that 20 of those 
studies removed extreme ETR values (above 100 percent or below 0 percent) and eliminated negative-profits. 
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asset-scaled proxies provide more information: The construction of BTD is possible for 73.6 
percent of all observations. This is due to the fact that BTD relies (like CURRENT ETR) on the 
availability of current tax expense (txc) and total assets (at) but does not require the trimming 
of negative profits or extreme values.15 Likewise, HS2018 produces meaningful values for 67.2 
percent of all observations. The construction of the HS2018 measure is more demanding than 
BTD as it relies on adjusted cash taxes paid (txpd, txr) and market value of total assets, which 
is computed as book value of assets (at) plus the difference between market value of equity 
(prcc, f, csho) and book value of equity (bkvlps, csho).  
When comparing the corresponding concepts CURRENT ETR and BTD (CASH ETR 
and HS2018), it is to conclude that the asset-scaled proxy provides approximately 43.1 percent 
(28.1 percent) more meaningful values and thus expands the sample size in this scenario by 
64,430 (39,619) observations. This underlines the extent of data truncation in ETR research, 
but also shows that asset-scaled measures are not able to incorporate all observations in 
Compustat, neither. Interestingly, the surplus of observations for the HS2018 measure is not as 
large as initially expected. This should be kept in mind when discussing data truncation because 
now the non-missing criteria for required variables to compute market values of total assets in 
Compustat determine the sample selection. 
Next, sample selection issues for the intake of additional observations through asset-
scaled proxies will be discussed. Table 1 shows structural attributes of additional observations 
which provide meaningful values when measured with BTD (HS2018) in comparison to the 
baseline sample that can be analyzed with both, CURRENT ETR and BTD (CASH ETR and 
HS2018) in terms of tax avoidance. 
                                                 
15 However, BTDs have often been subject to winsorizing at the top and bottom one percent in the literature, e.g. 
see Hanlon (2005). 
37 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection Characteristics by Tax Avoidance Measure 
Sample 
Current ETR & 
BTD 
Only BTD  
Cash ETR & 
HS2018 
Only HS2018 
Observations 79,901   68,245 73,023   47,654 
  
Mean Median   Mean Median Mean 
Media
n 
  Mean Median 
AGE (Years) 18.55 14   12.42 8 17.89 13   13.64 9 
LIFETIME 28.61 25   19.95 17 27.87 24   21.14 18 
SALES 2661.1 316.0   637.6 22.2 2677.5 277.9   726.3 46.0 
TOTAL_ASSETS 5338.8 368.4   1745.3 39.4 5301.8 318.7   1958.8 57.3 
MNE 0.410 0   0.258 0 0.442 0   0.328 0 
ROA 0.323 0.08   -7.45 -0.17 0.201 0.083   -8.774 -0.113 
R&D 0.036 0   4.30 0 0.035 0   3.155 0 
PPE 0.285 0.20   0.244 0.14 0.255 0.186   0.244 0.150 
INTANG 0.121 0.03   0.118 0.01 0.129 0.045   0.124 0.024 
LEVERAGE 0.327 0.21   2.211 0.23 0.283 0.182   2.044 0.242 
CAPEX 0.316 0.20   0.712 0.21 0.318 0.225   0.435 0.204 
ADVERT 0.012 0   0.023 0 0.013 0   0.020 0 
SPECIAL_ITEMS 0.285 0   -3.400 0 0.045 0   -4.624 -0.002 
NOL 0.291 0   0.535 1 0.313 0   0.526 1 
MARKET_BOOK 5.83 2.00   1.40 1.33 5.29 2.03   -0.58 1.18 
BTD 0.673 0.0125   -7.160 -0.1730 - -   - - 
CURRENT ETR 0.262 0.28   - - - -   - - 
HS2018 - -   - - -0.008 -0.004   0.164 0.0267 
CASH ETR  - -   - - 0.2416 0.238   - - 
Note: The baseline sample Current ETR & BTD refers to the subsample of observations which provide meaningful 
observations for both BTD and CURRENT ETR (53% of population). The Only BTD sample provides meaningful values 
exclusively for BTD (44%). The next baseline sample Cash ETR & HS2018 refers to the subsample of observations that 
provide meaningful values for both HS2018 and CASH ETR (57%). The only-HS2018 surplus sample provides exclusively 
meaningful values for HS2018 (34%). The subsamples that produce only meaningful values for CURRENT ETR (3%) or 
CASH ETR (9%) have been ignored for the purpose of this table. 
It is apparent from Table 1 that the ability of BTD and HS2018 to interpret financial 
loss-years adds firms with very distinct attributes to the samples of tax researchers. As 
suggested by prior literature (Joos and Plesko, 2005; Klein and Marquardt, 2006), negative 
earnings firms have different characteristics than the remaining Compustat population. Those 
firms are significantly younger, shorter-lived and smaller than profitable ones. The difference 
in size is remarkable, as the median profitable firm has almost ten times more total assets/sales 
than the median loss firm. The shorter lifetime (years listed in the Compustat Database) of those 
firms suggests that a considerable amount of unprofitable firms went out of business during the 
sample period. Furthermore, loss-firms are substantially higher-leveraged, less international 
and invest more in R&D and capital relative to their assets, which is typical for smaller 
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corporations (Dang, Li and Yang, 2018). Nevertheless, loss-firms have also on average a lower 
Market-to-Book ratio, which suggests that the market anticipates their limited growth potential. 
Asset-scaled proxies additionally cover industries which have suffered from the crises over the 
sample period, namely the Dotcom-Bubble (2000-2002) and the last financial crisis (2007-
2009). Thus, asset-scaled proxies add numerous firm observations from Computer and 
Electronics Industries to the samples of tax researchers.16 Loss-observations do not occur 
randomly but highly concentrated in a distinct subpopulation of very small, non-prospering 
firms. This finding raises the question whether it is desired by researchers to include such a 
specific subpopulation of firms in their analyses. 
Given the distinct characteristics of loss-firms, it is reasonable to distinguish between 
firms that experience losses on an occasional basis and firms that report them frequently. Figure 
2 graphically illustrates the frequency of loss years for firms in the observed sample period. 
The histogram bars report the absolute number of firms that experience a given number of loss 
years (left y-axis) and the line depicts the average losses-to-lifetime ratio for firms with a given 
number of loss years in the sample (right y-axis). The losses-to-lifetime ratio describes the 
percentage share of loss years of a company’s years covered in the Compustat sample.  
                                                 
16 Table A3 in the Appendix shows the industry composition of the additional observations through asset scaled 
proxies. 
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Figure 2: Loss Frequency and Firm Lifetime 
 
Note: Full Sample covers 200,096 observations from 1990 to 2017 with non-
missing values for income. 
First, it is to note that approximately 6,000 firms in the sample have exclusively reported 
profits in the 27 year lasting sample period. Second, still a noticeable amount of 4,890 firms 
experiences between one to three loss-years and lastly, 5,406 firms have more than three loss-
years over the entire sample period. This shows that Compustat covers numerous firms with a 
frequent loss history. Moreover, the connected line illustrates that the average losses-to-lifetime 
ratio increases steeply with the number of reported loss-years. In fact, the average company that 
reports three loss-years between 1990 and 2017 shows a losses-to-lifetime ratio of 32.3 percent 
and thus has an expected lifetime of approximately nine years before it disappears from 
Compustat. The average Compustat lifetime for a company reporting five loss years is 
approximately ten years, indicated by a loss ratio of 49.8 percent. This underlines the findings 
from table 2 that not all loss-firms are experiencing a shorter lifetime in Compustat but 
particularly the rather steadily unprofitable subpopulation of small firms. While most tax 
researchers might agree that it would be worthwhile to incorporate infrequent loss-years of 
usually profitable firms into the analysis (e.g. Drake et al., 2018), it would require some clear 
intention why tax avoidance studies should include small non-prospering firms that accumulate 
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losses which eventually are unlikely to results in future tax benefits due to impending 
bankruptcy.17 
2.3.3 Determining Industry Tax Avoidance with Different Measures 
According to Guenther (2014), the profitability bias is responsible for different 
outcomes between studies that use BTDs and ETRs. In the following, I empirically investigate 
this finding by comparing the median tax planning between all U.S. industries subject to the 
different proxies for tax avoidance.18 My sample consists of U.S. firm observations between 
1990 and 2017 from Compustat Northern America. I restrict the sample to positive pretax 
income observations as only then both BTD and ETR can be constructed and subsequently 
compared. Additionally, all missing values for any necessary variable to compute CASH ETR, 
CURRENT ETR, BTD or HS2018 were removed for the sample in order to eliminate any sample 
selection bias in the comparative analysis.19 This results in a sample size of 55,232 observations 
from 33 industries according to the Fama and French (1997) classification.  
I follow Heitzman and Ogneva (2018) and compute a three-year medium run variable 
for each measure of tax avoidance. This serves the smoothing of volatile one-year values and 
thus mitigates the effect of outliers. A three-year medium run ETR is constructed by the sum 
of the annual respective tax liabilities/payments over the three-year period divided by the sum 
of pretax income (before special items) over the same period. Analogously, the three-year 
medium BTD is the three-year difference between pretax income and the approximated taxable 
income, scaled by the three-year average of total assets. Lastly, the three-year medium run 
HS2018 is constructed in the same manner as BTD but describes the averaged three-year 
difference between pretax income and cash-approximated taxable income. To compare the 
                                                 
17 Cooper and Knittel (2010) document that in particular smaller and younger firms struggle to realize tax benefits 
from their TLCFs. 
18 Industry definitions rely on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. The minimum number of 
firms per industry was set to 50 such that 33 industries remain for the comparison. 
19 Necessary Compustat items for computation of the named variables are (in order of the named proxies): pi, xi, 
txt, txpd, txc, at, bkvlps, csho, prcc, txr. 
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measures, I use negative BTD and positive HS2018 to specify that lower values imply higher 
tax avoidance, as it holds for ETRs. Ultimately, I compute the median value of the respective 
tax avoidance measure for each industry over the total time-period and develop a ranking of tax 
avoidance on this basis. Table 2 contains an excerpt of the results:20 
Table 2: Industry Tax Avoidance Ranking by Selected Measures 
Industry Code Firms CASH ETR CURRENT ETR        BTD HS 2018 
Petroleum & Gas 30 290 1 (0.135) 1 (0.156) 1 (0.021) 1 (-0.006) 
Real Estate 47 100 2 (0.14) 2 (0.182) 5 (0.008) 11 (-0.002) 
Computer Software 36 671 3 (0.192) 9 (0.289) 23 (-0.002) 9 (-0.003) 
Computers 35 206 4 (0.198) 11 (0.292) 28 (-0.005) 8 (-0.003) 
Electronic Equipment 37 433 5 (0.205) 6 (0.268) 8 (0.006) 3 (-0.003) 
Transportation 41 190 6 (0.211) 3 (0.227) 2 (0.02) 2 (-0.006) 
Entertainment 7 131 7 (0.228) 5 (0.265) 14 (0.002) 15 (-0.002) 
Medical Equipment 12 232 8 (0.247) 15 (0.305) 11 (0.004) 5 (-0.003) 
Communication 32 225 9 (0.25) 4 (0.254) 9 (0.005) 19 (-0.001) 
Pharmaceutical 13 240 10 (0.251) 14 (0.303) 7 (0.006) 10 (-0.002) 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
Construct. Materials 17 161 24 (0.304) 21 (0.32) 18 (0.001) 27 (-0.001) 
Automobiles & Trucks 23 107 25 (0.307) 22 (0.321) 20 (-0.0001) 23 (-0.001) 
Construction 18 107 26 (0.311) 31 (0.356) 31 (-0.006) 26 (-0.001) 
Food Products 2 137 27 (0.312) 25 (0.332) 17 (0.001) 21 (-0.001) 
Rubber & Plastic 15 81 28 (0.315) 27 (0.333) 25 (-0.003) 30 (0.0001) 
Apparel 10 111 29 (0.322) 29 (0.352) 29 (-0.005) 25 (-0.001) 
Consumer Goods 9 117 30 (0.324) 28 (0.348) 27 (-0.004) 31 (0.0001) 
Wholesale 42 343 31 (0.326) 30 (0.356) 30 (-0.005) 32 (0.0001) 
Retail 43 428 32 (0.327) 32 (0.358) 32 (-0.006) 29 (0.0001) 
Printing & Publishing 8 61 33 (0.337) 33 (0.358) 33 (-0.008) 33 (0.001) 
Note: A lower rank describes higher tax avoidance for all measures. The total sample contains 55,230 observations and 
spans the time-period 1990 to 2017. Industries with less than 50 firms were removed. 
The most tax aggressive U.S. industries have median cash tax rates between 13.5 percent 
and 21.11 percent, and include among others Petroleum and Gas, Computers and Software 
Products, Electronic Equipment and Transportation. Typical for all those industries is that they 
possess a relatively high share of mobile capital, which is easier shifted to low tax 
jurisdictions.21 Additionally, it is to be noted that many of the leading industries typically have 
                                                 
20 The complete industry ranking is listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
21 The real estate sector is ranked high in tax avoidance despite its intensity in physical capital. This surprising 
outcome might be related to the data truncation of loss-observations, which represent almost 50 percent of all 
observations from the real estate industry in the sample period. 
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high R&D expenditures, which has constantly been subject to generous tax credits over the past 
decades (Belz, von Hagen and Steffens, 2017). The bottom of the tax planning ranking is 
occupied with physical capital intensive industries as Printing & Publishing, Consumer Goods, 
Rubber and Plastics. These industries are less mobile in the geographical allocation of capital 
and thus do not possess the above described possibilities to lower their effective tax burden. 
Overall, it is to say that the measures display a similar assessment of tax planning for 
most industries. This holds in particular for the bottom of the ranking, where all four measures 
assign similar ranks to the respective physical capital-intensive industries. However, this is not 
the case for a couple of industries in the upper half of the ranking. Particularly Computers and 
Software are ranked as rather tax aggressive by profit-scaled measures while asset-scaled 
measures assign lower rankings to them. As already discussed before, current tax expenses and 
cash taxes paid differ because an accrual is affected by events which might not result in cash 
outflow. More important to the purpose of this study is how CURRENT ETR (CASH ETR) and 
BTD (HS2018) differ with respect to the median industry tax planning, as this divergence must 
result from the distinct scalars according to Guenther (2014). Figure 3 illustrates the divergence 
between tax avoidance ranks of profit- and asset-scaled measures: 
Figure 3: Industry Tax Avoidance by Selected Measures  
 
Note: A lower rank describes higher tax avoidance for all measures. The total sample contains 55,230 
observations and spans the time-period 1990 to 2017. Industries with less than 50 firms are removed. 
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Figure 3 plots the industry rankings of asset-scaled measures (x-axis) against the 
rankings of profit-scaled measures (y-axis). If both types of measure resulted in identical 
ranking of industries, all combined rankings were on the 45° line. However, we see that a 
substantial amount of observations is scattered around the line. If an industry is above the 45° 
line, it is perceived more tax aggressive by asset-scaled measures than by profit-scaled ones. 
According to Guenther (2014), the divergence systematically results from differences in ROA 
(ROMVA) as e.g. two firms with similar tax paid and profits but different size (amount of 
assets) are perceived differently by the measures. The rectangular, colored dots in the graph 
mark the bottom half industries in terms of ROA (ROMVA). The majority of the less profitable 
industries falls above the 45° line and thus are more tax aggressive according to BTDs than to 
ETRs. The detected pattern supports the argument of Guenther (2014) that asset-scaled BTDs 
reflect a combination of profit-scaled ETR and firm profitability. 
2.3.4 The Information Content of NOLs for Tax Avoidance Research 
The intake of NOLs is only possible when tax researchers use asset-scaled measures of 
tax avoidance. This enlarges the sample size and associated statistical power tremendously. On 
the other hand, under the assumption that profit-scaled ETR is the correct theoretical measure 
for corporate tax avoidance – which appears reasonable in the case of income taxes – scaling 
tax planning activity by book value of assets needs to be seen critically.  
First, Guenther (2014) and the approximation of U.S. industry tax avoidance in this 
article, highlight that asset-scaled measures over-estimate the tax aggressiveness of relatively 
less profitable firms. This is problematic because only if the ratio of pretax income (in profitable 
years) to book or market value of assets remains constant over time and equal between firms, 
BTD and HS2018 provide meaningful comparisons. Thus, Henry and Sansing (2018) only 
portray the actual trends in U.S. corporate tax avoidance with their new measure under the 
condition that the ratio between pretax income and market value of total assets remained 
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constant between 1988 and 2014 and does not differ on average between multinational and 
domestic firms.22 Second, the use of asset-scaled tax avoidance proxies changes the samples of 
tax researchers substantially. Loss-observations occur highly concentrated in a distinct 
subpopulation of small, non-prospering firms from specific industries and researchers should 
be clear on the increased heterogeneity in their samples. Among those new firms are shorter-
lived companies that accumulate losses which eventually are unlikely to results in future tax 
benefits due to impending bankruptcy (see Cooper and Knittel, 2010). Those firms are to be 
perceived critically as they yield limited information content for the assessment of corporate 
tax planning. 
Despite the named restrictions, it is to acknowledge that it is feasible to investigate loss-
firms’ tax planning with asset-scaled proxies like HS2018. Infrequent corporate loss-
observations yield information content in terms of tax avoidance and can be included in the 
samples of tax researchers, albeit only in a very controlled setup: Scholars must diligently 
ensure comparability among firms with regard to profitability, measured by ROA or ROMVA 
in years of positive earnings. Only then, loss-observations contain valid information for the 
assessment of corporate tax avoidance.23 Moreover, tax researchers should generally be advised 
to ensure certain minimum criteria with respect to firm size, year coverage or a minimum 
requirement for profitability. This way, steadily unprofitable firms remain excluded and the in-
sample heterogeneity is bounded. Ultimately, it is to point out that the necessity to incorporate 
NOL-years depends on the respective research question. 
2.4 Excluding NOLs from the Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance 
So far, the vast majority of tax researchers restricted their analyses to profitable 
subsamples. This holds for most studies that apply profit-scaled ETRs or asset-scaled BTDs. 
                                                 
22 This appears unlikely and will be discussed more in depth in section 4.3 of this article. 
23 Interestingly, Guenther (2014) shows that one typical way of controlling for profitability, by adding a control 
variable to the regression, does not solve this problem. Thus, sample stratification is required. 
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Nevertheless, the trimming of loss-observations might cause a measurement bias that is stronger 
in ex ante subsamples with more loss-firms (Teoh and Zhang, 2011). Particular from a tax 
perspective, the truncation of single loss-years is to be seen critically because the tax expenses 
of other years are likely affected by the loss-event. In the following, I will analyze how the 
truncation of loss-years affects the measurement of corporate tax avoidance. For this purpose 
and the given restrictions upon asset-scaled proxies, I will solely focus on profit-scaled ETRs. 
First, I explore in a controlled Compustat scenario how loss-observations contaminate firms’ 
ETRs around the event of a loss. Then, I revise the declining trend in CASH ETR documented 
by Dyreng et al. (2017) and pay particular attention to the underlying loss structure in the data. 
2.4.1 The Distortion of ETR values before and after Loss Years 
It is useful to assess the impact of a loss year on neighboring firm-year observations 
because it illustrates the real extent of the data anomaly: The ETR of the loss year itself is non-
meaningful and thus usually removed from the sample. However, the ETRs of the subsequent 
years are likely affected by the consequences of the loss (see Cooper and Knittel, 2006) and 
remain in the sample. Firms should be able to exercise their TLCF and consequently benefit 
from lower tax payments. Thus, low ETRs of periods after a loss are unlikely to mirror tax 
planning activity and should not be interpreted in such way.  
I collected a specific sample of Compustat firms that share a common history in loss-
years: All firms experienced exactly one year of negative profits with ten consecutive years of 
profits before and after the loss-year in the sample period 1990-2017. This implicates that firms 
do not have to experience the loss in the same actual year, but that all firms share a long-lasting 
profitable phase before and after it, such that the loss-year has been a unique event for the 
companies. This is important as I try to compute a firm’s true, idiosyncratic benchmark ETR 
level by building the ten year long-run ETR before and after the loss year. In the next step, I 
measure the difference between annual ETR values and the long-run ETR, what I call ETR-
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DEVIATION and explore how it develops around the loss year.24 The sample consists of 189 
firms with in total 3,546 observations over 21 firm-specific years.25 In accordance with common 
literature, the ETR value for the loss year is eliminated from the sample, which results in 3,357 
observations. Figure 4 displays the development of average CASH ETR-DEVIATION and 
GAAP ETR-DEVIATION from ten years prior to the financial loss year to ten years after it. 
Figure 4: CASH ETR and GAAP-ETR Deviation around the Loss Year 
 
Note: Figure 4 is based on a sample of 189 firms (3,546 observations) over 21 firm-specific years between 
1990 and 2017. All firms in the sample experience exactly one loss-year over the period. Table A4 in the 
Appendix contains descriptive statistics of the one-loss-year-sample. 
The figure illustrates that both CASH ETR Deviation and GAAP ETR-Deviation is 
mostly close to zero for pretty much all years before the loss and most years after the loss. This 
implies that the annual ETR values do not differ much from the long-run ETR in most profitable 
years. In contrast, the first two periods after the loss contain a CASH ETR DEVIATION (GAAP 
ETR DEVIATION) of approximately -14 (-11) and -7 (-6) percentage points. Thus, the graph 
displays that corporations are able to exercise their accumulated TLCF and correspondingly 
pay lower taxes. It is to note that even the second period after the loss shows a notably negative 
                                                 
24 The Long Run ETR is constructed separately for the pre- and the post-loss-period. This is required as the long 
run ETR before the loss might not be a good benchmark for ETR values after the loss and vice versa. An alternative 
approach using one constant benchmark for the entire timeline is not equally suitable here, as it does not display 
the discontinuity around the loss-year in a likewise manner and is more likely influenced by long run time trends 
in ETR. 
25 Table A4 in the Appendix contains descriptive statistics of the one-loss-year-sample. 
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CASH ETR-DEVIATION and GAAP ETR-DEVIATION. This should be of interest to tax 
researchers who currently control with an indicator variable for the first year after a loss but not 
any further. The figure reveals even more data anomalies around the loss year for CASH ETR: 
Already two years before the loss (t-2, t-1), large positive deviations of annual CASH ETR from 
the long run CASH ETR stand out. This implies that the relationship between firms’ cash taxes 
paid and reported profits is increasing before a loss. One potential explanation for this might be 
that firms transition towards a loss by experiencing steadily declining profits while tax 
payments do not decline at the same rate. This could result either from a certain structural non-
linear relationship between cash taxes and profits (see Edwards, Kubata and Shevlin, 2018) or 
the mere fact that advance payments for tax liabilities have not been adjusted adequately.  
The graph illustrates exemplarily how costly loss-observations might come in ETR 
research. In this selective subsample, a one-year loss results in an average of two consecutive 
abnormal low GAAP ETR and CASH ETR values after the loss and two abnormal high CASH 
ETR values before it. These abnormal values could falsely be misinterpreted as corporate tax 
aggressiveness despite the circumstance that the loss-years themselves are usually removed 
from the samples of tax researchers.26 How exactly NOLs affect the measurement of tax 
avoidance depends on the occurrence of losses in the respective sample. Thus, it is worthwhile 
to re-evaluate certain findings based on ETR research with respect to the loss-structure in the 
initial dataset.  
2.4.2 Re-examining Trends in U.S. Corporate Tax Avoidance 
Dyreng et al. (2017, p.462) state that “purely domestic firms do not appear to be 
disadvantaged relative to multinational firms in terms of tax avoidance and [...] both types of 
firms are benefitting from decreased effective tax rates over time”. This finding contradicts the 
                                                 
26 This is particularly alarming in the context of high losses-to-lifetime ratios for steadily unprofitable firms. Tax 
researchers would not be able to retrieve any but abnormal ETR values for these firms. 
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conventional knowledge that the declining effective tax rates of multinationals result from 
increasing income shifting and cross-border reorganization tactics, which are unavailable to 
domestic firms. Henry and Sansing (2018) re-examine the same analysis with their asset-scaled 
HS2018 measure instead of CASH ETR and expand the study to loss-firms. Among others, they 
find that domestic firms have become less tax-favored over time. Thus, the inclusion of loss-
firms appears to matter for the measurement of aggregate tax avoidance. In separate work, 
Watrin and Weiss (2018) develop a new measure of relative corporate tax avoidance and 
suggest that characteristic-varying tax planning did not follow any trend over the past 30 years. 
Drake et al. (2018) analyze the observed decline in domestic corporations’ GAAP ETR by 
investigating income tax reconciliations and argue that the aggregate phenomenon is largely 
attributable to the releases of TLCF valuation allowances, research credits and changes to 
GAAP reporting of goodwill. Schwab et al. (2018) highlight the frequent distortions of annual 
GAAP ETR through valuation allowance releases, too. Taken together, these studies suggest 
that the documented decline in domestic firms’ ETRs originates from data truncation and/or 
specific aspects of GAAP but not from actual corporate tax planning. 
In the following, I re-examine the study of Dyreng et al. (2017) with a special focus on 
loss-observations and surrounding, abnormal ETR values in order to review the alternative 
explanations for declining ETRs. Contrary to Henry and Sansing (2018), I will not expand the 
original sample to loss-observations but focus on firms that were subject to data truncation. 
Thus, this paper is the first to empirically link the underlying loss-structure in the data prior to 
data cleaning to the ex-post measured trend in tax avoidance after loss-years were removed 
from the sample. The authors removed loss-years from their sample. However, ETRs of 
profitable years subsequent to losses are expected to be downwards biased, which could affect 
their findings of declining ETR trends for multinational and domestic U.S.-firms. Lastly, I will 
discuss my findings and tools how to deal with loss-observations in ETR research.  
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 NOLs and Trends in Cash ETR over Time 
As mentioned in section 3.2, domestic firms are more likely to experience losses than 
international ones. Moreover, the loss coverage differs for both firm populations in Compustat 
over time. Table 3 describes the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample before the elimination of loss-
observations:27 
Table 3: Loss Coverage in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample  
Time Period    1988-1993 1994-1999 2000-2005 2006-2012 Total 
Panel:             
Multinational Firms 
Firms 1,427 2,410 2,670 2,493 4,294  
Obs. 5,604  8,764  10,685  12,435  37,488  
Losses  20.8% 21.8% 31.5% 27.4% 26.3% 
Panel:               
Domestic Firms 
Firms 2,614  3,849  3,058  1,932  5,766  
Obs. 9,817  13,456  10,662  8,148  42,083  
Losses 23.1% 27.6% 36.4% 35.7% 30.4% 
Note: The total sample contains 79,571 observations of which 22,621 are loss-observations. 
The share of domestic loss-observations in the sample increased from 23.1 percent up 
to 35.7 percent over the sample period and even ranged higher in the aftermath of the Dotcom-
Bubble. Loss-observations of multinational firms increased over time, too, but at a lower rate, 
namely from 20.8 percent to 27.4 percent over the entire sample period. Thus, abnormal ETR 
values, originating from loss-observations, are becoming more present in the subsample of 
domestic firms over time than for multinational firms. Furthermore, it is to note that the number 
of domestic firms falls from the year 2000 onwards. This suggests that a considerable number 
of domestic firms in Compustat went out of business and was not covered in Compustat 
anymore. Given all this, the decline in domestic CASH ETR over time might be related to loss-
induced distorted ETR values, which are not as present for multinational firms. 
Figure 5 is inspired by figure 3 of Dyreng et al. (2017, p. 448) and plots the average 
CASH ETR over time for multinational and domestic firms. Contrary to the original figure, I 
                                                 
27 The total number of observations in Dyreng et al. (2017) is 54,028. My sample contains 56,955 observations 
when losses are omitted. When loss-observations are included, the sample size is 79,571. 
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distinguish between loss-making and permanently profitable firms. Firms are considered 
permanently profitable only if they reported exclusively positive earnings in every year between 
1988 and 2012. The CASH ETR values of loss-making firms provide abnormal values 
surrounding omitted loss years, while profitable firms cannot be affected by abnormal ETR 
values through losses. In fact, one quarter (24.7 percent) of all observations in the Dyreng et al. 
(2017) sample stems from permanently profitable firms. 
Figure 5: Average Cash ETR over Time 
 
Note: Figure 5 is based on a sample of 66,177 observations and ranges from 1988 to 2017. Overall, 
24.7 percent of observations origin from permanently profitable corporations. The share of 
domestic firms is 51 percent. Loss-years are removed from the sample. 
 
Figure 5 documents the declining trend in CASH ETR for both multinational and 
domestic firms. It is to note that loss-firms on average show lower CASH ETRs than profitable 
firms. This holds in particular for the domestic subsample where the CASH ETR differential 
between the two groups ranges between 2 and 4 percentage points. The profitability induced 
CASH ETR differential for multinational firms is smaller and less persistent over time. In 
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general, the level difference in CASH ETR between profitable and loss-making firms appears 
mostly constant over time. This suggests a somewhat similar time-trend in CASH ETR 
regardless of the underlying loss-structure in the data.  
To analyze the effect of firm-specific losses on the aggregate time trend of ETRs, I re-
estimate the original regression by Dyreng et al. (2017) and include the additional variable 
LOSS.  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑡 + 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑡 𝑥 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (Eq.6) 
As in the original analysis, the variable TIME is calculated as the fiscal year of a given 
firm-year observation less the number 1988, which is the first year in the data set. Thus, TIME 
reveals the average annual change in CASH ETR, ceteris paribus. The binary variable LOSS 
describes the loss-affinity of a given firm in the sample before negative profit observations are 
eliminated. LOSS equals one for all firms that experience one or more loss-years in the sample 
period. This way, the LOSS variable indicates which firms are more likely to have distorted 
ETR values in the final sample despite the removal of loss years.28 Consequently, the interaction 
term TIME x LOSS describes how the average time trend in ETR varies between profitable and 
unprofitable firms. Then, the stand-alone TIME regressor captures the ETR trend of 
permanently profitable firms (LOSS = 0). In additional regression specifications, I control for 
the cofounding effect of loss-observations at the intensive margin: The variable LOSS_INT is 
the decile in which a firm ranks according to the ratio of reported loss-years to all firm-years in 
the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample. The more operating loss years a firm experienced over the 
sample period, the more distorted CASH ETR values are to expect. Table 4 contains the results 
of the regression outcomes for multinational and domestic firms, separately:29 
                                                 
28 Dyreng et al. (2017) winsorize outlier ETR values at 100 percent and 0 percent. Therefore, the distorted ETRs 
remain meaningful for the outcome. 
29 The original regression estimation is to be found in table 6 in Dyreng et al. (2017, p.453). 
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Table 4: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Losses over Time 
Dependent Variable CASH ETR 
Panel Multinational Firms    Domestic Firms  
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Dyreng et al. 
(2017)  
Replication 
Controlling 
for LOSS 
Controlling 
for 
LOSS_INT 
Dyreng et al. 
(2017)  
Replication 
Controlling 
for LOSS 
Controlling 
for 
LOSS_INT 
              TIME -0.434*** -0.473*** -0.462*** -0.415*** -0.410*** -0.339*** 
  (0.0232) (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0221) (0.0406) (0.0405) 
LOSS - -2.549*** - - -3.293*** - 
    (0.671)     (0.579)   
TIME x LOSS - 0.0570 - - -0.00518 - 
    (0.0444)     (0.0464)   
LOSS_INT - - -0.683*** - - -0.606*** 
      (0.0980)     (0.0799) 
TIME x LOSS_INT - - 0.00730 - - -0.0150** 
      (0.00646)     (0.00639) 
CONSTANT 34.40*** 36.33*** 38.70*** 31.50*** 34.61*** 36.07*** 
  (2.349) (2.387) (2.395) (1.877) (1.932) (1.928) 
Dyreng et al. (2017) 
Controls  
     
Industry Fixed Effects      
Loss-Obs. Omitted      
Observations 27,647 27,647 27,647 29,308 29,308 29,308 
Adj. R-squared 0.044 0.045 0.056 0.083 0.087 0.101 
Note: The dependent variable is CASH ETR. TIME is calculated as the fiscal year of a given firm-year observation less the 
number 1988, which is the first year in the data set. LOSS is binary and equals one for all firms that (relative to their 
lifetime in Compustat) experience at least one loss-year in the sample period. LOSS_INT is the decile in which a firm ranks 
according to the ratio of reported loss-years to all firm years. Control variables are: LOG_ASSETS, R&D, PPE, INTANG, 
LEVERAGE, CAPEX, ADVERT, SPECIAL_ITEMS, NOL and NOL. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Specification (1) and (4) refer to the replication of the original Dyreng et al. (2017, p. 
453) regression. Specifications (2), (3), (5) and (6) refer to the estimation strategy from equation 
(5) with either LOSS or LOSS_INT as additional interactive regressors. My coefficient of TIME 
in specification (1) is almost identical with the coefficient in the original study (-0.439), 
suggesting a decrease in multinationals’ CASH ETR of approximately 0.4 percentage points per 
year. The coefficient of the LOSS variable in specifications (2) and (5) is negative and 
statistically significant, demonstrating that firms which have been subject to loss-data 
truncation in the sample selection process show on average lower CASH ETRs, ceteris paribus. 
The LOSS_INT variable in specification (3) and (6) shows likewise that an increase in the firm-
specific loss intensity during the sample period is associated with lower CASH ETR. This goes 
in line with the documented pattern of abnormally low ETR values immediately following loss-
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years, discussed in section 4.1.30 However, introducing the LOSS variable and the TIME x LOSS 
interaction term does not alter the coefficient of the independent TIME variable noticeably, 
neither for multinational (2) nor for domestic firms (5). In fact, the negative stand-alone TIME 
coefficient in the multinational firm panel even increases slightly in magnitude to -0.473 
percentage points. The insignificant interaction terms in both specifications suggest that the 
time-trend is unaffected by the firm-specific loss-history at the extensive margin. Thus, 
permanently profitable firms experienced the same steady decline in both CASH ETR and as 
loss-firms over the 25 years. The interaction of TIME and LOSS_INT is insignificant for 
multinational firms (3) but not for domestic firms. In the domestic subsample, an increase in 
firm-specific loss intensity leads to a more declining time trend in CASH ETR (6). The stand-
alone TIME coefficient ranges at -0.339 and is less negative than before. However, this still 
implies that the CASH ETR of firms in the lowest decile of loss intensity decreased substantially 
over time. The contribution of loss-induced data truncation to the aggregate decline of CASH 
ETR over time appears negligible. 
NOLs and Trends in Cash ETR over Firm Age  
Given the robustness of the findings by Dyreng et al. (2017), I would like to add further 
understanding to the development of domestic firms’ CASH ETR over time. Thus, I replicate 
the analysis of Dyreng et al. (2017) again but control for the dynamic sample composition over 
time. Instead of examining the cross-sectional change in CASH ETR between financial years 
from 1988 to 2012, I elaborate how CASH ETR changes over the lifespan of multinational and 
domestic U.S.-firms. To be more precise, I regress CASH ETR not over a time trend variable 
(TIME) as before, but instead over the firm-specific age in the sample: FIRM_AGE is computed 
as the difference between the current financial year of the firm-year observation and the first 
                                                 
30 The negative coefficient of LOSS does not support the idea of abnormally high CASH ETR values before a loss. 
However, the abnormal low ETRs after the loss could be dominating the overall effect.  
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year in which the company appeared in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample. Thus, the variable 
FIRM_AGE does not describe the average cross-sectional yearly change of CASH ETR over 
time but the average yearly change of CASH ETR over the lifespan of U.S.-companies. In fact, 
the results by Dyreng et al. (2017) suppose that existing firms (both multinational and domestic) 
engaged in more aggressive tax planning over the years. However, it is also possible that the 
sample composition in Compustat changed over time unequally for both groups. New firms 
from more-tax aggressive industries might be added to the sample belatedly and determine the 
trending CASH ETR. Thus, I focus on the lifespan of each firm and examine FIRM_AGE as 
dimension of time.31  
Figure 6 plots the average CASH ETR of multinational and domestic firms over 
FIRM_AGE: 
                                                 
31 Whereas the TIME variable per definition is identical for all firms in the same financial year, the variable 
FIRM_AGE is not. In case of a fully balanced panel, however, TIME and FIRM_AGE would be identical. Figure 
A1 in the appendix illustrates the difference between the variables TIME and FIRM-AGE in the Dyreng et al. 
(2017) sample. 
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Figure 6: Average Cash ETR over Firm Age 
 
Note: Figure 6 is based on a sample of 66,177 observations and ranges from 1988 to 2017. Overall, 24.7 
percent of observations origin from permanently profitable corporations. The share of domestic firms 
is 51 percent. Loss-years are removed from the sample.  
Figure 6 makes apparent that CASH ETR of multinational U.S. firms declines steadily 
over the age of a firm, regardless of the profitability. Again, the CASH ETR of multinational 
loss-firms ranges below the CASH ETR of profitable multinational firms and the trend appears 
comparable over time, albeit slightly less declining for profitable multinationals. Thus, the 
figure suggests that U.S.-multinationals truly became more tax aggressive over the years of 
their existence and that this trend is not due to loss-induced data anomalies. This does not hold 
for the subsample of domestic firms. While domestic loss-making firms appear to have 
decreasing CASH ETR over their lifespan, the CASH ETR of profitable firms ranges at a 
somewhat steady level over most parts of their existence. Besides the drop in average CASH 
ETR around the firm age of 23 years32, the average CASH ETR lies between 28 and 34 
                                                 
32 Firms that were already listed in Compustat in 1988 witnessed the Dotcom Bubble Crisis in the 23rd year of the 
sample. 
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percentage points. The divergence between profitable and loss-making domestic firms suggests 
that the distribution of abnormal ETR values, induced by omitted loss years, evidently affects 
the trend of CASH ETR over firm age. 
Table 5 contains the results of regressing CASH ETR over FIRM_AGE instead of TIME, 
analogous to the regressions before:  
Table 5: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Losses over Firm Age 
Dependent Variable CASH ETR 
Panel Multinational Firms  Domestic Firms  
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Dyreng et al. 
(2017)  
Replication 
Controlling 
for LOSS 
Controlling 
for 
LOSS_INT 
Dyreng et al. 
(2017)  
Replication 
Controlling 
for LOSS 
Controlling 
for 
LOSS_INT 
              FIRM_AGE -0.283*** -0.306*** -0.258*** -0.236*** -0.0394 0.0501 
  (0.0241) (0.0412) (0.0414) (0.0257) (0.0522) (0.0499) 
FIRM_AGE x LOSS - 0.0398 - - -0.220*** - 
    (0.0467)     (0.0575)   
LOSS - -6.272*** - - -1.462*** - 
    (1.255)     (0.544)   
LOSS_INT - - -0.568*** - - -0.422*** 
      (0.0816)     (0.0676) 
FIRM_AGE x LOSS_INT - - -0.00571 - - -0.0503*** 
      (0.00699)     (0.00785) 
CONSTANT 32.57*** 34.28*** 36.23*** 29.73*** 31.53*** 33.34*** 
  (2.355) (2.388) (2.385) (1.884) (1.922) (1.911) 
Dyreng et al. (2017) Controls       
Industry Fixed Effects      
Loss-Obs. Omitted      
Observations 27,647 27,647 27,647 29,308 29,308 29,308 
Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.092 0.095 0.093 
Note: The dependent variable is CASH ETR. FIRM_AGE is the difference between the fiscal year of a given firm-year 
observation and the first year in the sample in which the firm was listed. LOSS is binary and equals one for all firms that 
(relative to their lifetime in Compustat) experience at least one loss-year in the sample period. LOSS_INT is the decile in 
which a firm ranks according to the ratio of reported loss-years to all firm years. Control variables are: LOG_ASSETS, R&D, 
PPE, INTANG, LEVERAGE, CAPEX, ADVERT, SPECIAL_ITEMS, NOL and NOL. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Specifications (1) and (4) replicate the original regression by Dyreng et al. (2017) with 
FIRM_AGE instead of TIME and the remaining specifications introduce the LOSS or LOSS_INT 
control and interactions with FIRM_AGE. There are two major take-aways from table 5: First, 
specifications (1) and (4) show that one additional year of FIRM_AGE is associated with a 
decrease of CASH ETR by -0.283 and -0.236 percentage points for multinational and domestic 
firms. This complements the findings of Dyreng et al. (2017) that CASH ETR also decreased 
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over firm-specific age and not just in the cross-sectional yearly aggregate. The coefficient of 
FIRM_AGE is smaller than the TIME coefficient in specification (1) and (4) of table 4, which 
suggests that a substantial part of the documented aggregate trend in cross-sectional CASH ETR 
by Dyreng et al. (2017) results from the coverage of additional, new firms in more recent years 
of Compustat data. The new generations of firms in the sample benefit from lower CASH ETRs 
than the firms that were already longer in the sample.33 Regression specifications (5) and (6) 
deliver the second key insight from table 9: The insignificant coefficient of FIRM_AGE 
indicates that the declining trend in CASH ETR over the life cycle of domestic firms is not 
robust when controlling for the loss-structure in the data. Both interaction terms are negative 
and statistically significant. The CASH ETR of domestic firms that were subject to loss-related 
data truncation declines sharper, by 2.2 percentage points, than the CASH ETR of permanently 
profitable domestic firms. The same holds on the intensive margin: The more loss-years a firm 
initially had in the sample, the more negative is the firm-specific trend in CASH ETR. Thus, 
permanently (and mostly) profitable domestic U.S.-firms did not benefit from decreasing CASH 
ETRs over the years of their existence. On the other hand, multinational U.S.-firms, as a whole, 
did.  
Ultimately, I run regressions on the permanently profitable sample of both multinational 
and domestic firms together in table 6.  
                                                 
33 Figure A2 in the appendix provides graphical evidence on the dynamic coverage of tax aggressive industries 
between multinational and domestic U.S.-firms. 
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Table 6: Corporate Tax Avoidance of Permanently Profitable Firms 
Panel Permanently Profitable Firms 
Dependent Variable CASH ETR HS2018 CASH ETR HS2018 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
TIME -0.404*** -0.0003*** - - 
  (0.0336)  (0.00003)     
TIME x MNE -0.0251 0.0000 - - 
  (0.0449) (0.0001)     
FIRM AGE - - 0.0899** 0.00001 
      (0.0439) (0.00004) 
FIRM AGE x MNE - - -0.309*** -0.0001*** 
      (0.0525) (0.00004) 
MNE 2.522*** 0.0013** 4.644*** 0.0026*** 
  (0.652) (0.0005) (0.563) (0.0005) 
CONSTANT 42.90*** 0.0004 39.56*** -0.0021 
  (2.333) (0.0018) (2.331) (0.0018) 
Dyreng et al. (2017) Controls     
Industry Fixed Effects    
Loss-Obs. Omitted    
Observations 14,875 14,875 14,875 14,875 
Adj. R-squared 0.091 0.076 0.091 0.076 
Note: The dependent variable is CASH ETR. TIME is calculated as the fiscal year of a given firm-year observation 
less the number 1988, which is the first year in the data set. FIRM_AGE is the difference between the fiscal year 
of a given firm-year observation and the first year in the sample in which the firm was listed. LOSS is binary and 
equals one for all firms that (relative to their lifetime in Compustat) experience at least one loss-year in the sample 
period. Control variables are: LOG_ASSETS, R&D, PPE, INTANG, LEVERAGE, CAPEX, ADVERT, 
SPECIAL_ITEMS, NOL and NOL. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
Over the 25-year lasting time-period, there are 1,493 firms that are permanently 
profitable (14,875 observations). As suggested by the graphical evidence in figure 5 and the 
split sample regressions before, the interaction term TIME x MNE is never significant: Neither 
in specification (1) with CASH ETR as dependent variable nor in specification (2) with the 
HS2018 measure of tax avoidance. Thus, the trend in corporate tax aggressiveness is not 
significantly different between profitable multinational and profitable domestic firms when 
measured at the cross-sectional year level over the 25-year lasting period. Contrary, the 
interaction term FIRM_AGE x MNE is negative and statistically significant for both dependent 
variables. Thus, the average decline in CASH ETR per firm year is 0.3 percentage points 
stronger for profitable U.S.-multinationals than for profitable U.S. domestic corporations. In 
fact, the CASH ETR of profitable domestic U.S.-corporations increased slightly by 0.09 
percentage points p.a.. When applying HS2018, the general outcome is similar. The last two 
59 
 
specifications underline that U.S.-multinationals became more tax aggressive on the firm level 
over the 25-year period while domestic U.S.-firms did not. The tax aggressiveness of profitable 
domestic firms did neither change over time when using HS2018. 
2.4.3  Discussion of Results 
My analysis reveals that the Compustat coverage of new tax aggressive firms in more 
recent years contributes substantially to the documented declining trend in cross-
sectional/aggregate CASH ETR over the years 1988 to 2012. The firm-lifetime CASH ETR trend 
is significantly declining, too, but at a lower rate than supposed by the results of Dyreng et al. 
(2017). Most interestingly, the decline in firm-specific CASH ETR of domestic firms is 
attributable to loss-observations and surrounding abnormal CASH ETR values. Given this, it is 
to adhere that domestic U.S.-corporations did not engage in more aggressive tax planning over 
the period 1988 to 2012. Instead, incremental Compustat coverage of additional domestic firms 
from tax aggressive industries determine the documented increasing yearly trend in aggregate 
domestic tax avoidance.  
It is to emphasize that this study neither criticizes the findings of prior research on the 
subject nor desires to correct them in any way. In fact, my results suggest that the findings of 
Dyreng et al. (2017) are robust and no empirical artefact of the loss structure in the data. The 
observed decline in cross-sectional CASH ETR for multinational and domestic firms over the 
financial years 1988 to 2012 remains statistically significant after controlling for the firm-
specific loss structure. However, I recommend a more careful extrapolation of the outcome 
based on yearly aggregate corporate tax avoidance. Inferences from time trends over cross-
sectional levels of an unbalanced panel might not only result from variation within firms over 
time, but also from the dynamic sample composition. When focusing solely on within firm 
variation it becomes clear that multinational and domestic firms evolved differently over time. 
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This, however, has been concealed in the data by abnormal CASH ETR values of loss-making 
firms.34 
Moreover, the findings in this article need to be distinguished from the contribution of 
Henry and Sansing (2018). In fact, my results indicate that loss-observations do not alter the 
time-trend of U.S. corporate tax avoidance when measured by annual aggregations (TIME), 
neither for multinational, nor for domestic firms. Contrary, Henry and Sansing (2018, p. 1065) 
conclude that the inclusion of loss-observations alters the trend in tax avoidance over the years 
(TIME) significantly: They find that multinational firms remained on the same level of tax 
favoritism over their 27-year-period and that domestic firms actually became less tax-favored. 
My results on the permanently profitable subsample (table 6) contradict this finding. I see two 
possible explanations for this: First, as described in section 3.2, loss-firms differ considerably 
from the remaining Compustat population. Henry and Sansing (2018) are likely to include 
numerous shorter-lived and smaller firms35 into the unbalanced panel. This possibly intensifies 
the cross-sectional change with respect to sample characteristics (i.e. industry tax avoidance) 
over time. Another potential reason for their different documentation of tax avoidance over time 
could be the conceptually induced profitability bias in the HS2018 measure, highlighted by 
Guenther (2014). The sharp growth in market capitalization of multinational Compustat firms 
over the sample period might hint towards an inflation of the HS2018 scalar in more recent 
years. Average domestic firms did not experience a likewise increase in market capitalization 
over time. This asymmetry possibly influences the documented divergence in the HS2018 
measure for multinational and domestic firms on the aggregate level.36 
                                                 
34 The approach of Dyreng et al. (2017) to control for firm-years with existing TCLFs (NOL, NOL) does not 
solve this problem. This is due to the poor quality of the available TLCF proxies in Compustat (Heitzman and 
Lester, 2018a) and the fact that not only ETRs one year after a loss, but several surrounding year ETRs are likely 
distorted (see Figure 4). 
35 Henry and Sansing (2018) leave unclear whether they apply a minimum size requirement for firms (e.g. book 
value of assets).  
36 Figure A1 in the Appendix illustrates the average market capitalization for multinational and domestic firms 
over time. 
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Considering the extent of loss-firms and their distinct characteristics in the Compustat 
database, the robustness of the detected time trend (TIME) in Dyreng et al. (2017) might appear 
surprising on first sight. But it is to note that Dyreng et al. (2017) apply minimum criteria for 
size (more than ten million USD in total assets) and Compustat coverage (more than 5 year 
observations) in the sample selection process. In view of the average small size and short 
lifetime of persistently loss-making firms, this way Dyreng et al. (2017) already ensure that a 
substantial amount of loss-firms is not included in the analysis and, consequently, was not 
included in my replication of the study. Therefore, for the sake of robustness to loss-
observations, tax researchers should generally be advised to ensure certain minimum criteria 
with respect to firm size, year coverage and/or a minimum requirement for profitability. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This article addresses the question whether loss-observations can be implemented in the 
measurement of corporate tax avoidance and analyzes how the handling of losses affects the 
measurement outcome. Tax avoidance researchers have two choices regarding the treatment of 
NOLs: They either remove losses from the sample or include them by using specific, asset-
scaled, measures of corporate tax avoidance. Asset-scaled measures, like BTDs, have the 
advantage over profit-scaled measures, like ETRs, that the scalar is independent of pretax 
income, such that loss-observations can be included in the analysis. However, this advantage 
comes at the cost of a scaling bias, highlighted by Guenther (2014), as such measures differ 
between firms of equal tax avoidance but varying profitability.  
My descriptive results confirm that BTD and the novel HS2018 measure label less-
profitable industries more tax aggressive than ETRs do. Moreover, I find that the intake of loss-
observations changes the samples of tax researchers substantially: Using BTD (HS2018) instead 
of CURRENT ETR (CASH ETR) increases sample size up to 43 percent (28 percent) while the 
newly gained loss-observations in Compustat are concentrated within a remarkably smaller, 
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shorter-lived and younger subset of steadily unprofitable firms. This underlines that financial 
losses do not occur randomly between corporations and time-periods. Therefore, tax researchers 
should be clear on whether they would like to include such specific firms in their analyses. 
Moreover, I show that the removal of loss-observations from tax researchers’ samples 
can have profound effects on the measurement of corporate tax avoidance. I document that one 
single financial loss does not only yield a non-meaningful ETR for the loss-year itself, but also 
distorted ETRs for several succeeding and preceding financial years of such firms. Thus, even 
studies that remove loss-observations from the sample deal with distorted ETR values, which 
could erroneously be interpreted as tax avoidance. In view of this, I revise the declining trend 
in CASH ETR for domestic firms detected by Dyreng et al. (2017). I control for the initial loss-
structure of firms in the original study and observe that the decline in CASH ETR of domestic 
U.S.-firms is to some part attributable to distorted ETR values that are linked to the loss-
structure in the data. Hence, contrary to multinationals, profitable domestic U.S.-corporations 
did not engage in more aggressive tax planning over the years of their existence. This finding 
is new because so far abnormal ETR values of loss-making firms insinuated that domestic firms 
as a whole became more tax aggressive. My results contribute to the tax literature by showing 
the lingering effect of loss-observations on the measurement of tax avoidance. Only when losses 
are taken into account, it becomes clear that U.S. domestic firms evolved differently with 
respect to successful tax planning than U.S.-multinationals. 
From a practical point of view, the measurement of corporate tax avoidance in the 
presence of NOLs is essentially more complicated than in their absence. Tax researchers can 
include loss-observations in their samples by applying asset-scaled proxies as BTD or HS2018. 
However, they should pay attention to the heterogeneous characteristics of non-prospering 
firms and the confounding effect of firm profitability (in years of positive earnings) on the 
measured outcome. Only then, NOLs can meaningfully be included in the measurement of 
corporate tax avoidance. Nevertheless, firms that steadily report negative earnings yield little, 
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if not any, information content in terms of tax avoidance. If researchers decide to remove loss-
observations from their samples, they should implement (manually constructed) NOL 
indicators before and after loss-years and, still, remain aware of the initial loss-structure in their 
data. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
ADVERT The ratio of advertising expense (xad; if missing set to zero) to sales (sale). 
AGE 
The difference between the financial year of the firm-year observation and the first financial 
year in which the firm was listed in Compustat. 
BTD 
The difference between pretax income (pi) and approximated taxable income (txc/ 𝜏), scaled 
by total assets (at). 
CAPEX The amount spent on capital assets (capx) scaled by net property, plant and equipment (ppent). 
CASH ETR The ratio of cash taxes paid (txpd) to pretax income (pi). 
CASH ETR-
Deviation 
The difference between the annual CASH ETR and the firm’s LONG RUN CASH ETR for the 
ten year-period before or after the loss year (in section 4.1). 
CURRENT ETR 
The ratio of current income taxes (txc) to pretax income (pi); the latter adjusted for special 
items (xi). 
FIRM_AGE 
The difference between the fiscal year for a given firm-year observation less the first fiscal 
year in which the company was listed in the Dyreng et al. (2017) data set. 
GAAP ETR 
The ratio of total income taxes (txt) to pretax income (pi); the latter adjusted for special items 
(xi). 
GAAP ETR-
Deviation 
The difference between the annual GAAP ETR and the firm’s LONG RUN GAAP ETR for the 
ten year-period before or after the loss year (in section 4.1). 
HS2018 
The difference between adjusted cash taxes paid (txpd-txr) and expected statutory tax 
liability (𝜏* pi), scaled by market value of total assets (at +mkvalt -ceq). 
INTANG The amount of Intangible Assets (intan) scaled by total assets (at). 
MNE 
Indicator for multinational firm-years and is equal to one if the absolute value of pretax foreign 
income (pifo) is greater than zero or if the absolute value of foreign tax expense (txfo) is greater 
than zero. 
LEVERAGE The total debt (dltt + dlc) scaled by total assets (at). 
LIFETIME 
The difference between the most recently recorded financial year of a firm and the first 
financial year in which the firm is listed in Compustat. 
LOG_ASSETS The natural log of total assets (at). 
LOSS 
Firm-level Indicator variable that equals one if a firm experienced at least one negative pretax 
income (pi) in the sample period before data processing. 
LOSS_INT 
The decile in which a firm ranks in the sample according to its number of loss-years (pi < 0) 
relative to its covered firm years in the sample period. 
MARKET_BOOK 
The ratio of market value of a firm’s equity (mkvalt; if missing replaced by share price (prcc_f) 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding (csho)). 
NOL 
Indicator variable equal to one if Compustat reports a tax-loss carryforward (tlcf) at the end of 
the previous year. 
NOL 
The change in net operating losses and is the difference between the current and lagged tax-
loss carryforward (tlcf), scaled by lagged total assets (at). 
PPE The ratio of net property, plant and equipment (ppent) to total assets (at). 
R&D 
The amount of research and development expense (xrd; if missing set to zero) scaled by the 
sales (sale). 
ROA The ratio of pretax income (pi) to total assets (at). 
ROMVA The ratio of pretax income (pi) to market value of total assets (at +mkvalt –ceq) 
SALES The absolute USD amount of sales (sale). 
SPECIAL_ITEMS The ratio of special items (spi; if missing set to zero) to average total assets (at). 
TIME 
The difference between the fiscal year for a given firm-year observation less the number 1988, 
which is the first year in the Dyreng et al. (2017) data set. 
TOTAL_ASSETS The absolute USD amount of total assets (at) in millions. 
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Table A2: Complete Industry Tax Avoidance Ranking by Selected Measures 
Industry Code Firms Cash ETR 
Current 
ETR BTD HS 2018 
Petroleum and Gas 30 290 1 (0.135) 1 (0.156) 1 (0.021) 1 (-0.006) 
Real Estate 47 100 2 (0.14) 2 (0.182) 5 (0.008) 11 (-0.002) 
Computer Software 36 671 3 (0.192) 9 (0.289) 23 (-0.002) 9 (-0.003) 
Computers 35 206 4 (0.198) 11 (0.292) 28 (-0.005) 8 (-0.003) 
Electronic Equipment 37 433 5 (0.205) 6 (0.268) 8 (0.006) 3 (-0.003) 
Transportation 41 190 6 (0.211) 3 (0.227) 2 (0.02) 2 (-0.006) 
Entertainment 7 131 7 (0.228) 5 (0.265) 14 (0.002) 15 (-0.002) 
Medical Equipment 12 232 8 (0.247) 15 (0.305) 11 (0.004) 5 (-0.003) 
Communication 32 225 9 (0.25) 4 (0.254) 9 (0.005) 19 (-0.001) 
Pharmaceutical  13 240 10 (0.251) 14 (0.303) 7 (0.006) 10 (-0.002) 
Restaurants, Hotels, etc. 44 166 11 (0.256) 10 (0.29) 4 (0.009) 4 (-0.003) 
Measuring. Eq. 38 159 12 (0.257) 17 (0.312) 15 (0.002) 12 (-0.002) 
Healthcare 11 207 13 (0.257) 18 (0.314) 24 (-0.002) 16 (-0.002) 
Insurance 46 228 14 (0.262) 7 (0.279) 10 (0.005) 13 (-0.002) 
Steel Works Etc 19 102 15 (0.266) 12 (0.293) 6 (0.007) 7 (-0.003) 
Banking 45 128 16 (0.267) 13 (0.294) 16 (0.002) 22 (-0.001) 
Chemicals 14 132 17 (0.274) 8 (0.287) 3 (0.012) 6 (-0.003) 
Recreation 6 65 18 (0.282) 19 (0.316) 21 (-0.000) 28 (0.0001) 
Machinery 21 236 19 (0.286) 20 (0.316) 12 (0.004) 14 (-0.002) 
Personal Services 33 99 20 (0.291) 23 (0.326) 19 (0.001) 17 (-0.002) 
Electrical Equipment 22 100 21 (0.292) 24 (0.327) 22 (-0.000) 18 (-0.001) 
Business Services 34 457 22 (0.294) 26 (0.332) 26 (-0.003) 24 (-0.001) 
Business Supplies 39 93 23 (0.3) 16 (0.311) 13 (0.003) 20 (-0.001) 
Construction Materials 17 161 24 (0.304) 21 (0.32) 18 (0.001) 27 (-0.001) 
Automobiles and Trucks 23 107 25 (0.307) 22 (0.321) 20 (-0.000) 23 (-0.001) 
Construction 18 107 26 (0.311) 31 (0.356) 31 (-0.006) 26 (-0.001) 
Food Products 2 137 27 (0.312) 25 (0.332) 17 (0.001) 21 (-0.001) 
Rubber and Plastic  15 81 28 (0.315) 27 (0.333) 25 (-0.003) 30 (0.0001) 
Apparel 10 111 29 (0.322) 29 (0.352) 29 (-0.005) 25 (-0.001) 
Consumer Goods 9 117 30 (0.324) 28 (0.348) 27 (-0.004) 31 (0.0001) 
Wholesale 42 343 31 (0.326) 30 (0.356) 30 (-0.005) 32 (0.0001) 
Retail 43 428 32 (0.327) 32 (0.358) 32 (-0.006) 29 (0.0001) 
Printing and Publishing 8 61 33 (0.337) 33 (0.358) 33 (-0.008) 33 (0.001) 
Note: A lower rank describes higher tax avoidance for all measures. Profitability The total sample contains 
55,230 observations and spans the time-period 1990 to 2017.  
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Table A3: Industry Sample Selection by Tax Avoidance Measure 
Sample 
    Current ETR&                                     
BTD 
Only BTD 
    CASH ETR &  
HS2018 
Only HS2018 
Observations 79,901 68,245 73,023 47,654 
      
Computer Software 6.5% 11.7% 5.7% 11.5% 
Pharmaceutical Products 2.6% 11.4% 2.3% 6.7% 
Electronic Equipment 4.9% 5.8% 4.5% 6.6% 
Business Services 5.4% 4.9% 5.0% 5.2% 
Other 2.3% 4.8% 1.9% 4.7% 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 3.3% 4.6% 3.1% 5.0% 
Medical Equipment 2.6% 4.4% 2.4% 3.5% 
Fin. Trading  8.2% 4.1% 6.9% 4.6% 
Note: The Baseline Sample 1 refers to the subsample of observations which provide meaningful observations for 
both BTD and CURRENT ETR (53% of population). The BTD Surplus Sample only provides meaningful values 
for BTD (44%). The Baseline Sample 2 refers to the subsample of observations that provide meaningful values 
for both HS2018 and CASH ETR (57%). The HS2018 Surplus Sample only provides meaningful values for 
HS2018 (34%). The subsamples that produce only meaningful values for CURRENT ETR (3%) or CASH ETR 
(9%) have been ignored for the purpose of this table. 
 
Table A4: Sample Characteristics of One-Loss-Year Sample 
Variable  N Mean P25 P50 P75 SD Min Max 
AGE (Years)     3,566    23.41 11.00 19.00 35.00 15.63 0.00 66.00 
LIFETIME      3,566    35.93 23.00 32.00 48.00 15.47 15.00 68.00 
SALES     3,549    3294.1 140.2 607.3 2711.1 6937.6 -3.2 81186.0 
TOTAL_ASSETS     3,554    10673.7 318.9 1211.4 5352.3 31388.1 1.7 393780.0 
 MNE     3,566    0.355 0 0 1 0.479 0.000 1.000 
ROA     3,549    0.067 0.015 0.050 0.103 0.081 -0.937 0.761 
R&D     3,549    0.014 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.041 0.000 0.744 
PPE     3,423    0.231 0.022 0.142 0.352 0.244 0.000 0.948 
INTANG     3,299    0.098 0.000 0.023 0.137 0.149 0.000 0.829 
LEVERAGE      3,548    0.210 0.053 0.162 0.310 0.198 0.000 1.937 
CAPEX     3,129    0.203 0.092 0.159 0.271 0.165 -0.009 2.192 
ADVERT     3,554    0.010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.038 0.000 0.476 
SPECIAL_ITEMS      3,554    -0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.039 -1.014 0.532 
NOL     3,566    0.186 0 0 0 0.390 0.000 1.000 
MARKET_BOOK      3,172    2.62 1.17 1.72 2.79 9.36 -12.44 482.90 
GAAP ETR     3,546    0.27 0.25 0.33 0.38 0.55 -10.69 4.54 
CASH ETR     3,236    0.19 0.10 0.25 0.36 1.25 -23.10 11.43 
 Note: Table A4 is based on a sample of 189 firms (3,546 observations) over 21 firm-specific years between 
1990 and 2017. All firms in the sample experience exactly one loss-year over the period. 
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Figure A1: The Difference between Firm Age and Time  
 
Note: Figure A1 shows the median values of TIME and FIRM_AGE of multinational and domestic 
firms over the financial years in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample. The further the median FIRM_AGE 
falls below the TIME median in the graph, the more new firms have entered (and the more formerly 
covered firms dropped out of) the Compustat population in the given year. Until the year 1995, the 
upper 50 percent of all firms were already existent in 1988 in the data. This holds for multinationals 
until the year 2002. However, the coverage of new domestic firms in Compustat was much more 
comprehensive. Already in 1996, more than 50 percent of all existing domestic firms were added 
belatedly, after 1988, to the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample. Multinational firms have been added to the 
sample, too, but not in a similar scope and later in time. This highlights that the TIME coefficient of 
Dyreng et al. (2017) does not measure the change in CASH ETR of given firms over time but the cross-
sectional aggregate change in CASH ETR, which is affected by dynamic sample composition. 
 
Figure A2: Compustat Coverage of Tax Aggressive Industries over Time  
 
Note: Figure A2 shows the Compustat coverage of tax aggressive industries separately for 
multinational and domestic U.S. firms in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample between 1988 and 2012. 
The top ten tax aggressive industries are Petroleum and Natural Gas, Real Estate, Computer 
Software, Computers, Electronic Equipment, Transportation, Entertainment, Medical Equipment, 
Communication and Pharmaceutical Products. The sample contains 56,955 observations after the 
removal of NOLs. 
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Figure A3: Market Capitalization over Time  
 
Note: Figure A3 shows the development of average market capitalization (in Million USD) of 
public multinational and domestic U.S. firms in the Dyreng et al. (2017) sample. The sample 
contains 56,955 observations after the removal of NOLs. 
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3.1 Introduction 
It is well known that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can avoid taxes. However, there 
is no broad agreement about the definition of “aggressive” tax avoidance. We propose a new 
measure for the aggressive part of international tax avoidance of MNEs and apply it to U.S. 
MNEs. Moreover, we show how the additional information provided by a country-by-country 
reporting scheme (CbCR) fits perfectly the purpose of our new measure and apply it to CbCR 
data in the European banking sector. 
Aggressive tax avoidance of MNEs has received much attention recently. The debate 
has been stimulated by very low effective tax rates (ETRs) disclosed in consolidated financial 
statements and low tax payments in certain countries of some well-known firms. For example, 
Google Inc. paid only $ 0.36 billion foreign taxes on $ 8.1 billion of non-U.S. profits in 2012, 
which leads to a foreign ETR lower than 5 percent.37 As statutory tax rates on corporate income 
are significantly higher in most industrialized countries, this creates a gap between disclosed 
tax position and common expectations about the tax level imposed. Many citizens argue that 
MNEs should pay their fair share of taxes in every country where they operate. Recently, a 
study by Janský (2019) shows that affiliates of MNEs in all EU member states have lower ETRs 
than the respective nominal statutory tax rates. We, however, argue that the home country 
statutory tax rate is no adequate benchmark. MNEs pay their taxes in all countries of operation 
and consequently face different statutory tax rates. 
Therefore, we propose a new measure of international tax avoidance based on the gap 
between worldwide expected and actually paid tax payments. Our new measure ETRDIFF is 
computed as the difference between a benchmark tax level that would be expected if a firm paid 
its fair share of taxes and its ETR disclosed in consolidated financial accounts. As the 
benchmark tax level, we consider an average of the statutory tax rates imposed by all countries 
                                                 
37 Google U.K. paid £ 11.2m in corporate tax, The Financial Times, 30/09/2013. 
77 
 
worldwide that host at least one subsidiary of the respective MNE. The ETR is defined as 
worldwide tax expenses divided by worldwide pre-tax income of a MNE. Thus, the ETR 
represents a well-established ex-post measure for the effectively realized taxes of a firm. 
Considering the difference between the two measures, our new ETRDIFF measure isolates the 
additional or even aggressive part of international tax avoidance from the simple influence of 
differences in host country tax levels.  
Our measure does not categorize a MNE as tax aggressive if its low ETR is caused by 
low statutory tax rates of its host countries, e.g. in certain Eastern European countries. On the 
other hand, a firm is classified as tax aggressive if the gap between its expected benchmark tax 
rate and the actually realized ETR increases, for instance due to income shifting techniques. 
While the ETR can be taken from the financial accounts of public firms, the collection of 
information about the location of economic activities is more challenging. However, disclosure 
rules already oblige public firms to publish a list of their significant subsidiaries (e.g. Exhibit 
21 of SEC Form 10-k). We use this information about the worldwide distribution of a firm’s 
economic activities and compute our new ETRDIFF measure for U.S. firms. We consider 
different versions of our ETRDIFF measure referring to the GAAP ETR, the CASH ETR and 
the FOREIGN ETR.  
For a sample of U.S. firms from 2002 until 2012, we find an average FOREIGN ETRDIFF 
of approximately 5 percentage points. This suggests that U.S. firms clearly undercut the mean 
of all foreign statutory tax rates. Hence, U.S. MNEs in our sample appear to engage in 
aggressive tax planning that goes beyond the mere benefitting from moderate corporate tax 
rates. We also validate our measure with established proxies for international tax avoidance. 
Our analysis shows that larger tax haven operations or the enhanced opportunities to manipulate 
transfer prices are clearly associated with a higher value of our ETRDIFF measure. 
A concern with the data disclosed by MNEs is the lack of detailed information regarding 
the structures of their worldwide activities. Thus, in subsequent case-studies, we focus on a 
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specific industry where such valuable data exist. Since 2014, a European directive obliged 
financial institutions headquartered in the European Economic Area (EEA) to publicly disclose 
key financial and tax information on a country-by-country level. We show that the data 
provided by a CbCR can be implemented in the construction of a more refined version of our 
new measure. We exploit this – so far unique – data and compute our ETRDIFF measure for 
the largest European banks. This application shows that our measure can be used to condense 
the data set provided by a CbCR. Consequently, applying our ETRDIFF measure to CbCR data 
allows a proper distinction between the aggressive part of tax avoidance and tax differences 
that are associated with different statutory tax rate imposed by different host countries. 
The previous literature has already investigated tax avoidance of MNEs (for an overview 
cf. Dharmapala, 2014; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Most of the literature considers financial 
accounting data and refers to different types of ETRs (Collins and Shackelford, 1995, 2003; 
Rego, 2003; Plesko, 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). A few studies analyze 
abnormal or permanent differences between book and tax income (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006, 2009; Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009).  
The idea of using a differential between effective taxes and statutory tax rate as tax 
avoidance measure is also known in the tax literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p. 140). As 
subsidiaries of MNEs are subject to different tax levels in their host countries, we argue that a 
reduction in the ETR resulting from foreign economic activities should not be denoted as 
“aggressive” tax avoidance. Only an additional tax reduction should be attributed to aggressive 
tax avoidance. Considering the influence of international tax rate variation, we replace the 
statutory tax rate of the home country by the average of all statutory tax rates imposed by all 
host countries of a MNE.  
Our approach also relates to a measure proposed by Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay 
(2019) that benchmarks a firm’s tax level with its industry mean. Using the industry mean as a 
benchmark, however, might lead to some underestimation of the scope of tax avoidance if the 
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majority of industry-peers avoid taxes as well. Accordingly, previous evidence has not 
disentangled the elementary effect of tax rate variation across host countries from additional or 
even aggressive tax avoidance like transfer pricing, royalties or ‘check-the-box’ techniques. To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a measure of tax avoidance that isolates 
the effect of more aggressive international tax planning strategies from the simple influence of 
differences in host country tax rates. This way, we provide a more refined assessment of 
corporate tax avoidance and expand the discussion of fair tax payments beyond already 
mentioned firms with strikingly low ETRs by any standards.  
We contribute to the current discussion about base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) of 
MNEs (OECD, 2014). In particular, the OECD requests new measures to analyze the scope and 
the determinants of base erosion and profit shifting. We believe that it is important to distinguish 
between MNEs with justified low tax expenses and MNEs that are truly tax aggressive. Only 
then, targeted policy actions can be designed effectively in the combat against global tax 
avoidance. Moreover, we show that the additional information provided by a CbCR can be used 
to identify more aggressive forms of tax avoidance. The OECD base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) project suggests only a confidential CbCR available for tax authorities (OECD, 2015). 
This paper, however, demonstrates how such data could be used outside tax authorities. 
Consequently, we hope to stimulate the ongoing debate about public CbCR.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose our new 
measure for the aggressive part of tax avoidance. In Section 3, we apply our measure to U.S. 
MNEs and in section 4 to large European banks. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2 Measuring International Tax Avoidance 
3.2.1 The Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance 
Until now, there does neither exist a uniform definition of corporate tax aggressiveness 
nor an academic consensus on how to measure it (Blouin, 2014). Instead, tax researchers apply 
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numerous empirical proxies when examining tax aggressiveness. A broad literature has 
analyzed subsidiary level data and provides evidence for international tax avoidance, e.g. due 
to income shifting (cf. Hines Jr and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Blouin, Robinson 
and Seidman, 2012; Klassen and LaPlante, 2012a, 2012b). However, insights into the scale of 
the global tax avoidance of MNEs requires an analysis based on data from the consolidated 
financial statements of MNEs. ETRs and Book Tax Differences (BTDs) represent probably the 
two most widely used measurement concepts for tax avoidance and often appear together in 
research designs (e.g. Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009; Lennox, Lisowsky and Pittman, 2013). 
Both measures relate tax expense and pre-tax financial income. The ETR describes the 
respective average tax rate paid for one unit of financial income (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). 
BTDs portray the gap between a company’s financial and (approximated) taxable income 
(Manzon Jr and Plesko, 2002). Thus, lower (higher) ETRs (BTDs) signal tax aggressiveness.  
However, BTDs are constructed via grossing up taxable income by dividing the tax 
expense through the statutory tax rate of the firm’s country of incorporation. Hence, the concept 
of BTD automatically benchmarks a company’s tax expense to the expected statutory tax 
expense in its home country.38 The metric of the ETR does not involve an automatic benchmark 
such that researchers often resort to individual comparisons. While many scholars follow the 
most obvious choice to compare ETR to the company’s home country statutory tax rate (e.g. 
Dyreng, Hoopes and Wild, 2016), others choose differently. For example, Balakrishnan et al. 
(2019) decide to capture relative tax avoidance by measuring the differential between firm-
specific ETR and the average ETR of similar sized industry-peers. However, the industry 
benchmarking can only identify tax avoidance that is not typical for the industry. 
Regarding international tax avoidance, a few studies have investigated the impact of 
foreign activities on the ETR. Rego (2003), Collins and Shackelford (1995, 2003) as well as 
                                                 
38 BTDs are usually scaled by book value of total assets to be comparable between firms of different size. See 
Guenther (2014) for a conceptual comparison of BTD and ETR. 
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Markle and Shackelford (2012a) compare ETRs of MNEs with those of domestic firms. 
Expectations for the impact of international activities on the ETR are ambiguous. On the one 
hand, investments in high tax countries like the U.S., Canada, Germany or Japan are associated 
with increasing ETRs. On the other hand, MNEs invest in low tax countries or even tax havens. 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012a, 2012b) consider tax haven 
operations and proxies for profit-shifting channels as determinants of ETR measures.  
Recently, a study by Janský (2019) on MNEs’ worldwide ETRs fueled the ongoing debate 
about whether corporations pay their fair share. The study shows that affiliates of MNEs in all 
EU member states have lower ETRs than the respective nominal statutory tax rates. On the 
basis of these results, the Greens, a German based political party in the European parliament 
who commissioned the study, posit the introduction of minimum effective tax rates in the EU 
to stop the tax competition in the European Union (Janský, 2019, p. 4).  
We believe that low ETRs of MNEs’ unconsolidated affiliates should be interpreted with 
caution. First, a low ETR of an unconsolidated affiliate cannot be linked to MNEs’ cross-border 
profit-shifting activities because income shifting also affects by definition pre-tax income, as 
the denominator of the ETR. Moreover, low ETRs of certain firms, in particular holding firms, 
are to a certain degree expected from the design of national tax systems. Dividends received 
from other subsidiaries are (almost) tax-exempt because they reflect income that was already 
subject to tax at the level of the other subsidiary. Second, even when discussing the ETR of 
consolidated group accounts, we argue that the home country statutory tax rate is no adequate 
benchmark. Under territorial tax regimes, MNEs pay their taxes in all countries of operation 
and consequently face different statutory tax rates.39 Thus, the worldwide tax liability of a MNE 
should not be benchmarked solely against the statutory tax rate of a single country.  
                                                 
39 The effect is similar under quasi-territorial tax systems like the U.S. system prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
if permanently re-invested earnings are not subject to tax in the home country. 
82 
 
In fact, we argue that a substantial part of MNEs (headquartered in high-tax countries) is 
wrongly perceived as too tax aggressive while other MNEs (headquartered in low-tax countries) 
are not recognized sufficiently critical when following the described logic above. Our argument 
can be illustrated by the example of a hypothetical manufacturing firm headquartered in France. 
Suppose the company has outsourced substantial parts of its production to subsidiaries in 
Eastern European countries due to lower wages than in France. Hence, the firm will produce, 
for example, in Hungary, a country with a statutory tax rate of 9% in 2015. The after-tax profit 
of the Hungarian subsidiary is distributed to the French parent company where intercompany 
dividends are almost tax exempt. Most likely, the company also has a production line in France 
and pays the French corporate income tax rate (33.3%) on profits generated there. In absence 
of any income shifting strategies, the total tax liability of the group should equal something 
between the French and the Hungarian statutory tax rates, depending on the distribution of 
geographical activity. 
As international differences in corporate tax rates are significant in magnitude and 
subsidiaries are subject to taxation in their host countries, we argue that a reduction in the ETR 
resulting from the incorporation of an additional foreign subsidiary in a host country with a 
moderate tax level should not be denoted as “aggressive” tax avoidance.40 Only an additional 
reduction of tax expenses should be attributed to additional or even aggressive tax avoidance. 
Therefore, we suggest to reconsider existing benchmarks for “fair amount of taxes paid” and 
propose a more differentiated measure to distill the aggressive part of international tax 
avoidance from MNEs’ worldwide tax payments.  
                                                 
40 Here, it is to emphasize that we clearly distinguish between countries with moderate tax rates and tax havens. 
We design our new measure such that the benchmark is not watered-down by tax rates of tax havens. 
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3.2.2 A New Measure for Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
We denote our new measure as ETRDIFF because it is computed as the difference 
between a firm’s individual benchmark tax level and an ETR. The ETR is taken from the 
consolidated financial accounts of a firm and a commonly used proxy for tax avoidance in 
previous literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). A lower ETR suggests that a firm has realized 
less tax expenses than other firms with higher ETRs. We benchmark the ETR against the 
expected tax level that would occur if the MNE pays taxes at the statutory tax level. Therefore, 
we compute the following measures for each multinational firm i in fiscal year t: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡   (Eq.1) 
where: 
𝑆𝑇𝑅:  Worldwide average of the statutory corporate tax rates 
of all host countries of firm i where at least one 
subsidiary is located (no consideration of tax haven 
countries).41  
ETR:  Effective tax rate measure like the GAAP ETR, CASH 
ETR or FOREIGN ETR. 
 
The ETRDIFF measure identifies abnormally low ETRs that cannot be explained by a 
benchmark tax level. Accordingly, we categorize a MNE as tax aggressive if its ETRDIFF is 
positive. This means that its ETR is abnormally low compared to a benchmark tax level that 
would be expected in the absence of any profit shifting strategies and shell corporations in tax 
haven countries. We use different versions of our ETRDIFF, considering established versions 
of ETR like, for example, the GAAP ETR, CASH ETR or the FOREIGN ETR. 
Our benchmark 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is the average of the statutory corporate income tax rates of all 
countries worldwide that host a subsidiary of the respective firm. Since 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is used as a proxy 
for the expected tax level according to the distribution of real economic activities, we do not 
                                                 
41 We classify countries as tax havens according to the established tax haven list of Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
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consider typical tax haven countries for the computation.42 Our benchmark tax level is 
determined by a firm’s individual business model, i.e. by location choices, but is not affected 
by particular aggressive tax planning strategies. 
We argue that the statutory corporate tax rate of a host country is a convincing benchmark 
for the proper tax level of a MNE’s subsidiary in the absence of any additional tax planning 
activities. The incorporation of an additional subsidiary in a host country with a moderate 
corporate tax rate affects both the ETR as well as the 𝑆𝑇𝑅. If a MNE benefits from additional 
tax savings due to profit shifting or other aggressive international tax planning, the ETR 
decreases while the 𝑆𝑇𝑅 remains constant. The more extensively a MNE uses tax planning 
strategies to decouple the locations of its business activities from those of taxable income, the 
wider fall 𝑆𝑇𝑅 and ETR apart. Our approach allows to isolate the aggressive part of international 
tax avoidance and to identify the impact of certain tax planning strategies. The ETRDIFF 
reflects the scope of additional tax planning that cannot be explained by the distribution of a 
firm’s real activities, i.e. the subsidiary locations.  
The main challenge associated with the computation of the benchmark tax level 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is 
data availability. Information on the international structure of a MNE is required but only 
rudimentary disclosed. However, SEC rules (Exhibit 21 of form 10-k) and IFRS 10 specify the 
disclosure of a list of all subsidiaries considered. Such data allow the construction of 𝑆𝑇𝑅 as an 
arithmetic mean of statutory tax rate across all host countries of a firm.  
This benchmark might be already a good heuristic for the idea that a MNE should pay its 
fair share of taxes. A more refined benchmark 𝑆𝑇𝑅 could also consider a weighting scheme in 
accordance with the scale of real economic activities of a MNE at each of its locations. Proxies 
for economic activity or value creation are, for example, sales or the number of employees. 
                                                 
42 In further analysis we also modify the ETRDIFF measure and include tax haven locations but consider a 
weighting scheme that refers to host country sales as a proxy for size of real economic activities at each location 
of a MNE. 
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Unfortunately, complete subsidiary-level data on sales or employees is not available for most 
MNEs. Well-known databases like Amadeus or Orbis include only an incomplete number of 
subsidiaries and detailed financial data is missing for more than 50 percent of them. However, 
the data provided by a CbCR perfectly fit and can be directly used to compute a weighted 
average benchmark tax level 𝑆𝑇𝑅. In Section 4, we will therefore exploit actual CbCR data 
from the European banking sector. 
3.3 Measuring Aggressive Tax Avoidance of U.S. MNEs 
In this section, we apply our ETRDIFF measure to U.S. MNEs listed in the S&P 500 
index. We use the S&P 500 index for two reasons: First, U.S. corporations have been at the 
center of the public debate about aggressive base erosion and international tax planning 
activities. Second, U.S. listed firms are obliged by SEC regulation to disclose a list of their 
significant subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of form 10-k. We use this information about the structure 
of the worldwide activities of MNEs and compute our new measure.  
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
We consider a panel of U.S. firms listed in the S&P 500 over the period from 2002 to 
2012. We use financial data from Compustat North America (5,907 firm-year observations). 
The construction of our ETRDIFF measure requires information about foreign subsidiary 
locations. Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k contains information about significant subsidiaries (Item 
601 of SEC Regulation S-K).43 Similar to Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), we use the subsidiary 
information disclosed in Exhibit 21 and available at the SEC’s database EDGAR.44 Companies 
                                                 
43 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), a subsidiary can be deemed not to be a significant 
subsidiary if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ 
investments in the subsidiary do not exceed 10 % of the parent company’s total assets; (2) the parent company’s 
and its other subsidiaries’ investments proportionate share of the assets of the subsidiary do not exceed 10 % of 
the consolidated firm’s total assets; and (3) the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ investments 
proportionate share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income from continuing operations does not exceed 10 % of the 
consolidated income from continuing operations. 
44 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
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which do not provide an Exhibit 21 in EDGAR are not included in our data sample. We refer 
to the group structure disclosed in the Exhibit 21 from the year 2007 because subsequently, 
U.S. companies removed hundreds of offshore subsidiaries from their publicly disclosed 
financial filings in the successive years.45 Moreover, we limit our sample to multinational U.S.-
based firms and thus delete all firms which are not headquartered in the U.S. and have only 
domestic subsidiaries. Imposing these prerequisites on the dataset results in a sample of 4,345 
firm-year observations. On average, one U.S. firm in our sample has 132 foreign subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, we limit the sample to companies that have a positive pre-tax income (pi) 
as it is difficult to analyze tax planning activities of loss firms (cf. Stickney and McGee, 1982; 
Zimmermann, 1983; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Rego, 2003).46 We exclude observations with 
ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1 to limit the influence of outliers.  
3.3.2 Measurement of Aggressive Tax Avoidance of U.S. MNEs 
We apply the methodology described in Section 2.1 to compute our ETRDIFF measures 
for each firm included in our sample. We consider different ETR definitions47 like the GAAP 
ETR as well as the CASH ETR and the FOREIGN ETR to compute the GAAP ETRDIFF, the 
CASH ETRDIFF and the FOREIGN ETRDIFF. Table 1 depicts mean values for the GAAP 
ETRDIFF, the CASH ETRDIFF and the FOREIGN ETRDIFF of U.S. MNEs. 
As benchmark tax level, we consider the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates of all 
host countries of a firm (𝑆𝑇𝑅). Tax haven countries are neglected because setting up a tax haven 
subsidiary might be already interpreted as an aggressive form of tax avoidance. The mean value 
for the 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is 0.32 which is smaller than the U.S. tax level due to smaller corporate tax rates 
                                                 
45 Cf. The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary – From Google to FedEx, Wall Street Journal, 5/22/2013. 
46 In case of the FOREIGN ETR measures, we require a positive pre-tax foreign income (pifo). 
47 GAAP ETR is defined as total taxes divided by pre-tax profit less extraordinary items. The numerator of the 
CASH ETR is computed by using cash taxes paid (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). FOREIGN ETR is the sum 
of foreign current taxes and foreign deferred income taxes divided by foreign pre-tax income. 
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imposed by several host countries. The standard deviation of the benchmark 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is 0.037 
suggesting very different tax levels in the host countries of MNEs.  
Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, the U.S. tax system was worldwide. Foreign 
income of U.S. MNEs was subject to U.S. corporate income taxes at repatriation. However, 
U.S. taxes could be deferred if foreign income was retained. Many U.S. firms avoid 
redistribution and prefer to reinvest or hold just cash in their foreign subsidiaries (Foley, 
Hartzell, Titman and Twite, 2007). Moreover, ASC 740-30-25-3 provides an exception to 
deferred tax accounting for permanently reinvested foreign earnings.48 We therefore neglect 
repatriation taxes when computing our benchmark 𝑆𝑇𝑅.  
Considering the U.S. firms in our sample, the mean GAAP ETRDIFF is 0.018 (Panel A). 
The value of 0.018 indicates that the difference between the GAAP ETR (sample mean: 30.2 
percent) and the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates of all host countries of a firm (sample 
mean: 32 percent) is 1.8 percentage points. The mean values for the CASH ETRDIFF and 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF are larger and amount to 0.062 and 0.050, respectively. The positive 
ETRDIFF shows additional tax avoidance beyond the benchmark tax level associated with the 
international tax rate distribution across host countries. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics Subsamples – ETRDIFF 
  GAAP ETRDIFF CASH ETRDIFF FOREIGN ETRDIFF 
            N Mean           N     Mean   N          Mean 
(1) TOTAL 2,422 0.0179 2,351 0.0623 1,760 0.0502 
(2) HAVEN 626 0.0298 600 0.1013 497 0.0787 
(3) R&D 606 0.0570 588 0.0938 440 0.1274 
(4) INCOME MOBILE = 1 528 0.0556 522 0.0901 481 0.1189 
Notes: Table 1 shows descriptive results for the dependent variables GAAP ETRDIFF, CASH ETRDIFF and FOREIGN  
ETRDIFF for different (sub)samples: (1) Total number of observations; (2) HAVEN in top-75% percentile; (3) R&D intensity 
in top-75% percentile; (4) INCOME MOBILE = 1. 
 
                                                 
48 ASC 740-30-25-3 (formerly APB 23) allows an U.S. multinational to assert that its investment (outside basis) 
in a foreign subsidiary is permanent and those foreign earnings will be indefinitely reinvested, so there is no current 
or deferred incremental U.S. tax liability. 
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Moreover, we employ the data to provide some validation of the ETRDIFF measure. 
Table 1 reports sample means of the ETRDIFF for subsamples that might be particularly tax 
aggressive: (i) firms with tax haven operations in the top-75% percentile, (ii) firms with a R&D 
intensity in the top-75% percentile, and (iii) income mobile firms.49 The additional data clearly 
illustrate that, compared to the total sample, ETRDIFF measures increase if we only consider 
firms with intense tax haven operations, firms with intense R&D activities or income mobile 
firms. The mean GAAP ETRDIFF of U.S. MNEs doubles for firms with intense tax haven usage 
or when firms from income mobile industries are considered. The differences become even 
more apparent for the CASH ETRDIFF and FOREIGN ETRDIFF. For example, the mean value 
of the FOREIGN ETRDIFF computed for firms in income mobile industries is 0.12. The 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF of 0.12 translates into a difference between a firm’s benchmark tax level 
and its FOREIGN ETR of 12 percentage points. The explorative analysis suggests that proxies 
for certain international tax avoidance schemes are associated with higher values of the 
ETRDIFF measure. 
3.3.3 Adjusted Benchmark Tax Levels 
As benchmark tax level for our ETRDIFF measures, we consider the mean of the statutory 
corporate tax rates of all host countries of a firm (𝑆𝑇𝑅). A concern with the arithmetic mean of 
the corporate tax rates across all locations of a MNE is the asymmetric economic relevance of 
locations. Unfortunately, no additional financial information is included in Exhibit 21. As a 
robustness check, we however try to approximate the economic weights of MNEs’ foreign 
subsidiaries. We do so by using statistics on the outward activities of U.S. MNEs provided by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These statistics 
provide information about the sales of U.S. controlled foreign subsidiaries for each host country 
                                                 
49 According to De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014), we classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income 
mobile industries: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). 
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and the number of U.S. subsidiaries located in the respective country.50 We use this data and 
construct a new weighting scheme for the host countries of each individual firm. 𝑆𝑇𝑅 is now 
an average of the host counties’ statutory tax rates weighted by the sales of a typical controlled 
foreign subsidiary as reported in the BEA data.51  
Table 2: Summary Statistics Subsamples – ETRDIFF adjusted 
  GAAP ETRDIFF CASH ETRDIFF FOREIGN ETRDIFF 
 Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean 
(1) TOTAL 2,422 0.0330 2,351 0.0776 1,760 0.0644 
(2) HAVEN 626 0.0460 600 0.1179 497 0.0949 
(3) R&D 606 0.0710 588 0.1078 440 0.1403 
(4) INCOME MOBILE = 1 528 0.0701 522 0.1045 481 0.1322 
Notes: Table 2 shows descriptive results for the dependent variables GAAP ETRDIFF adjusted, CASH ETRDIFF adjusted 
and FOREIGN ETRDIFF adjusted for different (sub)samples: (1) Total number of observations; (2) HAVEN in top-75% 
percentile; (3) R&D intensity in top-75% percentile; (4) INCOME MOBILE = 1. 
 
Table 2 depicts the measures using this alternative weighting scheme for 𝑆𝑇𝑅 when 
computing adjusted ETRDIFF measures. For the U.S. firms, the mean values for the adjusted 
ETRDIFF measures are slightly larger compared to the values computed without any 
adjustment. We conclude that the MNEs in our samples tend to have larger economic activities 
(measured by sales) in high tax countries. Therefore, the arithmetic mean of statutory tax rates 
across all host countries underestimates the benchmark tax level. Accordingly, the values 
reported for the standard definition of the ETRDIFF might still underestimate the aggressive 
part of international tax avoidance to some extent. 
Although the differences between adjusted and unadjusted ETRDIFF measures are small, 
this exercise suggests that more refined data about the relevance of economic activities of 
foreign subsidiaries for the individual firm would be helpful to better infer the amount of 
aggressive international tax avoidance. In Section 4, we therefore also apply the ETRDIFF 
                                                 
50Available for download at http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm. 
51Average domestic sales of a typical U.S. subsidiary is assumed to be 55 % of total sales.                                                                       
cf. http://us.spindices.com/documents/research/research-sp-500-2014-global-sales.pdf?force_download=true 
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measure to the European banking sector, where publicly available CbCR data provide the 
possibility to adjust the benchmark tax rate with respect to the exact geographical operations of 
large European headquartered banks. 
3.3.4 Determinants of Aggressive Tax Avoidance 
In an additional analysis, we use multivariate regressions to further validate the ETRDIFF 
as a measure for the aggressive part of tax avoidance. We evaluate how some established 
proxies for international tax planning strategies affect the ETRDIFF measure of firm i in year 
t. More precisely, we estimate the following OLS regression: 
 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝑀𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑗  + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡            
           (Eq. 2) 
As dependent variable, we evaluate different versions of our ETRDIFF. As control 
variables, we consider firm-specific determinants of tax avoidance that have been widely used 
in previous literature. In particular, we consider SIZE, which is total assets (in logs). The 
variable capital intensity (CAPINT) is the quotient between property, plant and equipment 
(ppeveb) and total assets (at). Additionally, we include the variable LEVERAGE in our analysis, 
which is defined as short-term liabilities (dlc) divided by total assets (at). A description of all 
variables and descriptive statistics are shown in the Appendix. As tax avoidance opportunities 
differ across industries due to different business models (Balakrishnan et al., 2019), we control 
for industry-fixed effects in accordance with the Fama and French classification of 17 different 
industry groups.52 
                                                 
52 Updated industry-classification can be downloaded from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages 
/faculty/ken.french/ Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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Our main focus, however, is on established proxies for international tax planning via the 
use of tax havens and profit shifting. We expect positive effects for the proxies for international 
tax planning activities on the ETRDIFF measures. First, we construct a variable HAVEN, which 
is the number of tax haven countries in which the group has subsidiaries scaled by the total 
number of countries in which the company operates.53 In addition, we include a variable R&D, 
which is defined as R&D expenses scaled by total assets in our analysis54 because firms with a 
large amount of R&D have enhanced opportunities to reallocate profits in low-tax countries 
(Grubert, 2003). Firms in high-tech and pharmaceutical industries (“income mobile industries”) 
have significant intellectual property and products which allow them to implement tax 
avoidance strategies by shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions via transfer-pricing. We 
compute a dummy variable INCOME MOBILE which equals one if the respective industry of 
the parent is supposedly mobile in income. According to De Simone, Mills and Stomberg 
(2014), we classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 
(Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). 
Table 3 depicts the regression results using the GAAP ETRDIFF, CASH ETRDIFF and 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF as dependent variables. Columns (1), (3) and (5) contain variables 
concerning firm characteristics and general tax planning activities. The other columns also 
consider the additional proxy variables for international tax planning activities.  
                                                 
53 The definition of tax haven countries follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Note that tax haven subsidiaries are 
not considered when computing the benchmark tax level used for the ETRDIFF. 
54 We require companies to have non-missing values for all components of the dependent and independent 
variables. However, visual inspection of several Form 10-K filings reveals that many of the missing values in 
Compustat, especially for R&D expenses, should be coded as zero. Therefore, we set missing R&D to zero. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Aggressive Tax Avoidance  
  GAAP ETRDIFF CASH ETRDIFF FOREIGN ETRDIFF 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE 0.0076** 0.0082** 0.0078 0.0078 0.0088 0.0122** 
  (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0058) 
PROFITABILITY -0.0583 -0.0997** 0.1290 0.1160 0.2770*** 0.2730*** 
  (0.0505) (0.0505) (0.0846) (0.0834) (0.0830) (0.0795) 
CAPINT -0.0275 -0.0155 -0.0128 -0.0044 -0.1000*** -0.0736*** 
  (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0265) (0.0246) 
LEVERAGE -0.0682* -0.0592 -0.0505 -0.0637 -0.1700** -0.1390** 
  (0.0406) (0.0412) (0.0498) (0.0524) (0.0804) (0.0705) 
NOL 0.0537*** 0.0529*** 0.0841*** 0.0876*** -0.0166 -0.0120 
  (0.00962) (0.0095) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0193) (0.0191) 
HAVEN   0.0851**  0.1680*** 
 0.2680*** 
    (0.0365)  (0.0496) 
 (0.0635) 
INCOME MOBILE   0.0218*  0.0318** 
 0.0428** 
    (0.0118)  (0.0157) 
 (0.0193) 
R&D   0.3960***  0.1600 
 0.4320*** 
    (0.1170)   (0.1470)   (0.1330) 
Industry-FE       
Year-FE       
N 2,422 2,422 2,351 2,351 1,760 1,760 
R² 0.141 0.185 0.124 0.153 0.176 0.250 
Notes: Table 3 presents results of OLS regressions with the GAAP ETRDIFF in columns (1) – (2), the CASH ETRDIFF in columns (3) – (4) and the FOREIGN ETRDIFF 
in columns (5) – (6) as dependent variables. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. All specifications include a constant. Variables are defined                  
in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.    
 93 
 
First, we take into account the GAAP ETRDIFF in specifications (1) and (2). Across both 
specifications, our analysis shows a positive effect of SIZE on the GAAP ETRDIFF. This result 
refers to the political power theory (Siegfried, 1972). Larger firms have greater resources to 
influence political processes in a tax-efficient manner. Moreover, tax planning activities might 
be associated with economies of scale which leads to a more aggressive tax avoidance behavior. 
Additionally, the dummy variable NOL has a high positive impact on the GAAP ETRDIFF. The 
use of prior operating tax loss carry-forwards reduces firms’ tax payments (Cooper and Knittel, 
2010) while the benchmark tax rate remains constant. The variables PROFITABILITY and 
LEVERAGE only exert a weak and less robust negative influence on the GAAP ETRDIFF, 
whereas CAPINT is not significant at any conventional level. 
The variables for international tax planning activities are associated with significantly 
higher values of GAAP ETRDIFF. Our results in column (2) of table 3 support the expectation 
that the ETRDIFF is significantly higher if a MNE operates in tax haven countries. Compared 
with a firm not having any tax haven activities, our prediction for GAAP ETRDIFF is about 1.9 
percentage points higher for a firm with the sample mean of HAVEN activities (0.2208). 
Recent evidence suggests that multinationals can particularly shift some types of taxable 
profits that are more mobile. Indeed, we find a positive and significant effect of proxy variables 
for income shifting opportunities on the GAAP ETRDIFF. Considering the coefficient 0.396 of 
the variable R&D in column (2), we find that, evaluated at sample mean, R&D intense firms 
have a higher GAAP ETRDIFF of approximately 1.1 percentage points. In columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 3, we also provide additional regressions using the CASH ETRDIFF as dependent 
variable. Again, almost all proxies for international tax planning opportunities have a significant 
positive impact on our measure.  
In specifications (5) and (6) of Table 3, we examine the FOREIGN ETRDIFF as 
dependent variable to focus more on international tax avoidance. Across all specifications, 
PROFITABILITY exerts a strong positive effect on the FOREIGN ETRDIFF. This positive 
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relationship is very reasonable because more profitable firms have more opportunities and 
incentives to reduce tax expenses by engaging in tax avoidance. For instance, widely used 
transfer pricing methods such as the cost plus method, the resale pricing method or the 
transactional net margin method are associated with particular profit-shifting opportunities if 
profitability is abnormally high. CAPINT exerts a negative and significant influence on 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF in all specifications. The negative effect suggests less aggressive tax 
avoidance if a firm has a high level of property, plant and equipment, which is in line with the 
expectation that profit-shifting is more associated with intangibility in assets.  
Moreover, results depicted in column (6) also confirm that the FOREIGN ETRFIFF 
measure is larger in the case of income mobile industries, the use of tax havens and profit-
shifting opportunities associated with R&D. Evaluated at sample means (0.2152), tax havens 
are responsible for an increase in FOREIGN ETRDIFF of 5.8 percentage points. Moreover, 
INCOME MOBILE firms have a FOREIGN ETRDIFF that is 4 percentage points higher than 
firms from other industries. Taking the coefficient of 0.432 for the variable R&D into 
consideration, we receive an additional effect of approximately 2 percentage points on the 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF for a firm with a R&D intensity that is one standard deviation higher. 
Coefficients and inferences for the international tax planning determinants are higher if 
we consider FOREIGN ETRDIFF compared to the GAAP ETRDIFF and CASH ETRDIFF. We 
conclude that in particular the FOREIGN ETRDIFF allows a detailed analysis of the effects of 
enhanced international tax planning activities.  
3.4 Measuring Aggressive Tax Avoidance Using Country-by-Country Reporting Data 
So far, we have considered the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates of all host 
countries of a MNE as the relevant benchmark tax level. However, this is only an approximation 
of the benchmark tax level that is perceived as fair according to the distribution of the firm’s 
real economic activities. It only represents the worldwide tax obligations of a MNE if all its 
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activities are equally distributed across the host countries. In fact, it would be necessary to 
incorporate the scope of real economic activities in all host countries of a MNE in order to 
compute the fair statutory tax liability on a worldwide basis. This way, a firm’s individual 
worldwide benchmark tax level could be constructed as the mean of all statutory tax rates 
weighted by local economic activity. Potential weights for real economic activity could be the 
employment of full-time workers or generated revenues in the respective country. Therefore, 
the information content of a comprehensive CbCR scheme, as demanded by the OECD, 
perfectly complements our ETRDIFF measure. 
3.4.1 Availability of Country-by-Country Reporting Data 
Action point 13 of the BEPS initiative by the OECD leads to the implementation of a 
CbCR obligation for MNEs in the majority of all OECD member states. MNEs with a 
sufficiently high revenue are obliged to disclose key financial information, among others 
revenue, number of employees, profit and income taxes paid, for each jurisdiction in which the 
MNE operates (OECD, 2015). However, this tax transparency initiative is only addressed 
towards tax authorities as the actual reports are not required to be disclosed publicly. This 
regulatory aspect led to substantial criticism (Tax Justice Network, 2014; U.S. Congress 
Members, 2017).  
Contrariwise, the European Commission mandated an independent publicly available 
CbCR for European headquartered multinational banks in order to fight financial opacity in the 
financial sector (European Commission, 2013). Thus, European Banks currently represent the 
only MNEs for which accurate information regarding their geographic economic activity is 
publicly available. In the following, we refine the benchmark tax rate of our measure for large 
multinational European banks where sufficient data exist. Subsequently, we re-examine 
ETRDIFF for these banks.  
96 
3.4.2 Aggressive International Tax Planning: The Case of HSBC 
HSCB, Europe’s largest bank by assets, is headquartered in London and operates in 57 
countries worldwide (HSBC, 2016). For the years 2013-2017, the firm’s medium run GAAP 
ETR shows that the HSBC group had an annual tax expense of 21.2% of its worldwide income.55 
The corporate tax rate in the UK was 20% in 2015, suggesting that HSBC paid more taxes than 
required by UK standards. However, since 2009, the UK tax system is territorial (as most other 
EU countries) and exempts foreign income from taxation in the UK. Consequently, HSBC’s 
generated profits abroad underlie foreign tax regimes. The average statutory tax rate of all 57 
tax-regimes listed in the official Country-by-Country Report 2015 of HSCB is 24.8%, 
suggesting that HSBC paid less than its worldwide fair share of taxes.  
In view of the simplifying assumptions of this approximate benchmark, we further extract 
information regarding HSBC employees in all its countries of operation. We eventually use the 
local number of employees of HSBC in a given country as weight for the country’s tax rate 
when constructing the benchmark tax rate. Only 17.2% of HSBC’s total employees are located 
in the UK and generate 25.2% of the group’s total revenue. Following our logic, the fair tax 
share of HSBC’s worldwide profits should only depend to less than one fifth on the UK 
corporate tax rate when we assume that taxes should be paid where the economic activity – here 
measured by full-time employment – takes place. In total, we find that HSBC’s fair worldwide 
benchmark tax rate should be 28.8% when corporate tax rates are weighted with local employee 
numbers.  
This exercise illustrates that HSBC is actually not paying its fair share of taxes on a 
worldwide level as its GAAP ETR ranges 7.6 percentage points below the average statutory tax 
rate that it faces in different parts of the world – weighted by economic activity. Accordingly, 
                                                 
55 The medium run GAAP ETR equals the amount of total taxes paid for the years 2013-2017 divided by the 
amount of pre-tax income (adjusted for special items) over the five-year period. We chose medium run ETR over 
annual ETR in this section as it produces less volatile values via smoothing. 
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the ETRDIFF of HSBC amounts to 0.076 if we consider an employee weighted statutory tax 
rate as the benchmark. If we would consider the home country tax rate as the benchmark, the 
difference would be only 0.002. 
3.4.3 Aggressive International Tax Planning in the European Banking Sector 
We similarly construct different tax rate benchmarks for the remaining European 
headquartered Global Systematically Important Banks (G-Sibs). Then, we compute their 
ETRDIFF for the year 2015. Figure 1 illustrates the ETRDIFF of nine G-Sibs56 headquartered 
in the EU: 
Figure 1: Aggressive International Tax Planning of European Banks 
 
When using the benchmark adjusted for international economic activity some banks, 
including HSBC, ING Bank and Banco Santander, appear as tax avoiders because their 
worldwide GAAP ETR is lower than the weighted average international tax rates that the banks 
face. Other banks, including Crédit Agricole, BNP Paribas and Groupe BPCE, do not appear as 
tax avoiders when incorporating their economic activity abroad. These banks have subsidiaries 
                                                 
56 In total, 13 EU-headquartered banks were listed as G-Sibs in the year 2015 (Financial Stability Board, 2015). 
However, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland and Unicredit Group accumulated losses in the 
respective years such that no meaningful ETR could be constructed. Thus, they are not included in Figure 1. 
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in numerous countries with lower statutory tax rates than in France and thus for a reason pay 
less taxes relative to their profits than purely domestic French firms do. Moreover, this finding 
is not apparent when comparing those banks’ GAAP ETR to their home country’s statutory tax 
rate. Generally, banks from low-tax countries, such as the UK, appear more tax aggressive and 
banks from high tax countries, such as France, are perceived less tax aggressive when using the 
adjusted benchmark. Nevertheless, there exists variation within the headquarter countries, too: 
While foreign activities explain a substantial share of Crédit Agricole’s and Société Générale’s 
allegedly low tax burden, this is less the case for BNP Paribas and Groupe BPCE.  
Overall, we conclude that the perception of EU banks’ tax avoidance changes 
substantially when the public mind benchmarks the banks’ tax payments against the expected 
tax liability in all countries of operation. Particularly French banks turn out less aggressive and 
UK headquartered banks more aggressive than expected beforehand. According to the 
ETRDIFF measure, HSBC engages by far the most in aggressive international tax planning 
among all examined G-Sibs. Unfortunately, public CbCR data are only available for the 
European banking sector. The assessment of other MNE’s international tax avoidance would 
likely benefit from the access to CbCR data, too. 
3.5 Conclusion 
We have proposed a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax avoidance. 
The ETRDIFF measure describes the differential between the worldwide ETR of a MNE and 
the average of all statutory tax rates imposed on the global subsidiaries of the MNE. 
Accordingly, we characterize a MNE as tax aggressive if its ETR is abnormally low compared 
to a firm’s individual benchmark that would be expected in the absence of any profit shifting 
strategies and additional subsidiaries in tax haven countries. The ETRDIFF measure considers 
that tax levels of MNEs vary in accordance with the variation in statutory tax rates of their host 
countries and isolates only the additional or even aggressive part of international tax avoidance. 
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We have applied our new measure to a sample of U.S. firms listed in the S&P 500 Index. 
We exploit a SEC regulation that requires public U.S. companies to publish a list of their 
significant subsidiaries. This data allows to compute for each firm in the S&P 500 Index the 
average of all statutory corporate tax rates imposed by foreign host countries on the subsidiaries 
of the firm. This way, we construct a firm-specific benchmark tax rate and compare it to the 
ETR of U.S. MNEs. We find significant positive values for the FOREIGN ETRDIFF suggesting 
additional tax avoidance beyond the benchmark tax level of the firms. In an additional analysis, 
we have evaluated whether proxies for tax planning opportunities affect the scope of 
international tax avoidance. Our regression analysis reveals that proxies for tax haven 
operations and opportunities to manipulate transfer prices are associated with significantly 
higher values of ETRDIFF.  
Our findings contribute to the recent debate about base erosion and profit shifting. The 
OECD requests new measures to analyze the scope and the determinants of base erosion and 
profit shifting (OECD, 2014). The methodology proposed in this paper allows to isolate the 
aggressive part of international tax avoidance and to identify important determinants such as 
tax haven usage and opportunities to manipulate transfer prices.  
In additional computations, we have approximated the economic relevance of the foreign 
subsidiaries by sales data taken from FDI statistics and provide adjusted values for our 
ETRDIFF measures. Although the differences between adjusted and unadjusted ETRDIFF 
measures are small, more refined data about the relevance of economic activities of foreign 
subsidiaries for the individual firm is helpful to further improve estimations of the amount of 
aggressive international tax avoidance. Therefore, we exploited the CbCR reports of large 
European headquartered banking groups for the construction of an adequate benchmark tax 
rate, weighted by true economic activity in host countries. While some banks have substantial 
operations in countries with moderate corporate tax rates and consequently pay less taxes (e.g. 
Crédit Agricole), other banking groups manage to pay less taxes globally despite their 
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predominant activities in high tax countries (e.g. HSBC). This exercise shows that our new 
measure can help to understand tax avoidance of MNEs. 
If comprehensive data from a detailed CbCR scheme as discussed by the OECD (2015) 
became publicly available for all industries, the identification of aggressive corporate tax 
planning would be facilitated at large. Consequently, our study also demonstrates how CbCR 
data could be analysed.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
GAAP ETR 
The ratio of total income taxes (txt) to pretax income (pi); the latter adjusted 
for special items (xi). 
GAAP ETRDIFF 𝑆𝑇𝑅 – GAAP ETR   
CASH ETR The ratio of cash taxes paid (txpd) to pretax income (pi). 
CASH ETRDIFF 𝑆𝑇𝑅 – CASH ETR 
FOREIGN ETR 
The ratio of total and deferred foreign income taxes (txfo + txdfo)  to pretax 
foreign income (pifo). 
FOREIGN 
ETRDIFF 
𝑆𝑇𝑅 – FOREIGN ETR 
STR 
Worldwide average of the statutory corporate income tax rates of all 
countries where subsidiaries are located. 
SIZE The natural log of total assets (at). 
PROFITABILITY The ratio of pretax income (pi) to total assets (at). 
CAPINT The ratio of property, plant and equipment (ppeveb) to total assets (at). 
LEV The total debt (dltt + dlc) scaled by total assets (at). 
HAVEN 
Number of tax havens in which the group has subsidiaries scaled by total 
number of countries the company operates in. 
INCOME MOBILE 
Dummy which is one if the SIC Codes of the parent is: 283, 357, 367, 737 
or 738. 
R&D 
The amount of research and development expense (xrd; if missing set to 
zero) scaled by the book value of assets (at). 
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Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Panel A1: U.S. Sample – GAAP ETRDIFF 
U.S. Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
GAAP ETR 2,422 .302812 .1001742 .0005053 .9817883 
𝑆𝑇𝑅 2,422 .3206857 .0366824 .20585 .4159 
GAAP ETRDIFF 2,422 .0178737 .1042004 -.6974849 .3855493 
SIZE 2,422 9,351229 1,327573 6,448.386 13,92941 
PROFITABILITY 2,422 .1133787 .0708528 .0012223 .5242996 
CAPINT 2,422 .4771289 .3539383 .0029962 1,769818 
LEV 2,422 .0427874 .0757203 0 .7142423 
INCOME MOBILE 2,422 .2180017 .4129738 0 1 
R&D 2,422 .0283963 .0425736 0 .2830379 
HAVENS 2,422 .2208277 .1376736 0 .75 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis regarding the GAAP 
ETRDIFF. Variables are defined in Table A1. 
Panel A2: U.S. Sample – Foreign ETRDIFF 
U.S. Sample Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
FOREIGN ETR 1,760 .2615714 .1494751 .0014045 .9837399 
𝑆𝑇𝑅 1,760 .3117356 .0321824 .2400317 .4118 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF 1,760 .0501642 .1529443 -.6899928 .405124 
SIZE 1,760 9.323.095 1.322.681 6.448.386 1.392.866 
PROFITABILITY 1,760 .1046511 .0842599 -.4670951 .4675889 
CAPINT 1,760 .4759077 .3418687 .0044364 1.769.818 
LEV 1,760 .0425033 .0702686 0 .6285961 
INCOME MOBILE 1,760 .2732955 .4457779 0 1 
R&D 1,760 .0366518 .0499038 0 .6798642 
HAVENS 1,760 .2151871 .1186979 0 .75 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis regarding the 
Foreign ETRDIFF. Variables are defined in Table A1. 
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Abstract  
We analyze the effect of mandatory financial transparency on corporate tax avoidance. Capital 
Requirements Directive IV by the European Commission forced multinational banks to publish 
key financial and tax data in the form of Country-by-Country Reporting for the first time in 
history. We use this event as an exogenous shock to the disclosure duties of European banks 
and examine tax expenses around the reform. We find that multinational banks increased their 
tax expense relative to other banks unaffected by the Country-by-Country Reporting mandate. 
Moreover, we find a stronger response of those banks that were particularly exposed to the new 
transparency due to significant activities in tax havens. In additional tests we compare our 
sample of multinational banks to several different control groups from the financial sector and 
other industries.  Our results suggest that Country-by-Country Reporting can serve as an 
additional instrument for policy makers to curb corporate tax avoidance. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Policy makers have struggled to curb tax avoidance of multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
in the last couple decades. Recently, the OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project 
presented additional proposals for novel anti-tax avoidance regulation (OECD, 2015a). 
Traditional anti-avoidance rules commonly subject certain transactions or entities to additional 
taxes or fines under the rationale that punitive damages will prevent firms from egregious forms 
of tax avoidance. However, the effectiveness of regulations like controlled foreign company 
and thin-capitalization rules is questionable because firms can react by using alternative tax 
planning that is not subject to specific legislation. Thus, in recent years, comprehensive tax 
transparency has been discussed as an alternative strategy for combating avoidance. Corporate 
tax transparency rules require the disclosure of key financial data—in particular actual tax 
expenses—and are intended to indirectly curb tax aggressiveness by exerting pressure on CEOs 
and CFOs of MNEs. 
Until now, most tax transparency initiatives have not yet been fully implemented and 
the existing ones don’t make the collected data available to the public. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of tax transparency policy is largely unknown. However, from the reporting 
period of 2014 onwards, a European directive mandated that financial institutions 
headquartered in the European Economic Area (EEA)57 publicly disclose key financial and tax 
information on a country-by-country level. This introduction of mandatory Country-by-
Country Reporting (CbCR) provides a rare opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of 
transparency as an anti-tax avoidance instrument. Accordingly, we use the implementation of 
CbCR as an exogenous shock to disclosure requirements and investigate its effect on the 
worldwide tax expenses of MNEs.58 Several studies show that banks engage in international 
                                                 
57 The EEA comprises all 28 member states of the European Union (EU) and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. 
58 Art. 89 of CRD IV, which refers to CbCR, was a last-minute amendment to the directive and thus is unlikely to 
have been anticipated by the affected companies (E&Y, 2014). 
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profit shifting and other strategies with the intention of saving taxes (Huizinga, Voget and 
Wagner, 2012; Merz and Overesch, 2016; Bouvatier, Capelle-Blancard and Delatte, 2017). We 
compare tax expenses of European multinational banks with tax expenses of other banks and 
firms that were unaffected by the new CbCR-legislation. Overall, our results suggest a 
significant influence of CbCR on the worldwide tax expenses of banks, and thus on their 
corporate tax avoidance behavior. 
The new European CbCR regulation is part of the EU Capital Requirement Directive IV 
(CRD IV) and was one of the first international policy actions involving a CbCR for MNEs at 
that time.59 The implementation of CbCR for multinational banks in Europe stimulated the 
ongoing debate about tax avoidance tremendously as key figures such as effective tax payments 
per country had been under the guise of fiscal secrecy thus far. This newly available information 
has garnered much attention in the media. Headlines of large European newspapers have 
addressed these issues, for example, “French banks rely heavily on tax havens”60 or “Barclays 
in Luxembourg: £593m profits, £4m tax, report reveals”.61 Hence, the introduction of CbCR 
induced a new era in terms of financial transparency to the affected banking institutions (Oxfam 
France, 2014; Tax Justice Network, 2014).  
The focus of our analysis is on the behavioral response of managers to increasing tax 
transparency associated with CbCR-obligations. In particular, we evaluate the effect of one of 
the pioneering CbCR-legislations on corporate tax avoidance of MNEs. We exploit financial 
data from the consolidated accounts of European headquartered banking groups (and other 
control groups) through the Compustat Global database. As dependent variable we deploy 
effective tax rates (ETRs) as measure of worldwide tax expenses divided by worldwide pre-tax 
                                                 
59 The European Commission imposed new disclosure rules for extractive industries in a separate EU directive in 
2013. To our knowledge, this has been the only other supranational legislation at the time, which obliged firms to 
fulfill CbCR duties. 
60 CNBC (16/05/2016), available at: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/16/report-french-banks-rely-heavily-on-tax-
havens.html. 
61 The Guardian (30/03/2015), available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/03/barclays-
luxembourg-profits-tax-report.  
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income of a MNE. ETR represents a well-established measure for worldwide tax payments of 
a firm. A lower ETR indicates reduced corporate tax payments. Thus, we expect the ETRs of 
tax aggressive European banks, which have been obliged to disclose CbCR, to increase relative 
to unaffected banks after CRD IV. 
We start by comparing the ETRs of international European banks and European 
domestic banks to determine the impact of CbCR-obligations, which were exclusively 
established for multinational banks from the 2014 reporting period onwards. We subsequently 
differentiate between banks by activity in European tax havens. This way we measure the 
impact of CbCR on presumably more exposed banks (to the new regulation) in comparison to 
their multinational peers without reprehensible activities in tax havens. Our results suggest that 
European-headquartered multinational banks increased their effective tax levels significantly 
relative to their domestic peers after CbCR entered into force. We find that banks with activities 
in tax havens react the strongest to the reform due to their particular exposure to tax 
transparency.  The ETR of those exposed banks increases by 3.6 percentage points relative to 
other banks without presence in European tax havens. Moreover, comparisons with other 
control groups are undertaken in order to eliminate trends in tax avoidance either in the financial 
sector or commonly for multinational enterprises. Additional analyses reveal that neither U.S. 
multinational banks nor financial sector firms nor manufacturing firms – all unaffected by the 
CbCR regulations - did exhibit a likewise effect.  
Our findings support the view that enforced transparency via CbCR curbed tax 
avoidance of European multinational banks. We contribute to prior literature, which suggests 
that disclosure of additional information about the international firm structure influences the 
scope of international tax avoidance. Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) find significantly lower 
ETRs for firms that abstain from the disclosure of geographic earnings in their financial reports 
after the adoption of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 in 1998. Dyreng, 
Hoopes and Wilde (2016) analyzed public pressure on MNEs in the United Kingdom (UK) to 
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carefully report a complete list of all foreign subsidiaries. The study reveals increasing ETRs 
for UK firms after they were required to reveal additional information. We add to this literature 
by analyzing the impact of the first comprehensive, supranational tax transparency initiative on 
tax avoidance behavior of MNEs. In particular, we investigate whether the exposed content of 
the newly demanded CbCR is powerful enough to reduce incentives for aggressive tax planning. 
In concurrent work Joshi, Outslay and Persson (2018) document changes in profit shifting 
activities of banks over the implementation of CRD IV. However, we remain uncertain on the 
availability of sufficient subsidiary level data and discuss their findings alongside ours in the 
results section. Our analysis suggests that European banks in fact responded to the transparency 
shock. 
 Our results have policy implications. So far, most MNEs are not obliged to disclose a 
CbCR. The OECD decided only to enhance tax transparency towards the tax authorities instead 
of the general public (OECD, 2015b). However, supporters clamor for a publicly disclosed 
CbCR in Europe and the U.S. (Tax Justice Network, 2014; U.S. Congress Members, 2017) or 
for public disclosure of tax returns (Lenter, Shackelford and Slemrod, 2003; Hoopes, Robinson 
and Slemrod, 2018). Currently, European international banks are among the few firms that have 
to provide tax information through public CbCR. Our results suggest that publicly available 
CbCR is associated with less tax avoidance in the European financial sector. Accordingly, our 
results confirm a relationship between publicly available information on international firm 
structures and the scope of international tax avoidance. Consequently, our results support the 
view that tax transparency can be an effective instrument to limit tax avoidance of MNEs. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides institutional 
details on CbCR requirements and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the 
applied research design. Section 4 contains the results of our analysis. We show the robustness 
of our results and dismiss other regulatory changes as alternative explanations in section 5. We 
conclude in section 6. 
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4.2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Country-by-Country Reporting Duties within CRD IV 
The Basel III regulatory framework imposes guidance on capital adequacy, market 
liquidity risk and stress testing of worldwide banks. Furthermore, this framework was devoted 
to address the deficiencies in financial regulations that were revealed during the financial crisis 
of 2007/08 by fortifying the capital requirements of banks (Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, 2010; Cohen and Scatigna, 2015). The European Commission nevertheless 
expanded the scope of the Basel III agreement on prudential requirements for credit institutions 
and investment firms with its capital requirements regulation.62 The legislative package 
comprises Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) and Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013. In CRD IV, 
the European Commission included specific rules for corporate governance and remuneration 
policy linked to risk management and, most important to our purpose, an enhanced transparency 
initiative regarding the international activities of banks and investment funds via mandatory 
CbCR. Banks, that serve as credit  institutions, are now required to publish key financial and 
tax information about the geographical distribution of their business activities and tax 
payments. 
All EEA countries were required to transpose CbCR into domestic law, and most 
member states effectively implemented the directive in the first half of 2014 at the latest (PWC, 
2014). National laws require financially active banks to publish profits and effective tax 
payments per tax jurisdiction since the 2014 financial year (European Commission, 2013a; HM 
Treasury, 2013; E&Y, 2014).63 This implies that the public is able to perform meaningful cross-
country comparisons of key performance indicators using annual reports referring to the period 
of 2014. Consequently, bank managers have to consider the additional transparency of CbCR 
                                                 
62 The Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) accompanies CRD IV (European Commission, 2013b). 
63 CRD IV introduced a tentative version of CbCR excluding profit and tax figures, which was supposed to pave 
the way for the upcoming complete transparency initiative. Those reports referred to the elapsed 2013 fiscal year 
and did not include information regarding profit and tax payments. 
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for their tax planning since 2014. However, banks certainly were urged to adjust their tax 
structures quickly due to the short time frame between the publication of CRD IV legislation 
and its transposition into national law.  
According to Art. 89 of CRD IV, multinational European banks must publish the 
following information, per country: 
a) The name, activities and geographical location of any subsidiary and branch 
b) Turnover 
c) Average number of employees  
d) Profit or loss before tax 
e) Corporate taxes paid 
f) Public subsidies received 
Institutions of scope are defined as entities authorized to act as a credit institution or an 
investment firm. Specifically, European headquartered groups with at least one foreign 
subsidiary must disclose CbCR-Information on the highest group level. We will refer to all 
these institutions as multinational banks. Banks without foreign subsidiaries, which we refer to 
as domestic banks, are not required to publish CbCR. European headquartered financial service 
providers without credit lending activities, as e.g. insurers, do not have to fulfill any CbCR 
duties. International banks that are headquartered outside Europe must disclose CbCR solely 
for their subsidiaries located within Europe. This means, that U.S. multinational banks must 
only provide a very fragmentary CbCR that covers solely their subsidiaries in the EEA. 
For European G-SIBs64, the largest and systematically most relevant banks, Art. 89 
CRD IV includes a special feature: The G-SIBs have already been required to submit profit and 
tax figures confidentially to the European Commission for the 2013 fiscal year. The special 
status of G-SIBs is examined in depth in empirical specifications of the robustness section. 
                                                 
64 Worldwide 29 banks represent Global Systematically Important Banks (G-SIBs) out of which fourteen are 
headquartered in the European Union (Financial Stability Board, 2013). 
116 
In particular, the information on profitability in combination with measures of real 
economic activities (turnover and number of employees) allows to compute financial indicators 
by country such as operating profit margin ( 
𝑑
𝑏
 ) or profit per employee ( 
𝑑
𝑐
 ). Accordingly, this 
information can be used for simple cross-country comparisons. Significant deviations from the 
mean might be perceived as an indication for profit shifting i.e., where profits might be 
artificially inflated and hence shifted from other locations. Moreover, intelligence regarding 
surprisingly low tax payments on a per-country basis can help to identify tax avoidance in 
certain host countries.  This information does not only facilitate the work of tax auditors, it 
makes disproportionate tax patterns easy to grasp and to pass on by the media, as Oxfam France 
(2014) did in its special report on French banks: “Abroad French banks make one third of their 
profits in tax havens while they only represent one fourth of their activity, one fifth of their tax 
and one sixth of their employees”. 
4.2.2 Development of Hypotheses 
The European Commission argues that enhanced transparency is essential in order to 
regain the trust of citizens into the financial sector after the financial crisis (European 
Commission, 2013a). One crucial question on the reasoning behind CbCR is whether it solely 
satisfies the curiosity of citizens or additionally has a real impact on future activities of the 
affected firms through surging pressure from the newly given insights. So far MNEs have been 
required to disclose information about their tax position in their financial accounts. This 
information already can be used to compute measures of effective tax expenses. However, the 
detailed information about the distribution of economic activities, profits and tax payments 
provided by a CbCR allows for the first time an assessment of intra-group profit shifting 
activities with the goal of saving taxes. 
Limited regional disclosure regulations and a lack of cross-border transparency for 
banking groups made financial information regarding their subsidiaries scarce before CRD IV. 
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Available databases as Orbis Bankfocus provide detailed information on the consolidated 
accounts but cover subsidiaries within banking groups utmost fragmentarily.65 Thus it was 
neither possible for regulatory bodies nor for researchers nor the public to examine the extent 
of international profit shifting activities of multinational banks before. In fact, the additional 
information from 2014 onwards can be used to identify anomalies in profit margins as well as 
tax payments across host countries of an MNE. Moreover, international tax avoidance is 
associated with cross-border firm structures (Lewellen and Robinson, 2013). Therefore, 
information about subsidiaries and particularly about activities in tax havens is often perceived 
as evidence for an aggressive tax avoidance strategy.  
The disclosure of detailed information via CbCR might impact banks’ tax avoidance 
behavior if managers and investors anticipate public scrutiny. Additional costs cause the link 
between rising fiscal transparency and tax avoidance: An engagement in tax avoidance 
strategies is not only associated with paying less taxes but also with risks. Activities like tax 
sheltering carry the risk of being detected or suffering a negative reputation for the firm and its 
top management. As a consequence, enhanced tax transparency may increase reputational costs, 
litigation costs and regulatory costs associated with tax avoidance.  
First, reputational damages may occur if customers believe that a bank does not pay its 
fair share of taxes in all of its locations of presence and/ or is engaged in significant activities 
in tax havens. Reputational costs crucially depend on the information available for the 
assessment of a firm’s tax strategy by shareholders, customers or the general public. If a firm 
uses aggressive tax avoidance strategies and fears reputational effects, the firm should benefit 
from less transparency due to the decreasing risk of being detected or suffering a negative 
reputation. Consequently, rising fiscal transparency due to a new CbCR should increase 
                                                 
65 We extracted all available subsidiaries of the HSBC group, Europe’s largest bank by total assets, in Orbis 
Bankfocus for the time before 2013 and solely financial information on subsidiaries in 10 countries turned out 
accessible. By way of contrast HSBC officially incorporates subsidiaries in 57 countries worldwide (HSBC, 2015). 
Langenmayr and Reiter (2017, p.11) lament this shortcoming of the Orbis Bankfocus database, too. 
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reputational costs (Hombach and Sellhorn, 2018). A survey among tax executives of U.S. firms 
suggests that managers are concerned with the reputational effects associated with corporate 
tax planning (Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff, 2014). Hoopes et al. (2018) support this 
view as they detect reactions in tax payments, consumer sentiment and stock prices after 
information from company income tax returns was made publicly accessible in Australia. 
Managers should be less tax aggressive, if they perceive significant reputational costs 
associated with public disclosure regulations. Second, the revealing of sensible information as 
generated profits and paid taxes per jurisdiction may provide tax auditors with additional 
information for a more effective prosecution of international profit shifting. Fiscal authorities 
have access to additional information on the worldwide distribution of profits and might 
intensify their investigations leading to additional tax litigations. Tax audits are often 
characterized by discussions about interpretation of laws and administrative instructions 
between taxpayer and tax-auditors. Transfer pricing disputes serve as important examples. 
Therefore, the bargaining position of a taxpayer in confrontations with tax authorities is likely 
to be deteriorated by the new CbCR. Third, additional disclosure might be associated with 
future regulatory cost: The salience of disproportional profit and tax patterns of certain banks 
between high and low tax jurisdictions could trigger new laws and regulations by governments 
or standard setting institutions.  
Given all this, the expectation of public scrutiny should incentivize bank managers to 
re-allocate profits to the presumable high-tax countries of origin after CbCR became 
mandatory. Due to its large geographical scope of application over all 31 member states of the 
EEA, the new CbCR regulation for European Banks is expected to be very powerful in exerting 
pressure through the creation of financial transparency beyond borders. Consequently, banks 
might engage less in tax avoidance due to public pressure, which they possibly anticipate from 
information published by CbCR. Therefore, we will test the following hypothesis: 
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H1: Banks that have been affected by the implementation of CbCR-duties in 2014 should 
experience increasing effective tax levels relative to unaffected banks or firms.  
From a conceptual perspective the intensity of the transparency shock introduced via 
CbCR depends on the intelligence, which a financial institution is forced to reveal. Tax savings 
from international tax planning crucially depend on tax rate differentials between host 
countries. The existence of significant activities in tax haven countries that impose only low or 
even zero taxes are associated with low ETRs (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Lisowsky, 2010;  
Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b). Therefore, information on subsidiary location, 
particularly on subsidiaries in tax haven countries, is often perceived as evidence for an 
aggressive form of tax avoidance strategy. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that enforced 
transparency has a particular impact if a bank is more exposed to reputational damage or 
litigation effects due to its revealed activities in tax havens. We test this supposition in the 
second hypothesis:  
H2: Banks with activities in tax havens should be more exposed to tax transparency and 
consequently experience a stronger surge in effective tax levels after the reform. 
The expectation of such a behavioral response of managers goes in line with related 
work on CbCR of European resource-extracting companies. Rauter (2017) documents real 
effects on various government payments of European resource extracting firms to hosting 
governments after CbCR became mandatory.66 
Nevertheless, the benefit of additional information to assess international tax avoidance 
is arguable. In particular, MNEs are already obliged to disclose information about their tax 
position in their financial accounts. CbCR provides only new information about the 
geographical distribution of activities and tax payments but does not disclose detailed 
                                                 
66 CbCR in extractive industries was among others motivated by the opaqueness of negotiated contracts between 
corporations and local governments. However, CbCR in the banking sector exclusively serves tax transparency. 
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information about tax planning techniques. Previous literature finds only ambiguous evidence 
for the magnitude of reputational costs if firms were involved in tax shelters as a particular 
aggressive form of tax avoidance (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Gallemore, Maydew and 
Thornock, 2014). Regarding the introduction of mandatory CbCR, findings for the effect on 
firm values are also mixed. While Johannesen and Larsen (2016) find a decrease in firm values 
after the announcement of European CbCR obligations for extractive industries, an event-study 
by Dutt, Ludwig, Nicolay, Vay and Voget (2018) for the announcement of CRD IV doesn’t 
detect any capital market reaction. 
4.3 Data and Research Design  
4.3.1 Data and Sampling 
In order to analyze the impact of CbCR-duties on corporate taxation we exploit 
consolidated financial information on banking groups from the Compustat Global database. In 
a first step, we collect financial data on all available banks headquartered in EEA countries 
from the year 2010 to 2016. We identify 375 such banks within the Compustat Global database. 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Description  Observations 
   European Banks Firm-Years 
Available in Database   375 1,952 
Highest Consolidated Group Level  336 1,748 
Elimination of Cross-Ownership  277 1,440 
Non-Missing Control Variables  207 1,202 
 
Second, we restrict our sample to banks that represent the highest hierarchy level within 
their group structure. We remove all observations with missing financial control variables. We 
pursued a consistent elimination of outlier and non-plausible values at this stage of the sample 
selection.67 We deleted all firm year observations with negative profits and erased the top and 
                                                 
67 Italian-headquartered banks were removed from the sample due to apparently conceptual measurement errors in 
the Compustat Global Database. Despite a statutory tax rate of 27.5%, the average ETR of an Italian bank ranges 
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bottom one percentile of ETR values in the sample. Finally, there remain 207 banks in our 
sample, providing in total 1,202 bank-year observations.  
In a third step, we classify the banks of our sample as multinational or domestic banks. 
The distinction between multinational banks and domestic banks matters as only multinational 
banks are subject to CbCR obligation according to CRD IV. We denote a European bank as a 
multinational (MULTI = 1) if it has at least one subsidiary in another country than the bank 
headquarter is located in.68 Of the 207 firms, 83 are categorized as multinational banks and 124 
banks count as domestic (MULTI = 0).69 A bank is classified as domestic if either all of its 
subsidiaries are located within the same country as the banks headquarter or if the bank does 
not own subsidiaries at all. 
While detailed financial information at the subsidiary or country-level was missing 
before CbCR introduction, information about the existence of subsidiaries was to a certain 
extent available. We gain the information from the Orbis Bankfocus subsidiary database. Given 
the aforementioned fragmentariness of the Orbis Bankfocus database, we augmented and 
validated the data by extensive manual research on the corporate structures of all banks in our 
sample. This additional information was taken from annual reports or other official documents 
disclosed on the official webpages or from trustworthy internet sources on company structures. 
Furthermore, we distinguish multinational banking groups according to their activities 
in tax havens. We designate banks in our sample accordingly with the indicator variable 
EXPOSED, which equals 1 for all banking groups that have at the minimum one subsidiary in 
at least one of the following five European tax havens: Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg and Malta. All five countries can be found in the established tax haven list by 
                                                 
above 50%. The implausibly high Italian ETRs in the Compustat Global database have been previously lamented 
by other scholars. See e.g. Kohlhase and Pierk (2016). 
68 The most minimalistic case of CbCR extends to two countries, as it exemplarily can be observed for the UK 
headquartered Arbuthnot Banking Group, which is active in the UK and Dubai. 
69 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) regularly publishes monitoring results of the implemented 
standards for worldwide banks and refers to an amount of 101 large international and 129 “other” banks within its 
confidential data analysis (Bank for International Settlements, 2016). The number of 83 international banks in our 
EU sample is smaller, but appears fairly justified in terms of selection as we only refer to European banks. 
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Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and are moreover listed as tax havens by the IMF (Reuters, 2008). 
We focused on countries with small population numbers and relatively low GDP figures 
because activities in small tax haven countries are more likely to be perceived as tax 
motivated.70  
We exclusively consider European tax havens because of poor data quality in the Orbis 
Bankfocus database. However, there exists recent evidence by Bouvatier et al. (2017) for 
European banks to have strong preferences for tax havens within geographical Europe, which 
suggests that we pick up a substantial share of banks’ overall tax haven activity in the selected 
five countries. Moreover, it is unlikely that European banks have a subsidiary in overseas tax 
havens like the Bahamas if they are not already engaged in a European one. 
We define the ETR, our dependent variable, as tax expenses divided by pretax income 
and adjust the latter for extraordinary items. In accordance with the accounting literature, we 
use ETR as an ex post measure of tax avoidance (e.g. Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Dyreng, 
Hanlon and Maydew, 2010; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b). Information to compute 
the ETR is taken from the consolidated financial statements of MNEs. The ETR evaluates 
retrospectively the worldwide tax expenses of a firm and therewith indicates the overall level 
of employed tax avoidance. A lower ETR implies higher tax avoidance. A multinational bank 
with a low ETR appears to exercise tax planning activities more effectively compared to its 
peers with higher ETRs (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Our base sample of European banks covers a wide array of member states of the EEA 
and hence delivers an extensive picture of the European banking sector. The largest financial 
centers as London and Frankfurt host the most banking headquarters, which puts the UK and 
                                                 
70 Whereas a country such as the Netherlands is well known for its IP box regime, a bank’s decision to open a 
subsidiary there might be motivated by other factors than tax-related reasons such as the market potential, which 
countries with larger population and GDP numbers typically offer. 
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Germany to the top of our sample in terms of observations. Data availability of banking data in 
Compustat Global limits the representativeness of countries to some extent, but further 
stratification would be difficult to justify given the already small sample size. Therefore, to 
address imbalances among the regional compositions of our subsamples, we introduce country 
specific trends over time in our robustness section. Table A2 in the Appendix provides a country 
snapshot of the headquarters of all multinational banking groups in the sample. 
In accordance with the previous literature in tax accounting we define the ETR as tax 
expenses divided by pretax income that is corrected for extraordinary items. As one control 
variable, we deploy banks’ size (SIZE) measured by the log of total assets because banks that 
differ in size are likely to differ in their possibilities to pursue tax planning (Omer, Molloy and 
Ziebart, 1993). Second, we include bank profitability, represented by the return on equity figure 
(ROE), as more profitable institutions theoretically might encounter lower pressure to engage 
in aggressive tax planning strategies.71 Lastly, we control for the equity ratio of a bank 
(EQUITY) which describes the ratio of a bank’s equity to total assets. The capital structure of a 
bank matters for tax planning as it indirectly proxies financial leverage, which is well known 
for functioning as a tax shield through the deductibility of interest payments (Graham, 2000; 
Andries, Gallemore and Jacob, 2017). Table 2 contains summary statistics on all of our 
variables of interest for multinational and domestic banks. 
                                                 
71 Similarly, one could argue alternatively that profitable banks could engage more easily into tax planning due to 
greater financial resources. For a more detailed analysis of this connection see Thomas and Zhang (2014). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Multinational Banks Domestic Banks 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ETR 467 0.232 0.109 0.003 0.703 737 0.249 0.099 0 0.805 
SIZE 467 17.280 2.904 4.888 21.52 737 14.76 2.169 6.164 19.77 
ROE 467 0.151 0.208 0.008 2.652 737 0.132 0.12 0.001 1.192 
EQUITY 467 0.112 0.135 0.011 0.996 737 0.128 0.111 0.010 0.991 
MULTI 467 1 0 1 1 737 0 0 0 0 
EXPOSED 467 0.486 0.500 0 1 737 0 0 0 0 
EMPLOYEES 396 30,287 53,532 4 295,061 414 3,037 4,636 8 21,121 
Notes: Summary statistics for both banking groups are based on the pooled firm-year observations from 2010 to 2016.  
Certain structural attributes of multinational and domestic banks are apparent in the 
sample: First, internationally active banks are expectedly larger than their domestic peers. This 
finding is captured by differences in scaled total assets and even more emphasized by the 
distinct average numbers of full-time employees. Multinational banks in our sample show an 
ETR of approximately 23.2 percent whereas domestic firms report on average an ETR that is 
1.7 percentage points higher. This finding is in accordance with the expectation that 
internationally orientated firms have enhanced tax planning opportunities.  
 Multinational banks show a slightly higher profitability than domestic banks. This 
pattern is familiar in financial services industries within OECD countries, where substantial 
profits arise from cross border activities (Shehzad, De Haan and Scholtens, 2013). We observe 
an equity ratio of approximately 12 percent for both groups, which accompanies the mandatory 
Basel III capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent.72 Among the multinational banks, the EXPOSED 
variable indicates that every second multinational bank in our sample was to reveal tax-haven 
activities in its CbCR. 
                                                 
72 Basel III sets a fixed threshold for the capital adequacy ratio. This ratio differs from the equity ratio as it involves 
risk weighted total assets. The set minimum capital adequacy ratio (Tier 1) that banks must maintain is 8 percent 
(Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 2010). 
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4.3.3 Methodology 
Our empirical analysis of tax avoidance in the banking sector consists of several 
independent Difference in Differences (DiD) setups with altering control groups in order to test 
hypothesis 1. We begin with the comparison of European multinational and domestic banks. 
We measure the relative change in the ETR between the two groups over time to identify the 
effect of mandatory CbCR. Therefore, we deploy the dummy variable MULTI as a quasi-
treatment in our DiD regression approach:  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑖  + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (Eq. 1) 
The dependent variable is the ETR of bank i in year t. The variable POST is a time 
dummy, which equals 1 from the year in which the full CbCR-regulations have been in place. 
This is the case for the financial years from 2014 to 2016. We include year fixed effects in order 
to correct for annual trends in ETRs. The main coefficient of interest, 𝛽2, measures the relative 
change of multinational bank-ETRs over the CRD IV implementation to the change of domestic 
banks over the same period. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 denotes additional covariates, which are introduced 
into the regression framework to account for other variables associated with effective tax 
payments of banking institutions. Finally, we perform additional regression specifications 
including bank-fixed effects to eliminate omitted variable bias through time-invariant factors.  
We test hypothesis 2 and analyze the heterogeneity in treatment intensity across 
European multinational banks by extending equation (1) with an additional interaction term:  
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ⋯ +  𝛽3  𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑥  𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝐷𝑖 +  𝛽4 𝑀𝑈𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑥 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑂𝑆𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
            
           (Eq. 2) 
We thereby differentiate the treatment effect between multinational banks, which have 
at least one subsidiary in one of the designated tax havens (Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg and Malta) and other multinational banks, that do not. We expect a positive effect, 
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i.e. presumably more exposed international banks should react stronger to the transparency 
shock induced by CbCR.  
Figure 1: Effective Tax Rates over Time 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the development of ETRs over time for all banks with yearly 
observations in our sample. Whereas domestic (circled markers, dashed line) and multinational 
banks (squared markers, dashed line) without particular exposure to tax transparency follow a 
slight general downwards trend in their ETRs from 2010 to 2016, the graph documents an 
increase in effective tax payments for banks, whose activities in tax havens have been exposed 
to public scrutiny ex post CRD IV (squared markers, solid line). We regard the ETRs of exposed 
and remaining multinational banks to share a common trend before CRD IV exclusively. 
Moreover, unexposed multinational ones and national banks appear to follow a largely similar 
trend over most of the sample period. 
Alternative Control Groups 
Domestic and international banks generally offer similar services, face the same 
financial market environment and underlie the same regulatory regime, namely, the Basel 
Committee. However, the business model of domestic banks potentially differs from the 
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concept of their multinational peers. For example, domestic banks may be more focused on 
retail lending and/or be less involved in risky investments.73 Therefore, in additional analyses, 
we consider three additional control groups, which were not subject to CbCR during the 
observed time-period.  
First, we deploy matched large multinational U.S. banking corporations as alternative 
control group. Large U.S. multinational banks are likely to rely on similar business models as 
European ones and possess equally international firm structures. We retrieved information on 
the multinational activity of U.S. banks from the Federal Reserve System’s list of large 
commercial banks (Federal Reserve System, 2017). Second, we consider matched European 
financial service providers outside banking as control firms to check for general trends in the 
financial industry with regard to tax-expenditures. Non-banking financial firms as, for instance, 
insurance companies have been subject to regulatory change by a reform named Solvency II, 
but not yet with regard to tax transparency (European Commission, 2014). Third, we consider 
a control group of matched European corporations from various industries, particularly 
manufacturing industries. This comparison is intended to test whether higher tax payments by 
banks after CRD IV could have also been explained by an upwards trend in the ETR across all 
industries in Europe, that is possibly driven by the BEPS process.  
For each comparison a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) approach is applied. We 
identify matching partners for our international banks with regard to key financial 
characteristics, such that we receive other firms similar to our multinational banks in terms of 
size and/ or profitability. The underlying idea of applying PSM here is to account for 
confounding factors that partly explain structural differences between the European banking 
industry and the control groups. 
                                                 
73 Theoretically, international banks penetrate foreign markets and crowd out domestic players of their routine 
business or alternatively can focus on niche services in the foreign market. Buch and Golder (2001) conclude that 
co-existence between domestic and international banks in most service lines is the case and hence business 
concepts appear comparable.  
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4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 ETR Development in the European Banking Sector 
We begin our investigation by using domestic European banks as control group. Table 
3 contains the corresponding outcome. We always use ETR as dependent variable. Specification 
(1) reports the most concise DiD estimation which solely includes the indicator variable MULTI 
and year fixed effects as control variables. Specification (2) introduces additional control 
variables to the regression and specification (3) adds firm-fixed-effects. The overall DiD-
coefficient of interest is the interaction term MULTI x POST.  
The coefficient is positive and statistically significant in specifications (1) – (3). 
Considering specification (2), the point estimate suggests that banks affected by the CbCR-
regulation experienced an average increase in effective tax levels of 2.5 percentage points 
relative to banks, which remained unaffected by the reform, ceteris paribus. The effect size 
ranges at 2.3 percentage points and is significant when firm fixed effects are introduced in 
column (3). This finding implies, that multinational banks paid substantially more taxes than 
their domestic peers after the reform. Taking an average ETR of 23 percent, the magnitude of 
the coefficient suggests that the overall tax expenditure of an affected banking group increased 
by approximately one tenth in total through CbCR. In particular, the introduction of firm fixed 
effects bolsters our interpretation of the CbCR-reform as the driving force because this model 
eliminates potential bias through time-invariant unobserved factors; this way any constant level 
differences between EU countries regarding taxes are controlled for. 
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Table 3: ETR Comparisons in the European Banking Sector 
VARIABLES Testing H1 Testing H2 Placebo Test (H2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MULTI -0.0230* -0.0122   -0.0109   -0.00532   
  (0.0122) (0.0118)   (0.0136)   (0.0126)   
MULTI x POST 0.0203** 0.0245** 0.0227** 0.0082 0.0045 0.0120 0.0104 
  (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.00998) (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0132) 
MULTI x EXPOSED       0.00085       
        (0.0190)       
MULTI x EXPOSED x POST       0.0332** 0.0361**     
        (0.0169) (0.0168)     
MULTI x LARGE           -0.0169   
            (0.0184)   
MULTI x LARGE x POST           0.0246 0.0235 
            (0.0170) (0.0171) 
SIZE    -0.00283 -0.0125* -0.00339 -0.0105* -0.0022 -0.0101 
    (0.00280) (0.00681) (0.00291) (0.00612) (0.00292) (0.00657) 
ROE   -0.0466* -0.0784* -0.0469* -0.0768* -0.0485* -0.0806** 
    (0.0281) (0.0408) (0.0274) (0.0398) (0.0279) (0.0406) 
EQUITY   -0.0786* -0.0390 -0.0805** -0.0376 -0.0772* -0.0376 
    (0.0406) (0.0623) (0.0405) (0.0612) (0.0408) (0.0616) 
CTR   0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
    -0.00067 -0.0016 -0.00067 -0.0015 -0.00066 -0.0015 
NOL   -0.0426** -0.0369 -0.0425** -0.0363 -0.0425** -0.0367 
    (0.0209) (0.0250) (0.0207) (0.0249) (0.0208) (0.0249) 
Year Fixed Effects       
Firm Fixed Effects           
N 1,204 1,202 1,202 1,202 1,202 1,202 1,202 
Pseudo R2 0.0166 0.230 0.113 0.234 0.144 0.231 0.150 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR. Specifications (1-3) serve the testing of H1 and compare the ETRs of both banking groups over the introduction of CbCR. Specifications 
(4-6) serve the testing of H2, the analysis of particular exposed banks, by introducing an additional interaction term to the regressions. Analogous to (4-6) an alternative placebo 
interaction term is introduced in specification (6-7) to show the distinct effect of exposure to transparency. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by 
firms are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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The covariates in our model affect banks’ tax payments in an anticipated manner: A one 
percentage point increase in the corporate income tax rate (CTR) of a bank’s home country is 
associated with an average increase of roughly 0.5 percentage points in the ETR of the bank. 
Larger and more profitable banks tend to pay slightly less taxes (conditional on cross-border 
activity) than their smaller and less profitable peers. We do not find an association between 
equity ratio and tax payments in our sample. The MULTI-indicator in specification (1) reveals 
a significant negative ETR level difference of 2.3 percentage points for international banks. 
This mirrors the fact that international banks enjoy additional possibilities to reduce their tax 
burden. 
In columns (4) – (5) of Table 3 we test our hypothesis H2. We expect that multinational 
banks with activities in tax havens are particularly exposed to a shock in transparency and 
consequently may show a stronger reaction in their adaption of tax payments. Therefore, we 
insert an additional interaction term MULTI x POST x EXPOSED. The coefficient is positive 
and significant in both specifications. Here - column (5)- we detect an effect of 3.6 percentage 
points. Hence firms with activities in tax havens increased their ETR by 3.6 percentage points 
relative to all other multinational banks over the period. This finding implies twofold: First, 
firms that declare activities in the named tax havens react in a more pronounced manner to 
CbCR-duties than other multinationals, which supports H2. Second, the magnitude of the 
interaction term and the corresponding insignificant coefficient of the MULTI x POST variable 
suggest, that the exposed banks are driving the detected overall effect of column (3). The 
remaining multinational banks do not provide a substantial reaction in tax payments – relative 
to domestic banks. This is in line with the presented concept of surging pressure through 
reputational cost and litigation risk: Banks that are not forced to lay bare any dubious activity, 
should not be urged to adjust their tax planning in the presence of enhanced transparency.  
For presumable reasons, the indicator EXPOSED is positively correlated with the size 
of a bank, as larger banking groups per se possess more subsidiaries and hence are more likely 
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to be present in one of the designated tax haven countries. To not misinterpret the EXPOSED 
indicator as a disguised size proxy, we run a placebo test in specifications (6) - (7) of Table 3: 
The dummy LARGE equals 1 for the largest 38 multinational banks measured in total assets in 
the sample.74 The coefficient of interest MULTI x POST x LARGE is positive but not significant 
and supports our interpretation that truly the fact whether a bank has been subject to critical 
exposure of dubious tax planning in fiscal havens by CbCR, caused the stronger adaptation in 
tax levels. Our results support H2: Banks with activities in tax havens experienced stronger 
transparency pressure through CbCR, which is expressed through higher effective tax levels ex 
post 2014. 
4.4.2 Additional Control Groups  
To strengthen our findings, we present additional comparisons with alternative control 
groups. We assign each European multinational bank to a certain number of alike firms from 
the respective control group in order to compare the development of exposed banks’ tax levels 
to tax planning trends across other industries.75 Given the available pool of matchable firms, 
the PSM criteria were selected in such way, that comparability according to the attributes is 
guaranteed and the number of successfully matched multinational banks is maximized.76 
The subsequent matched sample analysis follows the specification from equation (1) 
while different control groups are introduced in separate samples, illustrated by the panels A, 
B and C. Table 4 contains the corresponding outcome.
                                                 
74 The threshold of 38 is to design a proportionally alike sample split to the exposed/non-exposed differentiation 
among the multinational banks. Taking the median in size as threshold neither entails significant interaction terms. 
75 Only exposed multinational European banks with activities in tax havens are used for the PSM.  
76 Information on the undertaken PSM and for all control groups are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 4: ETR Comparisons beyond the European Banking Sector 
Variables  
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Control Group:                          
U.S. Multinational Banks 
Control Group:                                               
EU Financial Services 
Control Group:                                               
EU Manufacturing Firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EU-Multi-Bank -0.0626*** 0.0051   -0.0139 -0.0285   -0.0284 -0.0835***   
  (0.0173) (0.0226)   (0.0209) (0.0185)   (0.0179) (0.0260)   
EU-Multi-Bank x POST 0.0323* 0.0494* 0.0398* 0.0391** 0.0397** 0.0382** 0.0300* 0.0310* 0.0317** 
  (0.0174) (0.0259) (0.0207) (0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0157) 
SIZE    -0.0009 -0.0078   0.0029 -0.0126   0.0034 -0.0076 
    (0.0031) (0.0092)   (0.0044) (0.0091)   (0.0054) (0.0108) 
ROE   0.0818 -0.182   -0.0472** -0.0552**   -0.0251 -0.0261 
    (0.103) (0.165)   (0.0235) (0.0214)   (0.0184) (0.0273) 
EQUITY   0.0267*** 0.0129*   -0.0585 -0.0920   -0.146*** -0.192* 
    (0.0065) (0.0075)   (0.0564) (0.0885)   (0.0505) (0.100) 
CTR   0.505*** 0.0324   0.0041*** 0.0039   0.0032*** 0.0007 
    (0.166) (0.389)   (0.0015) (0.0038)   (0.0012) (0.0027) 
                    
Matched Control Group         
Year-Fixed Effects         
Firm Fixed Effects               
Number of  EU Banks  15 15 15 35 35 35 34 34 34 
Number of Control Firms  15 15 15 41 41 41 82 82 82 
N 199 184 184 442 439 439 715 713 713 
Adj. R² 0.111 0.230 0.3069 0.035 0.160 0.538 0.004 0.085 0.4417 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR. OLS Regressions are based on three separate sample-panels (A, B and C) with observations ranging from 2010 to 
2016. In each panel a specific number of EU banks is matched to a number of respective control firms over a specific set of control variables. Panel A 
comprises 1:1 matched (total assets in € and return on equity) U.S. Banks and EU Banks. Panel B comprises 1:2 matched (absolute profits in €, total equity 
in €, number of employees) EU banks an EU non-banking financial services providers. Panel C contains 1:3 matched (absolute profits in €, number of 
employees) EU banks and EU manufacturing enterprises. Information on the quality of the undertaking PSM are to be found in Table A3. The constant is 
not reported. Robust standard errors clustered on the firm level and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
 133 
 
Panel A contains a small-scaled matched sample of equally large and profitable U.S. 
and European multinational banks.77 Large U.S. multinational banks appear suitable as they 
undergo similar regulatory actions as their European peers and are likely to be affected by 
likewise business cycles. Specifications (1) - (3) show the corresponding results and deliver a 
similar interpretation to our main analysis: The coefficient of interest is EU Multi Bank x POST. 
The effect is positive which suggests that the observed rise in the ETR after the implementation 
of CbCR for European banks was not experienced in a similar manner by U.S. multinational 
banks. The significance of the coefficient of interest holds when including further controls and 
firm-fixed effects. However overall statistical significance does not exceed the 10 percent level, 
which is partly owed to the small number of observations. Furthermore, it is shown that 
European banks, on average, pay less taxes than their U.S. peers. This difference may originate 
from lower statutory tax rates in Europe and corresponds to findings in previous studies 
(PWC, 2011; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a). The sample size restrains the extensive validity 
of the findings; however together with the first comparison, it supports our interpretation that 
not explicit business cycle conditions for multinational banking groups explain the relative 
surge in ETRs of European multinational banks. 
Columns (4) – (6) refer to a matched sample of European multinational banks and other 
European financial service providers. We consider the alternative control group in order to test 
whether the particular development of the ETR in the banking sector was due to the 
implementation of CbCR and did not result from a general trend in the financial services 
industry. The control group includes mostly insurance and non-banking investment companies. 
Insurers appear among others suitable for our purpose because they have undergone 
                                                 
77 In case of the U.S. control group , the limited number of multinational U.S. banks origins from the list of large 
commercial banks from the FED (Federal Reserve System, 2017), which lists 23 U.S. headquartered banks to have 
subsidiaries abroad and data availability issues from the Compustat Banks Database. A 1:1 nearest neighbor PSM 
approach has been applied over the amount of total assets in € and the return on equity ratio. In total, we compare 
15 European multinational banks with 15 U.S. multinational banks in Panel A. 
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Solvency II, an insurance regulatory regime, passed by the European Commission in June 2014 
– which imposed somewhat similar capital requirements to the BASEL III, but without the 
obligation of CbCR.78  
The results shown in columns (4) – (6) of Table 4 support the established results. The 
main coefficient of interest, EU Multi Bank x POST, turns out to be positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level and is robust to the introduction of firm fixed effects. This finding suggests 
that other financial service providers, which have not been subject to CbCR-duties, did not 
experience a comparable rise in effective tax levels ex post 2014.  Moreover, no systematic 
difference in ETR between banks and insurance companies has been caught by the indicator 
variable EU Multi Bank.  
Panel C contains European multinational banks and matched firms from various 
manufacturing industries, whereby all firms are headquartered in the EU.79 Results of the 
matched sample analysis are shown in columns (7) - (9). The results support the preceding 
findings. The coefficient of interest EU Multi Bank x POST is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level. The magnitude of the coefficients resembles the magnitude of the previous results 
and is robust to the introduction of firm fixed effects. Particularly specification (9) suggests that 
constant heterogeneity neither between industries, nor between individual firms, causes the 
surge of banks’ ETRs relative to the ones of industrial firms. 
Independent comparisons across industries may suffer from structural differences 
among the groups. To curb such criticism, we deployed sector-related industries (financial 
services) and to certain extent, statistically comparable firms (matched firms) as counterfactuals 
                                                 
78 We apply 1:2 nearest neighbor matching and consider absolute profit in €, number of employees and the total 
amount of equity in € when computing the propensity score. The matched sample contains 35 European 
multinational banks and 41 other European financial firms. 
79 A 1:3 nearest neighbor matching was applied over the number of employees and absolute profit in € made in 
order to construct a group of firms that is similar to banks in terms of size and absolute profitability before the 
implementation of CbCR. The matching procedure results in 34 multinational banks and 82 industry firms in 
Panel C. 
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for multinational banks from Europe. We do not observe any likewise increase in effective tax 
levels for non-banking institutions post CRD IV. The concurrence of our comparisons within 
and beyond the European banking sector suggests that the increase in the effective tax levels of 
multinational banks since 2014 is associated with the implementation of the CbCR obligation. 
4.4.3 Insights from the Disclosed Reports 
While our findings suggest an increase in ETRs of European banks after CbCR 
introduction, additional analysis of certain tax avoidance schemes at the subsidiary level could 
further support the view that banks have reduced their tax avoidance behavior. Prior CRD IV, 
no comprehensive financial data on banks’ subsidiaries exist on a representative basis. Thus we 
argue that the introduction of CbCR provides new information that was not available to the 
public beforehand.  
As a consequence, the difficulty remains to closely observe changes in reported profits 
or certain tax avoidance structures on a host country basis before and after the reform due to 
the lack of data before 2014. Joshi et al. (2018) inspect the impact of the CRD IV reform on the 
profit shifting activities of banks and find a substantial decrease in the profit shifting activities 
of financial subsidiaries after the reform. However, the authors claim that the amount of profits 
shifted through non-banking subsidiaries could have increased at the same time, which 
supposedly keeps overall tax avoidance high.80 We are skeptical on the availability of sufficient 
data on the subsidiary level in existing databases to perform representative analyses on profit 
shifting channels of banks. As mentioned before, the Orbis Bankfocus database offers the most 
comprehensive data on bank subsidiaries worldwide but – from our and others’ experience 
                                                 
80 Potential reasons for the different documentation of aggregate tax avoidance in the banking sector might origin 
from variations in the applied research design and likely from distinct coverage of financial firms between the 
Compustat Global and the Orbis Bankfocus database. 
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(Langenmayr and Reiter (2017, p.11) - is far from full coverage of entire groups nor suitable 
for aggregations on the country level (see our discussion in section 2.2). 
In order to shed light on the underlying mechanisms behind the increase in worldwide 
tax payments of exposed banks, we extract information from the actual Country-by-Country-
Reports: We collected the publicly available reports of all available EEA-headquartered G-
SIBs81 for the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 and analyzed patterns of local profitability over time. 
Figure 2 describes the average profit per worker in the G-SIB’s respective headquarter-country 
alongside with Ireland and Luxembourg: 
Figure 2: G-SIBs’ Profitability in Selected Countries over Time 
 
Figure 2 displays a strikingly diverse image of per-worker-productivity between both 
Ireland and Luxembourg and other countries: In the respective banks’ country of incorporation 
one worker can be assigned to an average corporate profit of 44 K € in 2014, while at the same 
time the average G-SIB employee in Ireland is linked to 560 K €, which still appears moderate 
in contrast to a stunning average 2.6 m. € of pre-tax-profit per employee in Luxembourg. These 
obvious distortions in local profit accumulation found their way into European newspaper 
                                                 
81 BBVA and Standard One Bank were dismissed from the subsample due to permanent losses in their country of 
incorporation. All but one of the eleven banks possess subsidiaries in both Luxembourg and Ireland. 
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headlines and quickly reached the public mind. Moreover, the CbCR data show a trend in tax 
haven profitability over time since the implementation of CRD IV: The per-worker-profitability 
in Ireland and Luxembourg diminished over the succeeding years by a substantial amount. This 
might suggest an underlying intention by banks’ managers to paint a less conspicuous picture 
of their geographical profit allocation over time. It could indicate that reallocations of profits 
from tax havens to high-tax-countries might have resulted in higher overall ETRs of the 
observed banks. For the named eleven banks we document an average ETR increase of 3.1 
percentage points in our sample over a three-year window around the reform. 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
4.5.1 Variations in Sample Design 
In additional analyses standard placebo and other robustness checks of the applied 
statistics are undertaken. For each model specification we present only the coefficient of interest 
MULTI x POST. Table 5 contains the corresponding outcomes. 
We implement altering timings of the treatment before and after the actual 
implementation of the regulation in 2014 in order to examine the exact timing of the observed 
effect (specifications (A1) - (A3) of Table 5). We find no significant coefficient for a placebo-
early treatment in the interim period of 2013 (specifications (A2)). However, the treatment 
effect remains significant if we remove this year (specification (A1)) or start belated treatment 
in 2015 (specifications (A3)).82 This implies threefold: First, the disclosure duty of CbCR for 
annual reports of 2014 affected the effective tax levels of consolidated banking groups 
positively, which could not be observed in a likewise manner before the reform. Second, the 
fact that the exclusion of the interim treatment years 2013/14 does not alter our findings, 
suggests that banks did not only adapt their tax payments in the short run, but experienced 
                                                 
82 The alternative removal of the treatment year 2014 does not alter our finding, too. 
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longer lasting pressure through CbCR. Last, belated treatment from the year 2015 onwards 
yields a significant treatment effect. One possible reasoning behind this could be that – 
analogous to the second point - the banks’ response to the transparency shock required some 
time (corresponding to the development of local profitability displayed in Figure 2). The 
observed adaptation in tax planning appears to be a gradual process over the post-CRD IV 
years. 
Table 5: Alternative Sample Designs 
Sample: EU Multinational and EU Domestic Banks  
Description of Robustness Specification MULTI x POST 
(A1) Elimination of Interim Stage (2013) 
0.0228* 
(0.0116) 
(A2) Early Treatment in 2013 
0.0172 
(0.0109) 
(A3) Late Treatment in 2015 
0.0275** 
(0.0103) 
(A4) 
Large Sample including Financial 
Crisis (2007 - 2016) 
0.0223** 
(0.00984) 
(A5) 
Further ETR Outlier Elimination                                 
(top & bottom 5% in ETR) 
0.0249** 
(0.00872) 
(A6) 
Reduced - perfectly balanced - 
Subsample  
0.0321*** 
(0.0101) 
(A7) 
Negative Profit Observations remain 
in the sample 
0.00193* 
(0.0124) 
(A8) G-SIBs Interim Treatment in 2013 
0.0226** 
(0.00966) 
(A9) Including Country-Year Fixed Effects 
0.0269* 
(0.0138) 
Year Fixed Effects 
Controls  
Firm Fixed Effects 
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR. OLS Regressions are based on the sample of EU 
multinational and EU domestic banks from 2010 to 2016, as used in table 3. Exceptionally 
the specification A4 extends the sample to the time-period from 2007 to 2016. The 
regression model resembles specification (3) of table 3, including control variables and 
firm-fixed effects. The interaction terms refer to the DiD coefficient of interest in the 
respective regression captured by the interaction term of treatment and post-treatment 
period. The coefficients of other control variables and the constant are not reported. 
Robust standard errors clustered on the firm level and are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** show significance at the level of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
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Moreover, we run several robustness tests on different samples altering in size 
(specifications (A4) - (A7)).  First, we include the years 2007 – 2009 and thus ingest the 
financial crisis time-period. Second, we run our initial setup on the sample excluding outlier 
banks with regard to ETR values.83 Third, we use a reduced, fully balanced panel sample for 
the original estimation.84 Fourth, we repeat the analysis on the baseline sample including 
negative profit observations (specification (A7)), which have been eliminated in the original 
sample selection process. The tests on modified sample sizes indicate that the detected results 
are robust to changes in the sample composition and the estimation strategy. Including the years 
of the financial crisis in the sample does not affect the estimates in a notable manner. The same 
is true for the application of smaller subsamples: Neither using a perfectly balanced sample nor 
the exclusion of outliers in the ETR triggers changes in the coefficient of interest. 
Subsequently we examine the role of G-SIBs that have been obliged to report their tax 
data confidentially to the European Commission one year before CbCR became mandatory. We 
respect their early CbCR duty in 2013 in specification (A8). The early treatment of G-SIBs in 
2013 does not turn out to be a major driving force, either. 
Lastly, we introduce country-year fixed effects into our original regressions in order to 
account for potential national trends and/ or legislative changes and/or imbalances in country 
coverage in our sample (specification (A9). Introducing country-specific-trends over time even 
increases the magnitude of the DiD-coefficient.  
Given all the above, the detected surge in effective tax levels of multinational banks 
over their domestic peers in the European banking industry appears robust to several variations 
in our research design.  
                                                 
83 Outlier banks are defined as the bottom and top fifth percentile in ETR values. Hence in total 10% of banks in 
the sample are – additionally to the original elimination of outliers- truncated for this specification. 
84 The reduced fully balanced sample contains 692 observations over the 2010 to 2016 period. 
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4.5.2 Disentangling the effect of CbCR from CRD IV  
Subsequently, we address concerns regarding the interfering influences of other 
regulatory changes that accompanied CbCR (Art. 89) within CRD IV: The new standard 
minimum capital adequacy rate (Art. 129), new liquidity requirements (Art. 105) and revised 
corporate governance rules (Art. 90 – 96) for banking groups represent the most pertinent ones. 
In order to avoid a misinterpretation of our identified effect, we analyze whether ETRs of 
discernibly different banks with regard to size, profitability and equity equipment developed 
differently over the implementation of CRD IV.  
For this purpose, we again install placebo-treatments: we categorize banks as placebo-
treated according to their above/below-median attribute in the respective characteristic in the 
year before the reform. In specification (B1) of Table 6, we compare the change in effective tax 
payments of large relative to small European banks over the enactment of CRD IV. Likewise, 
we compare more profitable to less profitable banks in specification (B2) and stronger 
financially leveraged to less leveraged banks in specification (B3). Despite a certain correlation 
among the applied criteria, the presented setups provide widely diverging treatment group 
constellations of banks, containing both multinational and domestic ones. If our interpretation 
holds, we should not observe an effect from the placebo treatments on the ETR. Table 6 contains 
the coefficients of interest to the designated placebo-identification strategies, analogous to the 
empirical models from our main analysis: 
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Table 6: CRD IV Placebo Treatment Groups 
Sample: EU Multinational and EU Domestic Banks  
Description of Robustness Specification Coefficient of Interest  DiD Interaction Term 
(B1) 
Placebo: Critical Size as        
Treatment Classification 
0.0120 
LARGE x POST 
(0.010) 
(B2) 
Placebo: Critical Profitability as 
Treatment Classification 
0.0110 
PROFITABLE x POST  
(0.0099) 
(B3) 
Placebo: Critical Equity Share as 
Treatment Classification 
-0.0147 
STRONG EQUITY x POST 
(0.0094) 
Year Fixed Effects  
Controls   
Firm Fixed Effects  
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR. OLS Regressions are based on the sample of EU multinational and EU 
domestic banks from 2010 to 2016. The regression model resembles specification (3) of Table 3, including control 
variables and firm-fixed effects. The interaction terms refer to the DiD coefficient of interest in the respective 
regression captured by the interaction term of treatment and post-treatment period. The coefficients of other control 
variables and the constant are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered on the firm level and are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
No placebo-treatment delivers a statistically significant coefficient of interest. This 
means, that we only observe – in relative terms - higher post-reform effective tax payments for 
international banks, but not for larger, more profitable or less leveraged ones. Given this, we 
are confident that exclusively CbCR-duty explains this surge in tax payments, whereas other 
regulatory implementations over the course of Basel III doesn’t. 
4.6 Conclusion  
The European Commission implemented a pioneering CbCR regulation in 2014 with 
the goal of fighting financial opacity and restoring the trust of society and stakeholders in the 
European banking sector (European Commission, 2014b). While it is hard to answer the 
question of whether trust was restored, we investigate whether the new regulation exercised 
sufficient pressure on CEOs and CFOs such that it curbed international tax planning. We 
analyzed the impact of the tax transparency shock on banks’ tax avoidance behavior by 
evaluating their effective tax rates both before and after the mandatory disclosure of CbCR. 
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Our results suggest that European multinational banks experienced a significant increase 
in their effective tax levels after the regulation, relative to unaffected banks. In particular, we 
find that the multinational banks, which are most exposed to the newly demanded transparency 
through the revelation of their activities in tax havens, reacted the strongest to the mandatory 
disclosure of CbCR. Banks with activities in tax havens increased their ETR by 3.6 percentage 
points relative to the other banks in our sample. In additional comparisons, we checked our 
results against trends in corporate tax avoidance, both in the financial sector and across other 
industries. This further analysis reveals a response only in the European banking sector. We 
also dismiss other regulatory influences embedded in the Basel III framework as alternative 
explanations. Ultimately, our results suggest that European multinational banks responded to 
the new transparency and did not simply follow a general trend in the financial sector or in 
international tax avoidance.  
This study contributes to the recent debate about financial transparency as a potential 
means to limit the tax avoidance of MNEs. From our analysis, we conclude that tax avoidance 
behavior of managers and the scope of public disclosure are related. Our findings suggest that 
CbCR can be an additional effective instrument for policy makers to curb cross-border 
corporate tax planning. 
However, one limitation of our study is that we are unable to clearly establish how 
transparency affects tax planning behavior. We discuss three potential channels for the observed 
effect. While we suspect the impending litigation-costs imposed by better-informed tax auditors 
to deliver the most incentives for company executives to react, the outcome could also result 
from increased reputational or regulatory cost of corporate tax planning. The examination of 
the distinct mechanisms remains a challenge for future research. 
  
 143 
 
Appendix 
Table A1: Variable Definitions 
CTR 
Corporate Income Tax Rate of a firm’s home country 
EMPLOYEES 
Number of a firm’s full-time employees 
EQUITY 
Ratio of a firm’s equity over total assets  
ETR 
GAAP Effective Tax Rate of a firm, i.e. income taxes divided by pretax income, which 
was corrected for extraordinary items 
EXPOSED 
Indicator variable, which equals one for all exposed banks that possess subsidiaries in 
at least one of the following five EEA Tax Havens: Cyprus, Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Malta 
LARGE 
Indicator variable, which equals one for firms that rank above the median value of Size 
in the respective sample 
MULTI/                 
EU MULTI BANK 
Indicator variable, which equals one for EEA-headquartered banks that possess at least 
one subsidiary in another country 
NOL 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm reported negative earnings in the prior 
financial year  
POST 
Indicator variable, which equals one for the year of treatment and following years 
PROFIT 
A firms annual profit in millions of € 
PROFITABLE 
Indicator variable, which equals one for firms that rank above the median value of 
ROE in the respective sample 
ROE 
Return on Equity i.e. pretax income divided by total assets 
SIZE 
Size of a Firm, i.e. logarithm of total assets 
STRONG EQUITY 
Indicator variable, which equals one for firms that rank above the median value of 
Equity Ratio in the respective sample 
TOTAL ASSETS 
Total Assets of a firm in billions of € 
TOTAL EQUITY  
A firms equity in billions of € 
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Table A2: Multinational Bank-Headquarter Locations by Country 
  EU Multinational Banks 
  # of Banks % of Banks 
Austria 6 7.2% 
Belgium 2 2.4% 
Bulgaria 2 2.4% 
Croatia 1 1.2% 
Cyprus 2 2.4% 
Denmark 5 6.0% 
Finland 2 2.4% 
France 6 7.2% 
Germany 13 15.7% 
Hungary 1 1.2% 
Iceland 1 1.2% 
Latvia 1 1.2% 
Liechtenstein 2 2.4% 
Netherlands 3 3.6% 
Norway 2 2.4% 
Poland 2 2.4% 
Portugal 1 1.2% 
Slovenia 1 1.2% 
Spain 4 4.8% 
Sweden 7 8.4% 
United Kingdom 19 22.9% 
Total 83 100.0% 
The baseline sample contains 83 multinational banks with their 
headquarters in the EEA. In total, the sample covers 21 of all 31 EEA 
countries. 
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Table A3: Propensity Score Matching Quality 
Panel A: Matching EU Multinational Banks & US Multinational Banks       
Nearest  
    Neighbor  
    1:1 
  Mean Bias t-test 
N EU Multi Banks US Multi Banks (in %) t p>t 
Total Assets (bn. €) 199 289.21 271.36 3.7 0.10 0.92 
ROE 199 0.1513 0.1682 -13.5 -0.63 0.53 
Panel B: Matching EU Multinational Banks & EU Financial Service Providers  
Nearest  
    Neighbor  
    1:2 
  Mean Bias t-test 
N EU Multi Banks EU Fin. Services (in %) t p>t 
Profit (m. €) 442 2,387 2,033 14.5 0.50 0.62 
Total Equity (bn. €) 442 21.470  18.321  16.2 0.53 0.60 
Employees 402 48,313  33,251  32.9 1.10 0.28 
Panel C: Matching EU Multinational Banks & EU Manufacturing Ind.     
Nearest  
    Neighbor  
    1:3 
  Mean Bias t-test 
N EU Multi Banks EU Manufacturing (in %) t p>t 
Profit (m. €) 715 1.595 2.005 0.3 0.02 0.98 
Employees 692 40,732  73,187  -56.8 -1.60 0.11 
 
Notes on the performed PSM-Methodology: 
Table A3 shows the matched samples A, B and C, used in Table 4, and their respective attributes after PSM was applied. 
For each panel we show the number of nearest neighbor matched firms, the variables of interest, the number of 
observations and most importantly the attribute-means for both groups, which should not provide a statistically 
significant difference (t-tests). The bias in mean values is expressed in percentage of the EU multinational banks’ mean. 
In Panel A we apply 1:1 nearest neighbor PSM approach over the amount of total assets in € and the return on equity 
ratio. In total, Panel A contains 15 European multinational banks with 15 U.S. multinational banks. Observations are 
from the period 2010-2016. In Panel B we apply a 1:2 nearest neighbor matching over the criteria absolute profit in €, 
number of employees and the total amount of equity in € in order to compute the propensity score. Panel B contains 35 
European multinational banks and 41 other European financial firms. Observations are from the period 2010-2016. In 
Panel C we apply a 1:3 nearest neighbor matching approach over the number of employees and absolute profit in €. 
The matching procedure leads to 34 multinational banks and 82 industry firms in Panel C. Observations are from the 
period 2010-2016. Standard caliper values are set to 0.03 for all matching procedures, which is in accordance with 
existing literature on the methodology (Austin, 2011; Lunt, 2014; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Matching procedures 
in Panel B and C allowed for replacement in the pool of firms. Replacement in Panel A was not feasible due to the low 
number of available multinational U.S. banks. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis aims at a better understanding of corporate tax avoidance, its empirical 
measurement and the evaluation of tools for policymakers in the global combat against it. The 
reliable detection and measurement of corporate tax planning strategies is indispensable for the 
design of targeted regulatory actions. Thus, the insights from this thesis hopefully contribute to 
the ongoing debate on the measurement of corporate tax avoidance and potential means to 
curb it. 
Chapter 2 addresses the question whether net operating loss (NOL) observations can be 
implemented in the measurement of corporate tax avoidance and how the handling of losses 
affects the measurement outcome. It is demonstrated that NOLs can systematically be included 
in the analysis but only under certain restrictions. Only, if researchers control for the 
confounding effect of firm-profitability and heterogeneous characteristics of non-prospering 
firms, losses can meaningfully be implemented in the analysis. When researchers decide to 
remove NOLs from their sample, they should be aware of misleading tax expenses before and 
after loss-years that remain in the sample and do not signal tax planning. Eventually, it is shown 
that the loss-structure in the data partly conceals the true development of U.S. domestic firms’ 
corporate tax planning. Thus, tax researchers must pay close attention to NOLs regardless of 
whether they include them in the analysis or not. 
Chapter 3 proposes a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax avoidance 
of multinational enterprises (MNEs). MNEs pay their taxes in all countries of operation and 
consequently face a spectrum of different statutory tax rates. Thus, we propose a measure of 
international tax avoidance that isolates more aggressive international tax planning from the 
influence of moderate tax rates in host countries. When applying the new measure it turns out 
that multinational U.S. firms systematically engage in aggressive tax planning that goes beyond 
the mere benefitting from moderate corporate tax rates. Furthermore, aggressive international 
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tax avoidance is strongly associated with tax haven operations and enhanced opportunities to 
manipulate transfer prices. Lastly, we exploit data from a pioneering Country-by-Country 
Reporting (CbCR) initiative in the European financial sector and refine our measure with details 
on geographical corporate activities. This way we revise the perception of multinational banks’ 
tax aggressiveness and demonstrate how useful tax transparency data can be, if made available 
to the public. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the effectives of tax transparency as a policy tool against 
international corporate tax avoidance. For this purpose, we examine how the aforementioned 
tax transparency initiative in the European banking sector affected the scope of banks’ 
aggressive tax planning. The Capital Requirements Directive IV from 2013 by the European 
Commission forced multinational banks to publish key financial and tax data in the form of 
CbCR for the first time in history. Our results suggest that European multinational banks 
experienced a significant increase in their effective tax levels after the regulation, relative to 
unaffected banks. In particular, we find that the multinational banks, which are most exposed 
to the newly demanded transparency through the revelation of their activities in tax havens, 
reacted the strongest to the mandatory disclosure of CbCR. Thus, CbCR appears to be an 
additional effective instrument for policy makers to curb cross-border corporate tax planning. 
 In conclusion, the precise empirical measurement of tax avoidance is intricate but 
possible and necessary. Tax researchers must pay attention to the underlying loss-structure in 
the data and incorporate information on international operations to correctly assess the extent 
of aggressive tax planning. Only on basis of reliable information policy makers can make 
effective decisions and, consequently, ensure the collection of public revenues. Among several 
other current initiatives, enhanced tax transparency appears to be one promising anti-avoidance 
legislation.   
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